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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is composed of three essays which evaluate financial strategies used to 
manage cash flows and the broader working capital management process in local governments. 
The objective of this dissertation is to address unresolved questions in the literature regarding the 
use of short-term financial resources to improve a government’s internal operating process and 
successfully navigate challenging fiscal environments. Together, the three essays contribute to 
our understanding of cash flow management strategies and the consequences of their 
implementation in United States local governments.  
The first essay, in Chapter 2, evaluates the motivating factors that encourage managers to 
use an external financing source, short-term debt. This research, conducted in collaboration with 
Professor Sharon N. Kioko, is the first empirical investigation of the factors that promote short-
term debt use by a wide range of local governments. It is hypothesized that managers can issue 
short-term debt as one financial strategy to reduce financial uncertainty from the timing of cash 
receipts, expenditure flexibility, and favorable long-term debt market conditions. On the basis of 
data examined between 1996 and 2016 from a heterogeneous sample of New York general 
purpose governments, evidence suggests that fewer cash assets, a declining prior year budget 
surplus, higher proportions of federal aid, increases in salary and wages expenditures, more 
capital spending, as well as more use of long-term debt for bridge financing increase the 
likelihood of using short-term debt. These results, in turn, imply that managers need to be 
responsive to changes in the composition of short-term assets and revenues, and understand the 
cash flow implications of changes in operations, revenue projections, and budgetary spending 
flexibility. These findings both add to our knowledge of the factors that influence the use of one 
 
 
external source of financing as well as motivate curiosity about alternative strategies used by 
managers.  
The second essay, in Chapter 3, extends our knowledge by evaluating various financial 
strategies that rely on internal resources and external sources of financing used throughout the 
working capital management process. Strategies that rely on internal resources (e.g., unrestricted 
cash, savings, interfund borrowing, interfund transfers, and delaying payments) and external 
sources of financing (e.g., speeding up collections of receivables, accessing a line of credit, 
direct lending, and issuing short-term debt) are used to mitigate cash deficits and promote 
sustained operations. In this first examination of the preference and use of public working capital 
management strategies, it is asserted that managers have a pecking order, or preference ranking, 
for strategies that use internal resources before external sources of financing. Using a 2016 
survey of financial managers in New York local governments, findings suggest managers have a 
preference ranking for reducing unrestricted cash before delaying payments, speeding up the 
collections of receivables, issuing short-term debt, and not taking any action to mitigate cash 
flow uncertainty. Managers most often implement strategies that combine the use of unrestricted 
cash and short-term debt. Yet, rule-based policies and operating procedures regarding these 
resources lack sufficient development. Ultimately, a more complete understanding of financial 
strategies used for public working capital management is advanced. However, the extent to 
which these strategies can be impacted by the broader economic and fiscal environment can be 
explored in future research.  
The third essay, in Chapter 4, asserts that the slack resource of excess taxing capacity 
influences the use of short-term resources. Specifically, this study systematically examines if 
excess taxing capacity (the difference between the levy limit and selected property tax level 
 
 
subject to the limit) impacts General Fund unrestricted cash and short-term borrowing. Using 
panel data from New York local governments between 1996 and 2016, I find suggestive 
evidence managers are more likely to reduce cash holdings and engage in short-term borrowing 
when excess taxing capacity increases. The implications of these findings are that managers 
likely leverage their internal cash and short-term borrowing capacity to accumulate external 
slack of their property taxing authority. Local government managers, therefore, are being prudent 
to not hoard cash and borrow in the short-term instead of continually utilizing more of their 
taxing authority. Overall, the findings represent an important addition to our knowledge of how a 
more visible slack resource, excess taxing capacity, influences the use of slack resources that are 
exclusively within the discretion of government managers, short-term resources.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction   
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1.0 Introduction to the Essays 
 
Cash flow management – the development of procedures that accelerate cash receipts 
(inflows) and control cash disbursements (outflows) to keep cash readily available – is necessary 
to sustain governmental operations. Public financial managers seek to maintain a favorable cash 
position in which outflows are greater than inflows, and thus excess cash is available. Prior 
research suggest policies should be established to invest idle cash to minimize exposure to risk 
while maximizing the potential investment earnings (Johnson & Mikesell, 2003; Khan, 1996; 
Khan & Hildreth, 2003; Larson, 2004; Lienert, 2009; Peng, 2013). Yet, forecasted estimates of 
cash inflows and outflows can deviate from projections due to unanticipated variations in 
economic conditions and emergencies. Managers may enact several strategic actions to maintain 
liquidity, however, the extent of use of alternative strategies is underdeveloped. This reality 
motivates understanding financial strategies used and implemented to manage cash flows of 
continual importance to public administration scholarship and practice.  
Treating this imperative, this dissertation presents three essays on the management of 
cash flows. The unifying theme of the essays is their concern for the practice of strategic 
planning to implement strategies: how managers anticipate use of strategies, evaluate the 
consequences of their use, and tradeoff alternative courses of action. Each essay tests theoretical 
arguments of how local government characteristics and contexts shape managerial practices to 
engage in using a financial strategy.  
 The first essay, in collaboration with Professor Sharon Kioko, develops an expanded 
understanding of a local government’s engagement in the short-term debt market to maintain 
liquidity – that is a government’s ability to manage cash flows over the budget period, with 
minimal loss in value. At its core, the essay argues that local governments with more non-cash 
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assets are motivated to access the external short-term debt market. Moreover, governments that 
issued short-term debt in the past, report budget shortfalls in multiple-years, have more 
dependence on unpredictable external sources of revenue such as federal aid might be more 
likely to engage in short-term debt use. Managers who incur greater non-discretionary 
expenditures to maintain liquidity, may be more likely to issue short-term debt. The timing of the 
long-term debt market can also be a factor to encourage more short-term debt use.  
New York county, city, town, and village governments between 1996 and 2016 are used 
to test which predictive factors encourage the use of short-term debt. Considering that the 
decision to issue short-term debt involves a two-part decision-making process, a linear hurdle 
model is used to test both the selection into issuing short-term debt and the decision to issue a 
larger amount of short-term debt. An instrumental variable tobit model is also presented for 
comparison to this two-part model. Findings indicate the likelihood of issuing external short-
term debt is increased by having a greater extent of non-cash assets, reductions in prior year 
surplus, more dependence on federal aid and less dependence on state aid. Furthermore, less 
flexibility in employee salary expenses, more spending on capital and equipment, and more 
issuance of long-term debt motivate short-term debt use. Local government managers can 
incorporate into their strategic planning the use of short-term debt when the indicated factors are 
present. The essay adds value by focusing on an external financing source to be leveraged if 
short-term internal resources, such as cash holdings, are not readily available.  
 The second essay examines the working capital management process and strategies 
managers prefer and use throughout the process. Working capital management is a managerial 
strategy that monitors and utilizes current assets (e.g., cash, accounts receivable, and inventory) 
and current liabilities (e.g., accounts payable and notes payable) to ensure cash flows are 
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maintained to sustained operations. This essay investigates how strategies relying on internal 
resources and external sources of financing are preferred and implemented by local government 
managers during the working capital management process. Internal resources include 
unrestricted cash holdings, savings in budget stabilization funds and unassigned fund balances, 
interfund borrowing, interfund transfers and fund sweeps, and delaying payments. External 
sources of financing include accelerating the collections of receivables, accessing a line of credit, 
enacting direct lending arrangements, and issuing short-term debt.  
Lower cost and risk strategies are asserted as being more likely to be preferred and 
implemented. Specifically, it is contended that managers have a pecking order, or preference 
ranking, for strategies that use internal resources before external sources of financing. Using a 
2016 survey of financial managers in New York local governments, managers are found to have 
a preference ranking for reducing unrestricted cash holdings before delaying payments, speeding 
up the collections of receivables, issuing short-term debt, and not taking any action to mitigate 
cash flow uncertainty. Managers implement most often a strategy that uses unrestricted cash 
holdings in conjunction with issuing short-term debt. However, rules-based policies and 
operating procedures regarding cash and short-term debt are not widespread. This essay expands 
our understanding of financial strategies preferred and implemented in the public working capital 
management process.  
The third essay asserts that excess taxing capacity, the difference between the levy limit 
and selected property tax level subject to the limit, influence the use of short-term resources. 
This research examines if excess taxing capacity from a New York State constitutional tax limit 
impacts General Fund unrestricted cash holdings and short-term borrowing. Empirical support is 
derived from a panel dataset of New York county, city and village governments between 1996 
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and 2016. Regressions analysis is conducted to investigate the impact of excess taxing capacity 
on short-term resources. Suggestive evidence is found that county and village governments with 
increases in excess taxing capacity are associated with reporting lower unrestricted cash 
holdings. Furthermore, county governments engage in borrowing larger amounts in the short-
term when excess taxing capacity increases while village governments are likely to borrow 
smaller amounts. It is posited that managers are likely leveraging their internal cash holdings and 
short-term borrowing capacity before accessing external slack of their property taxing authority. 
Local government managers, therefore, are being prudent to not hoard cash and to borrow in the 
short-term instead of continually utilizing more of their taxing capacity.  
 
1.1 Implications for Scholarship and Practice 
 
 The essays that compose this dissertation make distinct contributions to scholarship and 
practice. Through developing predictive factors that encourage the use of short-term debt, essay 
one creates opportunities for researchers to conduct further empirical analysis of patterns of its 
use, as well as extend investigations of the tradeoffs and consequences of selecting different 
types of strategies that use external sources of financing (e.g., bank loans, direct lending, new 
taxes or fees, and excess taxing capacity). This research can aid practitioners by enhancing their 
understanding of government characteristics and demographic conditions that encourage more 
short-term debt use. Managers can then create, implement, and/or refine policies that govern the 
management of short-term debt. These policies can be especially important to enact and 
understand if a local government infrequently accesses the long-term debt market and may fail to 
realize that their short-term debt burden is likely to increase as well.        
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 Through providing insights to alternative strategies used for working capital 
management, essay two provide researchers further insight of the various strategies available and 
how managers make decisions between preferred and implemented strategies. Practitioners are 
presented with information on the trade-offs among strategies and what might influence local 
governments of different sizes to enact certain strategies. Thereby, prudent managers might 
incorporate into their strategic planning process the knowledge of which types of strategies are 
more likely be preferred and adopted. Since established policies were not well established, 
practitioners can institute policies around the use of internal resources and external sources of 
financing.      
 Finally, through positing external constraints might impact short-term resources, essay 
three begins to uncover the interdependencies that exist between the use of short-term resources 
and limitations placed on local governments. Scholars can expand their knowledge of the impact 
slack in the form of excess taxing capacity and its influence on short-term resources at the local 
government level. Furthermore, practitioners are more informed about the likely use of short-
term resources to buffer against having to tap into excess taxing capacity.  
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Chapter 2: The Use of Short-Term Debt by General Purpose Governments 
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2.1 Introduction 
Cash flow management may be viewed as “the development of procedures to accelerate 
cash receipts and control disbursements to keep cash available as long as possible” (Khan, 2003). 
As cash flows ebb and flow in the financial period, the government will need to leverage 
resources, internal and external, to ensure services are provided and obligations are paid. One 
strategy to manage cash flows is the use of short-term debt as an external source of financing. 
Short-term debt is typically borrowing money from banks under a written acknowledgment of 
debt due using unsecured notes1 that constitutes a conditional or unconditional promise to pay 
from only specified resources of the issuing government (Moak, 1982). Short-term debt can be 
issued multiple times in a year for purposes including cash flow management, public 
improvements, and refunding previously issued notes. The issuance of short-term debt to meet 
cash flows needs is usually required to be redeemed one year after issuance.  
Cash flows can be impacted by declines in revenues sensitive to economic conditions and 
delays in state aid to typically increase borrowing needs. Local governments can develop a 
dependence on short-term debt for liquidity - that is a government’s ability to manage cash flows 
over the budget period, with minimal loss in value. Without the ability to borrow in the short-
term, local governments could be unable to meet payroll or other operating expenses if an 
immediate cash infusion is not received. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the predictors 
of short-term debt use since certain governments might continually use short-term debt as a cash 
flow management tool.  
                                                 
1 Typically, a note can be issued in anticipation of long-term bonds to be issued, taxes to be collected, 
nontax revenues to be received, or for unforeseen expenditures to be called a bond anticipation note, tax anticipation 
note, revenue anticipation note, and budget note, respectively. Short-term notes usually have a maturity of one year 
or less after the date of issuance. In the State of New York, bond anticipation notes can be issued or renewed for up 
to five years (New York State, 2008).  
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Another strategy to manage cash flows is the use of slack resources (e.g., excess 
unrestricted cash holdings, budget stabilization funds, and discretionary savings in general fund 
balances) as an internal financing source. Scholars have examined the role of slack resources on 
a government’s resilience to economic turbulence and related volatility in revenues and 
expenditures (Arapis, Reitano, & Bruck, 2017; Duncombe & Hou, 2014; Gianakis & Snow, 
2007; Hendrick, 2006; Hendrick & Crawford, 2014; Marlowe, 2005; Moulick & Taylor, 2017; 
Snow, Gianakis, & Haughton, 2015; Stewart, 2009; Stewart, Hamman, & Pink‐Harper, 2017; 
Wang, 2015; Wang & Hou, 2012). Emphasis has largely been then size and/or restrictions placed 
on these resources (Gauthier, 2009; Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 2009; Joyce, 
2001; Kriz, 2002). However, restrictions are not a proxy measure of liquidity. Moreover, a 
government could report a large fund balance, but limited liquid resources to manage cash flows.  
Our research extends the existing literature with a specific focus on an organization’s 
choice to use an external source of financing, specifically short-term debt. Using data of local 
governments in New York state, the results suggest governments are more likely to issue short-
term debt if the proportion of their non-cash assets was high. Our analysis also finds evidence 
that suggests that governments are more likely to issue short-term debt if they reported 
reductions in budget surplus in the prior years. Consistent with the existing literature, our 
analysis finds governments that reported a higher proportion of federal aid, a higher percent of 
spending on employee salaries, or a higher percent of capital spending are generally more likely 
to use short-term debt to manage cash flows. In New York, local governments are more likely to 
use short-term debt as a form of bridge financing (New York State, 2008). In a number of 
instances, local governments choose not to issue long-term debt, and simply relied on the short-
11 
 
term instruments to finance capital improvements. Not surprisingly, governments were more 
likely to issue short-term debt with prior experience in the short-term debt market.  
The implications of this study are that managers can be responsive to changes in the 
composition of short-term assets and revenues and understand the cash flow implications of 
changes in operations, revenue projections, and budgetary spending flexibility. Since engaging in 
the public capital markets has transaction costs, a government’s ability to issue and manage 
short-term obligations is largely dependent on cash flow management practices.  It’s important to 
note that while we focus on the use of short-term debt, governments are increasingly substituting 
bonds with direct lending (i.e., borrowing directly from a bank) (Breckinridge Capital Advisors, 
2014). While most governments can expect lower transaction costs, increased use of direct 
lending limits visibility and accountability. 
The rest of this essay is organized into sections. Section 2.2 is a review of the literature. 
Section 2.3 seeks to provide potential predictors to engage in the short-term debt market and 
derives testable hypotheses. Section 2.4 presents a description of the data and model 
specifications. Section 2.5 discusses the empirical results. Section 2.6 concludes with some 
limitations of this study as well as the potential implications from the results.  
 
2.2 Local Government Working Capital Management Literature  
Scholars have not developed an extensive body of literature on local government working 
capital management. Yet, our knowledge about slack resources is juxtaposed against our 
expectations for issuing short-term debt. The concept of slack resources is rooted in 
organizational theory. Chester Barnard (1938) describes the concept of slack as executives might 
receive more inducements, such as money, than they contribute to the organization. Cyert and 
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March (1963) build on this concept by coining the phrase slack resources to mean the “disparity 
between the resources available to the organization and the payments required to maintain the 
coalition” (1963, p. 36) which included under-utilized resources such as reserves and excess 
capital equipment.2 Although there is no universally accepted definition of slack resources 
(Riahi-Belkaoui, 1994), slack resources can be defined as “that cushion of actual or potential 
resources which allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment 
or the external pressures for change in policy, as well as to initiate changes in strategy with 
respect to the external environment” (Bourgeois, 1981). This definition implies that slack 
resources can be used to mitigate internal and external problems or can be used for strategic 
purposes.  
The Cyert and March (1963) conceptualization of slack resources produced two 
competing perspectives behind the accumulation of slack. Organizations can use slack resources 
to mitigate internal and external conflicts that otherwise would necessitate structural change 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Gianakis & Snow, 2007; Hendrick, 2006; Hendrick & Crawford, 2014; 
Snow & Gianakis, 2009). Hence, slack resources are a proxy measure of managerial competence 
(Meier & O’Toole, 2002; O'Toole & Meier, 2011). Managers strategically accumulate resources 
                                                 
2 Slack resources take numerous forms such as excess employees in a specific department (Williamson, 
1963), skills of professional staff (Walker, 1969), spare capital equipment (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & March, 1963), 
unused capacity (Nohria & Gulati, 1996), buffers to external environments (Thompson, 1967), or excess overhead 
(Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner, 2004). Slack can be unabsorbed with currently uncommitted resources (e.g., 
unreserved fund balance and budget stabilization funds) or absorbed with use in current operations (e.g., creating 
additional employee positions for operations and non-instructional school spending) (Moulick & Taylor, 2017; Tan 
& Peng, 2003). Financial management scholars have measured slack as reserves in budget stabilization funds 
(Gianakis & Snow, 2007; Snow & Gianakis, 2009; Snow, Gianakis, & Fortess, 2008; Snow et al., 2015), 
discretionary savings in general fund balances (Arapis et al., 2017; Duncombe & Hou, 2014; Hendrick, 2006; 
Marlowe, 2005, 2013; Moulick & Taylor, 2017; Stewart, 2009, 2011; Stewart et al., 2017; Wang, 2015; Wang & 
Hou, 2012), excess cash holdings (Gore, 2009; Hand, Pierson, & Thompson, 2016), non-instructional spending 
(Moulick & Taylor, 2017), and even excess property tax levy capacity (Bradbury, Mayer, & Case, 2001; Gianakis & 
Snow, 2007; Hawley & Rork, 2015; Lang & Jian, 2004; Nguyen-Hoang & Hou, 2014; Snow & Gianakis, 2009; 
Snow et al., 2008; Snow et al., 2015).  
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to finance capital improvements (Marlowe, 2005; Snow & Gianakis, 2009), manage credit risk 
and/or enhance credit quality (Marlowe, 2011; Snow & Gianakis, 2009), improve performance 
measures (standardized test scores) (Moulick & Taylor, 2017), and explore innovation 
opportunities (Fernandez & Wise, 2010; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Walker, 1969).  
Conversely, slack resources may be an indicator of principal-agent problems (Gore, 
2009; Jensen, 1986). For example, bureaucrats may accumulate slack resources to produce 
beneficial rents such as higher compensation (Wintrobe, 1997) or more spending on 
administrative expenses, manager salaries, and bonuses (Gore, 2009) instead of returning excess 
resources to citizens in the form of lower taxes and fees. Although bureaucratic budget 
maximization behavior with slack resources has been suggested (Migué, Bélanger, & Niskanen, 
1974; Moe, 1997; Niskanen, 1971) and political pressures arise for tax cuts or spending increases 
(Rose & Smith, 2012), consistent evidence of this, particularly in the public sector, is limited. 
Hand et al. (2016) suggest excess cash holdings by local governments is in fact a proxy measure 
of competent managers saving for a rainy day (Meier & O’Toole, 2002; O'Toole & Meier, 2011) 
and not an indicator of principal-agent problems as suggested by Gore (2009).  
A government’s ability to accumulate and retain cash reserves is largely a function of its 
revenue structure. Empirical evidence suggests governments are more likely to report a large 
unrestricted fund balance if a significant proportion of revenues were from property or sales 
taxes (Hendrick & Crawford, 2014; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2017; Wang, 2015; Wang & 
Hou, 2012). Furthermore, dependence on intergovernmental revenues may lower unrestricted 
fund balance (Duncombe & Hou, 2014; Hendrick, 2006; Marlowe, 2005; Stewart, 2009, 2011; 
Wang & Hou, 2012). Wang and Hou (2012) note intergovernmental transfers may be more 
volatile over the economic cycle as governments may limit transfers when under fiscal stress to 
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negatively impact a locality’s ability to accumulate reserves. Yet, local governments might 
realize more volatility exists and accumulate more slack resources to buffer against revenue 
shocks if a large dependence on intergovernmental revenue sources exists (Arapis et al., 2017; 
Gianakis & Snow, 2007; Hendrick, 2006; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2017; Wang, 2015). 
Governments are, therefore, more likely to issue short-term debt to manage volatile cash flows.  
Spending on capital and debt have been found to reduce fiscal slack but may motivate 
short-term debt use. Increases in capital outlays have been found to lower unreserved fund 
balance (UFB) (Hendrick, 2006; Hendrick & Crawford, 2014; Wang & Hou, 2012). However, on 
a conceptual level one might expect that capital outlays might lower (or have no impact on) the 
UFB and increase the reserved portion of general funds as well as cash balance. Therefore, 
governments might prudently save for capital projects through restricted funds and not save for 
capital projects through the general fund UFB. In respect to short-term debt, higher levels of 
capital outlays are likely to allow for more expenditure flexibility so short-term debt is not likely 
to be issued as a cash flow management tool. Yet, higher levels of capital outlays could also 
indicate more infrastructure construction and expansion in which short-term debt could be used 
to not delay long-term construction projects to motivate short-term debt use.  
In addition, long-term debt is also found to significantly influence slack resources with 
higher debt per capita reducing the UFB (Arapis et al., 2017; Hendrick, 2006; Stewart, 2009) and 
the imposition of a debt limit decreasing reserve fund balances for high need school districts 
(Duncombe & Hou, 2014). When general purpose governments borrow, they can transfer money 
from the general fund to a debt service or sinking fund created for debt obligations. Thus, the 
general fund UFB is expected to be lower since savings is occurring outside of the general fund. 
In respect to short-term debt issuance instead of fund balance, more short-term debt could be 
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issued to strategically time the long-term debt market in which it might be expected that a higher 
rating could be obtained by waiting a couple of months to issue long-term debt. Hence, a local 
government might be expected to issue short-term debt to not delay any capital improvement 
projects financed through long-term debt. Consequently, a local government that will issue more 
long-term debt might be more likely to use short-term debt.  
By investigating one type of liability, short-term debt, which can be used as a cash flow 
management tool, a contribution to the financial management literature can be made.3 Scholars 
have investigated predictors of long-term debt issuance (Bahl & Duncombe, 1993; Clingermayer 
& Wood, 1995; Ellis & Schansberg, 1999; Fisher & Wassmer, 2014; Kim & Lim, 2017; 
Trautman, 1995). To our knowledge, one study by Su and Hildreth (2018) examines the role of 
fiscal slack, unreserved general fund balance, on cash flow management notes (e.g. tax and 
revenue anticipation notes, tax anticipation notes, and revenue anticipation notes) to find a 
preference for accumulating slack to short-term borrowing. Yet, as previously discussed, UFB is 
not a proxy for liquidity but just the difference between assets and liabilities. Therefore, we 
improve upon the literature by examining the impact of the lack of liquidity (cash balances and 
short-term investments) on short-term debt. By evaluating a strict form of liquidity, we can test if 
governments that report less liquidity issue short-term debt as a cash flow management tool. 
Furthermore, it is critical scholars understand which factors contribute to short-term debt 
use to know which types of local governments will access the market. Certain governments that 
continually access the market might face more risk, especially during recessionary periods. 
                                                 
3 This paper could also enhance the local government debt market literature. To the best of our knowledge, 
the motivations for short-term debt use have not been empirically investigated at the local government level which 
could complement the overall debt market literature. One study investigates the relationship between fiscal slack and 
the issuance of cash flow management notes defined as tax anticipation notes, revenue anticipation notes, and tax 
and revenue anticipation notes (Su & Hildreth, 2018).  
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During the Great Recession, some local governments experienced a decrease in the number of 
buyers for their debt and those with buyers were likely experiencing higher interest costs (New 
York State, 2008). Moreover, local governments that have heavy and ongoing reliance on the 
short-term debt market might show signs of unresolved poor cash flow management which could 
lead to larger financial management problems. Consequently, investigating short-term debt use 
can provide insight into an alternative strategy to manage cash flows, can indicate the initial 
emergence of financial management problems, and can give a plausible reason for cyclical cash 
flow problems.  
 
2.3 Short-Term Debt Predictors and Testable Hypotheses  
As we have summarized thus far, the literature has largely focused on the relevance and 
significance of fund balance as a slack resource. Fund balance represents financial resources net 
of obligations. If a government reports assets (e.g., cash, investments, receivables, transfers in 
from other funds or governments, inventories, and prepaid expenses) that exceed liabilities (e.g., 
accounts payable, accrued liabilities, notes payable, and transfers to other funds and 
governments), they will report a positive fund balance. If assets are less than obligations, the 
government will report a negative fund balance – a strong indicator that it faces substantial 
liquidity challenges. What has not been clearly addressed is whether fund balance represents 
liquid resources. In fact, much of the discussion is focused on the restrictions placed on fund 
balance (Kelly, 2013).4 However, restrictions do not measure liquidity. We argue liquidity, or 
                                                 
4 For example, Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) requires governments to report fund 
balance in either of the following five categories - non-spendable, restricted, committed, assigned, and unassigned. 
Nonspendable fund balance is the amount that is not in spendable form (such as inventory or prepaid amounts) or is 
legally/contractually required to be maintained intact (such as the principal of an endowment fund). Restricted fund 
balance is the amount constrained to specific purposes by providers of the funds (such as grantors or bondholders) 
by constitutional provisions or enabling legislation. Committed fund balance is the amount constrained to specific 
purposes by the government itself. Assigned fund balance is the amount a government intends to use for a specific 
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lack thereof, is an important determinant of an organization’s choice to use external financial 
resources, specifically short-term debt. Our essay contributes to the existing literature and 
financial management field with the examination of when managers are likely to use short-term 
debt to manage cash flow deficits. In this section, we discuss and develop a series of testable 
hypotheses based on the strategies a manager would likely use to manage cash flows.  
A cash flow deficit occurs when cash inflows (receipts) are less than cash outflows 
(disbursements) in a given period. Managers can use various strategies to mitigate a cash flow 
deficit including the use of unrestricted cash reserves, savings, interfund borrowing, interfund 
transfers, delaying payments, accelerating the collection of receivables, and issuing short-term 
debt. The use of short-term debt is associated with transaction and monetary costs such as 
obtaining the financial capacity to issue, time for prior planning of issuance, fees to underwriters, 
and interest costs. Smaller jurisdictions might be discouraged from market entry due to 
potentially paying higher short-term interest rates (Moak, 1982) or even having banks be 
unwilling to issue unsecured notes due to their limited financial resources (Finkler, Smith, 
Calabrese, & Purtell, 2016). Thus, a government’s engagement in the short-term debt market 
could be after other options have been exhausted.  
In fact, managers would likely adjust cash inflows and/or outflows to eliminate the need 
for use of short-term debt. For example, managers will rely on existing cash reserves to finance 
the cash flow deficit. If existing cash reserves have been below policy recommendations or 
restricted for other purposes, managers could alter the collection of revenues and/or the timing 
                                                 
purpose through the expression by a governing body or official delegated with the authority to assign amounts. 
Unassigned fund balance is the amount available for any purpose that is the residual classification for only the 
general fund. Nonspendable, restricted, and committed fund balance are similar to the previous reserved funds. 
Assigned fund balance is similar to the previous unreserved designated classification. Unassigned fund balance is 
similar to the previous unreserved undesignated funds (Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 2009).  
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and level of expenditures to eliminate the cash flow deficit. If expenditures are expected to 
exceed revenues due to a revenue shortfall or unexpected increase in expenditures (i.e., projected 
deficit), the finance managers could cut spending, particularly on non-essential items (e.g., 
capital improvements).  
We have therefore developed a series of hypotheses based on strategies managers would 
likely engage in to eliminate the need for the use of short-term debt. Specifically, we focus on 
how managers would alter resources to maximize cash flows and minimize transaction costs. The 
hypotheses are presented in the order we would expect managers to try and mitigate a cash flow 
deficit such as tapping into unrestricted cash before cutting non-essential spending. For example, 
managers are more likely to use short-term debt if their government’s assets are not readily 
convertible into unrestricted cash. If a significant proportion of assets are reported as receivables, 
the government will likely be reporting lower levels of unrestricted cash and therefore more 
likely to use short-term debt to bridge the gap in the timing of cash receipts from receivables and 
payment on current obligations. To test this hypothesis, we measure the proportion of non-cash 
assets reported in the governmental fund statements as a proportion of total assets. We assert 
governments are more likely to use short-term debt if they report a higher proportion of illiquid 
resources, all else held constant. This hypothesis is at the core of the analysis and an important 
metric when estimating working capital needs. Formally, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Governments that report larger proportions of non-cash assets will have an 
increased expected probability of using (and using more) short-term debt. 
Relatedly, governments reporting budget shortfalls in multiple-years are more likely to 
have drawn down on current cash reserves. They are therefore more likely to report a larger 
proportion of their assets as illiquid. These governments are more likely to use short-term debt to 
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manage cash flow deficits but not necessarily resolve their operating deficit. Formally, our 
second hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis 2: Governments with larger cash flow deficits will have an increased 
expected probability of using (and using more) short-term debt. 
To maintain a cash flow surplus, managers can either cut or alter when expenditures are 
incurred. For example, a local government could cut non-essential costs or delay capital 
improvements. This strategy allows the government to decrease cash outflows and reduce or 
eliminate the cash flow deficit. This, however is a strategy that governments with a relatively 
large proportion of flexible budgetary items (e.g., capital improvements) can adopt. Other 
governments are more likely to use short-term debt since non-discretionary expenditures (e.g., 
salaries and wages) must be paid. We therefore expect local governments to use short-term debt 
if they report a greater proportion of non-discretionary expenditures and use short-term debt less 
if they report a greater proportion of discretionary expenditures. We measure non-discretionary 
expenditures using the proportion of salaries and wages paid as a percent of total expenditures 
and discretionary expenditures using the proportion of capital spending as a percent of total 
expenditures. Formally, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 3a: Governments with less expenditure flexibility will have an increased 
expected probability of using (and using more) short-term debt.  
Hypothesis 3b: Governments with more expenditure flexibility will have a decreased 
expected probability of using (and using more) short-term debt.   
The use of short-term debt is largely dependent on the timing of cash flows. We postulate 
that the provider of resources is an important consideration in working capital management. For 
example, if the government is relying on external sources of revenue (e.g., federal and/or state 
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aid) it is more likely to use short-term debt given the mismatch in budget cycles, and thus receipt 
of revenues. Own-source revenues on the other hand are much more predictable in receipt, 
particularly the property tax. Therefore, a government reporting a higher proportion of own-
source revenues will likely not need to use short-term debt as frequently. Our fourth hypothesis 
can be stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 4a: Governments with relatively large portions of own-source revenues will 
have a decreased expected probability of using (and using more) short-
term debt.   
Hypothesis 4b: Governments with more dependence on intergovernmental revenues will 
have an increased expected probability of using (and using more) short-
term debt.  
Managers could have a practice of using short-term liabilities to mitigate cash flows. 
Liabilities such as accounts payable, accrued liabilities and other liabilities can be used in 
conjunction with short-term debt. We assert that governments more likely to report a larger 
amount of short-term liabilities (other than short-term debt) are likely to report higher use of 
short-term debt to manage cash flows. Formally, our fifth hypothesis is as follows:   
Hypothesis 5: Governments that report a high amount of liabilities (other than short-term 
debt) have an increased expected probability of using (and using more) 
short-term debt.  
Finally, a frequent practice, particularly by local governments in New York is to use 
short-term debt as a form of bridge-financing (e.g., bond anticipation notes) (New York State, 
2008). The use of bridge financing allows governments to limit delays in capital improvements 
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all the while timing their long-term debt issue to when market dynamics would likely be most 
favorable to them. Our final hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 6: Governments that want to wait for a more favorable long-term debt market 
have an increased expected probability of using (and using more) short-
term debt.  
The following section describes the sources of data and model specifications. 
 
2.4 Data and Model Specification  
This study relies on data on from about 1,600 general purpose governments including 57 
counties, 61 cities, 929 towns, and around 554 villages in New York State for fiscal years 1996 
through 2016.5 Since each government has their own governing body and taxing authority, they 
are more likely to have the freedom to use short-term debt to manage cash flow deficits (New 
York State Department of State, 2014). Table 2.1 shows the study sample of county (1,197), city 
(1,279), town (19,288), and village (11,526) government observations.6 The average amount of 
short-term debt per capita is $167.00 for city, $95.94 for village, $65.80 for county, and $16.34 
for town governments, respectively.  
                                                 
5 Village government observations fluctuate the most year to year due to non-reporting, dissolution, and 
creation. The villages of East Nassau (1998), Sagaponack (2006), South Blooming Grove (2007), Woodbury (2007), 
and Mastic Beach (2011) were created over the study period and the village of Andes (2004), Pike (2010), 
Limestone (2011), East Randolph (2012), Perrysburg (2012), Randolph (2012), Seneca Falls (2012), and Altmar 
(2005 but officially dissolved in 2013) were dissolved over the study period. The last year of financial data for 
villages dissolved or the first year of financial data for villages created is indicated by the year in above parentheses. 
Villages were included when they were in existence and financial data was reported.  
6 The counties that comprise the boroughs of New York City (New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens, and 
Richmond) are excluded as well as New York City observation which are outliers and significantly different than 
other city government observations. Missing observations because of non-reporting or missing data include: two 
cities (Elmira and Mount Vernon) in 2016, about 136 town observations, and 193 village observations.  
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Each type of local government has a unique set of service responsibilities7 which impact 
their reliance on own-source and intergovernmental revenues. Although the property tax is the 
largest source of own-source revenue, the second most relied own-source revenue is the sales tax 
for county (20.56%) and town (13.81%) governments and fees and charges for village (29.93%) 
and city (22.86%) governments. State and federal aid revenue is more relied on by county and 
city governments than town and village governments. Salaries and wages expenditures comprise 
49.41%, 38.56%, 33.95%, and 33.19% of total expenditure for city, town, county, and village 
governments, respectively. The differences in reliance on revenue sources and non-discretionary 
spending impact our expectations about short-term debt use across local governments. We expect 
county and city government results to be more generalizable to other United States large 
municipalities than town and village governments that are largely influenced by residential 
preference.     
We created our dataset using publicly available resources including data from New York 
Local Government and School Accountability, Open Book New York, New York State Board of 
Elections, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the Local 
Government Handbook from the New York Department of State. Additional balance sheet 
financial information was provided by request of the New York State Controller’s office and 
                                                 
7 County governments are the largest and most inclusive form of local government to function as the 
administrative unit to carry out state functions (e.g., provide many state mandated services such as Medicaid and 
conducting elections for the state), education (e.g., pre-school special education and community college), and public 
safety (e.g., police, jails, and probation and rehabilitation services). City governments have the authority of home 
rule and have the authority to provide residents local government services such as water infrastructure, public safety, 
economic development, and social services. Town governments exist within a county to provide both town-wide 
services such as highway maintenance or police services and partial town services but cannot provide fire services 
town-wide and thus, create and administer special districts to provide this service. Village governments exist within 
a town and are created or dissolved by local initiative to truly exist through the discretion of residents (New York 
State Department of State, 2014).  
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financial variables were constructed from accounting codes provided. Bloomberg L.P. terminals 
were used to collect short-term debt amounts.  
 
2.4.1 Model Specifications 
The empirical strategy models the two-part decision-making processed used by managers 
to issue short-term debt. Managers might not issue short-term debt in a given year and thus, 
several zero values of short-term debt exist. Therefore, we model short-term debt use to consider 
the decision to not issue short-term debt which leads to censoring of the data. First, a hurdle 
model is presented to address the two-part decision-making process of managers. Second, an 
instrumental variable approach is used to account for the simultaneity of decision-making by 
managers with probit and tobit models.  
 
2.4.1.1 Hurdle Models 
First, mangers evaluate the government’s liquidity, which is determined by cash flow 
management, and decide to issue or not issue short-term debt. Second, managers decide how 
much short-term debt to issue. The factors that contribute to issuing short-term debt might be 
differing factors that contribute to issuing larger amounts. For example, a lack of cash reserves 
could motivate the use of revenue anticipation notes until property taxes are collected. However, 
a lack of cash reserves might not motivate a government to issue larger amounts of short-term 
debt especially, if property taxes are about to be collected. Therefore, the choice to issue short-
term debt and issuing larger amounts of short-term debt could have different motivating factors 
determining each choice.  
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This two-part decision-making process is modeled by estimating a linear hurdle model 
proposed by Cragg (1971).8 This model allows for different equations to motivate both the 
selection into issuing short-term debt and the decision to issue a larger amount of short-term 
debt, whereas a tobit model uses the same equation for both decisions. The linear hurdle model is 
characterized by the following relationship:   
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = s𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖∗               
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = �
1   if 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 +  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 >  0
0   otherwise
        
 ℎ𝑖𝑖∗ = x𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 represents the observed value of short-term debt issued; 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is the selection variable 
which is 1 if short-term debt is not bounded, greater than zero, and 0 otherwise, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 is a vector of 
explanatory variables to predict the issuance of short-term debt, 𝛾𝛾 is a vector of coefficients for 
the section of issuing short-term debt, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 is a standard normal error term for the selection 
decision, ℎ𝑖𝑖∗ is observed only if 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1 (short-term debt is issued), 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is a vector of explanatory 
variables for the amount of short-term debt issued, 𝛽𝛽 is a vector of coefficients for the amount of 
short-term debt issued, and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is an error term for the amount decision.  
 
2.4.1.2 Instrumental Variable Probit and Tobit Models 
Another empirical approach is to address the simultaneity of decision making that would 
create endogeneity to bias causal estimates of the use of short-term debt. The hypotheses are 
                                                 
8 A hurdle model was chosen to allow for two separate decisions/mechanisms to affect the participation of 
engaging in the short-term debt market and the amount of short-term debt issued. An instrumental variable (IV) 
probit and IV tobit with instruments of a lagged value of the endogenous variable expressed in ranks (Duncombe & 
Hou, 2014; Kroszner & Stratmann, 2000) and the amount of financial industry wages per population at the county 
level for salary and wages expenditures were used. Using the IV tobit indicates the relative effects of a single 
mechanism or motivating factor (explanatory variable) as being the same in both the participation and amount 
decisions. We might think that some motivating factors affect the participation decision but not the amount decision 
and thus, a hurdle model might be more appropriate model to describe the two-part issuance decision.    
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tested by estimating instrumental variable (IV) regression models. First, an IV probit regression 
model is used to reduce endogeneity of key variables. Equation (1) and (2) are developed which 
take the following form:  
       𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = y2𝑖𝑖t𝛽𝛽 + 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖γ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                   (1) 
𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Π1 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Π2 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                    (2) 
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �
0   𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ < 0
1   𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 0
 
 
where 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  represents the latent amount of short-term debt engaged in in which we observe 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
in with a value of 1 if short-term debt is used and a value of zero otherwise where i indicates a 
specific community (e.g., a county, city, town or village) and t indicates year, y2𝑖𝑖t is a vector of 
endogenous variables (endogenous key variables), 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of exogenous variables 
(exogenous key variables), 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of additional instruments (additional control 
variables), and ε is a stochastic error term. The equation for 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 t is written in reduced form.  
Second, an IV tobit model which is left-censored (censored at zero of not issuing short-
term debt) is run to test which predictors influence larger amounts of short-term debt being 
issued. Equation (3) and (4) are developed which the following form:  
       𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = y2𝑖𝑖t𝛽𝛽 + 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖γ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                   (3) 
𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Π1 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Π2 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                    (4) 
 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �
𝑎𝑎
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗
𝑏𝑏
    𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑎𝑎
       𝑎𝑎 ≤ 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗
    𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ > 𝑏𝑏
≤ 𝑏𝑏 
 
where 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  represents the latent amount of short-term debt engaged in in which we observe 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
with a continuous value that can be below, at, or above the latent amount of short-term debt used 
where i indicates a specific community (e.g., a county, city, town or village) and t indicates year, 
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y2𝑖𝑖t is a vector of endogenous variables (endogenous key variables), 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of 
exogenous variables (exogenous key variables), 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of additional instruments 
(additional control variables), and ε is a stochastic error term. The equation for 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 t is written in 
reduced form.  
 
2.4.2 Outcome Variable  
Ideally, short-term debt use would be measured on a monthly basis along with measures 
of cash inflows (e.g., tax receipts, intergovernmental revenues, and fees) and cash outflows (e.g., 
employee payroll, capital spending, and debt service payments). However, available data is 
aggregated on an annual basis including all short-term debt issued. The dependent variable is the 
amount of short-term debt issued in a fiscal year standardized by each community’s total 
population and converted to a natural log.9 This measure has two components: (1) new short-
term debt issued and (2) overdrafts of cash accounts. As collected from Bloomberg L.P.’s 
workstations, the first component is the annual amount issued of general obligation unlimited 
notes, general obligation limited notes, revenue notes, bond anticipation notes, tax anticipation 
notes, revenue anticipation notes, budget notes, certificates of participation, and warrants. The 
second component is the end of year amount of negative cash reported in governmental funds 
from Open Book New York.10 Since negative cash values might be overdrafts of bank accounts 
that are obligated to be repaid, the amount of negative cash should also be included in short-term 
                                                 
9 A value of one was added to all values so natural logs could be taken for values of zero short-term debt.  
10 All governmental funds are included except for the capital fund, debt service fund, and special district 
funds. These are excluded because they are distinctly created for specific purposes and the governmental funds 
included are more representative of everyday governmental activities.  
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debt obligations.11 The short-term obligation amount plus the amount of negative cash reported 
is standardized by the total population and presented in natural log form. 
 
2.4.3 Test Variables 
The independent variables of interest are the hypothesized factors that influence the use 
of short-term debt. First, a lack of cash reserves is illiquidity. We measure illiquidity as the 
proportion of assets not easily convertible into unrestricted cash (e.g., accounts receivable, due 
from other governments, inventory, and restricted cash) standardized by total expenditures and in 
percent form.12 The amount of illiquidity is likely to be endogenous because the community 
chooses the amount to have each year simultaneous to the allocation decision to issue short-term 
debt. Therefore, for models that address endogeneity, an exogenous variable or instrument can be 
used that is strongly correlated with the endogenous variable but does not have an independent 
relationship with short-term debt.  
The proposed instrument is a lagged value of the endogenous variable expressed in ranks 
that has been used by previous researchers (Duncombe & Hou, 2014; Kroszner & Stratmann, 
2000).13 Initially, the amount of illiquidity is lagged for one year for each type of municipal 
                                                 
11 In the data, 95 observations (2 counties, 5 cities, 51 towns, and 37 villages) for the fiscal years between 
1996 and 2016 had some amount of negative cash reported. 
12 Total governmental fund assets (excluding capital, debt service and special district funds) minus the 
amount of cash and marketable securities is standardized by governmental fund assets and measured as a percentage. 
This variable is tested to see if it is endogenous and the null hypothesis that the variable is exogenous is rejected at 
the 95% level of confidence given the endogeneity test with the ivreg2 Stata command. Following Duncombe and 
Hou (2014), partial F-statistics from the first-stage regressions can be calculated then determined if they are above a 
value of 10 for the instruments to be acceptable (Staiger & Stock, 1997). The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 
1468.70. Futhermore, comparing the Kleibergen-Papp rk Wald statistic to critical values established by Stock and 
Yogo (2005) are done to test if the instrument is likely weak. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic is 1479.05.  
13 This IV ranking approach is used for illiquidity (counties and towns), prior year surplus (villages), sales 
taxes (villages), fees and charges (counties), state aid (villages), federal aid (towns), capital spending (cities), and 
long-term debt (towns and villages). 
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government.14 Then, ranks are created by dividing the distribution of the lagged variable into 
thirds to assign a value of “1” to the lowest third of the distribution, a value of “2” to the middle 
third of the distribution, and a value of “3” to the highest third of the distribution. The rankings 
are to be strongly correlated to the endogenous variable but not correlated to the error term. 
Although the observations close to the points that switch from one value to another might be 
correlated, there are only two cross over points to another value and thus, might minimize this 
concern. However, for an instrument to be considered a better measure, the instrument should be 
tested to determine if it is highly correlated with the endogenous variable. Consequently, 
instrument tests are conducted and a one year lagged ranked instrument is used when 
necessary.15    
Second, governments’ ability to generate excess funds for cash inflows is measured as the 
prior year’s surplus or deficit. Surplus (or deficit if the value is negative) is measured as the 
percent of prior fiscal year’s total revenues minus total expenditures standardized by total 
expenditures. Since the ending surplus of one fiscal year is the amount of extra funds to be used 
in the preceding fiscal year, using a lagged value, or prior year’s value, is appropriate. Third, 
more discretionary expenditures, more flexible spending, can increase cash flows if cuts are 
enacted. More discretionary spending is measured as the percent of total expenditures used for 
capital and equipment since a government could delay capital projects. In contrast, non-
discretionary spending or less flexible spending is measured as the percent of total expenditures 
for employee salaries and wages.  
                                                 
14 Two and three year lagged variables are also tested but one year lagged variables are tested to be a less 
weak instrument and allow for more observations to be used.  
15 The ivreg2 Stata command is preformed to evaluate the endogeneity test of each regressor. Following 
Duncombe and Hou (2014), partial F-statistics from the first-stage regressions are calculated then determined if they 
are above 10 for the instruments to be acceptable (Staiger & Stock, 1997). The Kleibergen-Papp rk Wald statistic to 
critical values established by Stock and Yogo (2005) are reported and instruments are cautiously concluded a less 
weak based on a Cragg-Donald Wald F statstic higher than Stock-Yogo critical value of 10% maximal IV size.  
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Fourth, own-source revenues (property tax, sales tax, and fees and charges) all measure 
the amount of resources might be used to reduce the engagement in the short-term debt market. 
Each own source revenue is measured as the percent of each source standardized by total 
revenues. Fifth, intergovernmental revenues of federal and state aid measure sources of cash 
flow that likely take longer to receive. Each intergovernmental revenue source is standardized by 
total revenues and measured as a percent. Sixth, to measure the use of liabilities as a strategy to 
increase cash flows, the amount of governmental liabilities other than short-term debt per capita 
is used as a natural log. Finally, the likely timing of the long-term debt market is measured as the 
amount of long-term debt outstanding standardized by the population, in natural log form. 
The selection of the amount of each of these test variables is simultaneously decided with 
the amount of short-term debt issued. Consequently, each of the above variables are tested for 
endogeneity with a lagged ranked measure for an instrument. The exception is for salaries and 
wages which is instrumented with private sector salaries for comparable administration jobs in 
the county.16 The variables that are likely endogenous in the IV probit models are illiquidity 
(counties and towns), prior year surplus (counties, towns, and villages), fees and charges (towns), 
state aid revenue (towns and villages), federal aid revenue (towns and villages), salaries and 
wages (cities and towns), capital and equipment (towns and villages), and other liabilities 
(counties).17 The variables that are likely endogenous in the IV tobit models are illiquidity 
                                                 
16 Private sector wages at the county level was likely a weak instrument for town governments and a lagged 
rank measure of salaries was used to have a Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic of 11000 and the Kleibergen Papp Wald 
rk F statistic of 1000.  
17 Each measured variable was tested for endogeneity and found likely to be endogenous. For the IV probit 
models the measure of illiqudity, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1356.59 (counties) and 11000 (towns) while 
the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 1419.52 (counties) and 8649.82 (towns). For prior year surplus, the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1602.048 (counties), 13000 (towns), and 2748.37 (villages) while the Kleibergen 
Paap Wald rk F statistic is 1108.44 (counties), 7688.40 (towns) and 1798.54 (villages). For fees and charges, the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 9750.69 and the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 6170.80 for towns. For state 
aid, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 2643.02 (towns) and 420.54 (villages) while the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk 
F statistic is 2022.04 (towns) and 312.35 (villages). For federal aid, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 908.74 
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(counties and towns), prior year surplus (counties, towns and villages), sales taxes (cities), state 
aid (towns), federal aid (towns and villages), salaries and wages (cities and towns), capital 
expenditures (towns and villages), other liabilities (counties), and long-term debt (cities).18   
 
2.4.4 Control Variables 
Several economic, demographic, fiscal, and political factors that might influence 
engagement in short-term debt market or explain differences between communities.19 First, the 
unemployment rate is used as a control for the local economic climate in which poor economic 
conditions might be correlated with increased service needs.20 Second, the wealth of a 
community can create differences in short-term debt use. We control for wealth with the natural 
log of per capita personal income of residents measured at the county level of government. 
Third, the size of government could factor into how much short-term debt is likely to be issued. 
                                                 
(towns) and 836.90 (villages) while the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 742.72 (towns) and 625.61 (villages). 
For salaries and wages,  the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 83.57 (cities) and 11000 (towns) while the Kleibergen 
Paap Wald rk F statistic is 64.91 (cites) and 10000 (towns). For capital and equipment outlays, the Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic is 1726.71 (towns) and 875.72 (villages) while the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 1578.24 
(towns) and 813.82 (villages). For other liabilties, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1157.09 (counties) and the 
Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 1034.92 (counties).  
18 Each measured variable was tested for endogeneity and found likely to be endogenous. For illiqudity, the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1356.59 (counties) and 11000 (towns) while the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F 
statistic is 1419.52 (counties) and 8649.82 (towns). For piror year surplus, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 
1602.05 (counties), 13000 (towns), and 2748.37 (villages) while the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 1108.44 
(counties), 7688.40 (towns), and 1798.54 (villages). For sales tax, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1037.17 and 
the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 931.03 for cities. For state aid, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 
2643.02 and the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 2022.04 for towns.  For federal aid, the Cragg-Donald Wald 
F statistic is 908.74 (towns) and 836.90 (villages) while the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 742.72 (towns) 
and 625.61 (villages). For salaries and wages, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 83.570 (cites) and 11000 (towns) 
while the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 64.91 (cities) and 10000 (towns). For capital and equipment, the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1726.71 (towns) and 8745.72 (villages) while the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F 
statistic is 1578.24 (towns) and 813.82 (villages). For other liabilities, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1157.09 
(counties) and while the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 1034.92 (counties) and. For long-term debt, the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 1118.60 (cities) while the Kleibergen Paap Wald rk F statistic is 1540.42 (cities).  
19 All control variables are measured at the county level except for the indicator for past short-term debt 
issuance, the indicator for past deficits, government size, and city form of government indicators.  
20 The market conditions were also tested with The Securities Industry and Financial Market Association 
Municipal Swap Index. However, the annual average of this measure each fiscal year was over 50% correlated to 
unemployment. The unemployment rate was used instead of the index to control for market conditions.  
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Larger governments could have more resources to engage in the short-term debt market. The size 
of government is measured as total revenues per capita in natural log form.  
Fourth, prior engagement in the short-term debt market might lower barriers to its future 
use. We assert jurisdictions that have issued short-term debt in the past two years have a higher 
expected use of short-term debt in the current year. Prior engagement in market is measured as a 
dummy variable with a value of 1 if short-term debt is issued in the preceding two fiscal years. 
Fifth, governments could incur multiple years of deficits to motivate them to continuously 
borrow in the short-term. We control for jurisdictions that report deficits (total expenditures 
greater than total revenues) with a dummy value of 1 if a deficit is reported in the prior two fiscal 
years.  
Sixth, voter preferences are controlled for which might show the preferences towards 
government and its management. We identify for each county the proportion of votes that went 
towards a Republican candidate for Senate in the most recent election. The city, town, and 
village governments located in a specific county are given the county values as a proxy for voter 
preferences. Since voter’s budget information preceding an election carries political weight 
(Peltzman, 1992), we next control for the year of a Governor and Presidential election in which 
political priorities about fiscal policy could shift. Finally, several governance indicator variables 
are included as controls for the government structure of counties and cities.21 For county 
                                                 
21 From the New York State Local Government Handbook, the variables created are an indicator of the city 
form of government, the number of city council members, an indicator for a community located in a chartered 
county, an indicator of the type of governance type utilized by the county chief administrative official, an indicator 
of the county legislative body type, and the number of county legislative members. The city form of government is 
indicated as a dummy variable for having a mayor council, mayor-council-manager, council-manager, and mayor-
commission-manager or mayor-commission with the excluded group of mayor-council-administrator. The indicator 
of a community located in a chartered county is measured as a 1 if in a chartered county and 0 otherwise. A 
chartered county means that the county has adopted home rule charters by local initiative and action (The counties 
that have a charter are Nassau, Westchester, Suffolk, Erie, Oneida, Onondaga, Monroe, Schenectady, Broome, 
Herkimer, Dutchess, Orange, Tompkins, Rensselaer, Albany, Chemung, Chautauqua, Putman, and Rockland). The 
dummy variables indicating the county chief administrative governance is measured as indicating a chair of the 
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governments, an indicator for a chartered county, an indicator of the type of Chief 
Administrative Official, an indicator of the county legislative body type, and the number of 
county legislative members are controlled. For city governments, we control for an indicator for 
the form of government and the number of city council members.  
 
2.5 Empirical Results  
The overall results suggest that the expected likelihood of using short-term debt is 
increased when there is more illiquidity, larger reductions in prior year surplus, increases in fees 
and charges, less dependence on state aid, more spending on employee salaries and wages, 
increased spending on capital and equipment, and higher reported long-term debt. This section 
proceeds by first describing the results of the linear hurdle models in Table 2.2 and margins of 
the linear hurdle models in Table 2.3. Second, results of models accounting for endogeneity are 
reported for the IV probit models in Table 2.4, the IV probit margins in Table 2.5, and the IV 
tobit models in Table 2.6.  
 
2.5.1 Hurdle Model Results  
The linear hurdle models reported in Table 2.2 provide supportive evidence for most of 
our hypotheses. First, hypothesis 1, higher reported illiquidity of assets increases the probability 
of using short-term debt, is supported by county, town and village governments. As illiquidity 
increases these governments are more likely to engage in the short-term debt market but are not 
necessarily encouraged to issue higher amounts of short-term debt. Specifically, we find a 1 
                                                 
legislative body, executive, and manager with an administrator as the excluded group. The indicator for the county 
legislative body type is measured as have a legislature with a supervisor as the excluded group. All measurements 
are taken from 2009 numbers and used over the study period (New York State Department of State, 2009).    
33 
 
percent increase in illiquidity increases the likelihood of issuing short-term debt by 1.3%, 0.7% 
and 0.5% for county, town, and village governments, respectively. The evidence supports the 
notion that reductions of cash on hand increase short-term borrowing needs.  
Second, we find supportive evidence that reductions in prior year surplus increase the 
likelihood of issuing short-term debt. A 1 percent decrease in prior year surplus increases the 
likelihood of issuing short-term debt by 2.0%, 0.6%, and 0.3% for county, town, and village 
governments, respectively. Reductions in prior year surplus also increase the amount of short-
term debt issued for county, city, and town governments. Thus, this predictor is influential in 
both motivating the use and larger amounts of short-term debt issued.  
Third, less expenditure flexibility increases the likelihood of issuing short-term debt. City 
governments, on average, spend 49.4% of total expenditures on salaries. If salaries and wages 
were to increase by 1 percent, city governments have an increased likelihood of issuing larger 
amounts of short-term debt by 2.8%. Similarly, county governments are more likely to issue and 
issue larger amounts of short-term debt when there is an increase in salaries and wages spending. 
A 1 percent increase in salaries and wages spending increases the likelihood of issuing short-
term debt by 2.3% and increases the amount of short-term debt issued by 4.6%. This evidence 
supports the fact that higher levels of government that have large increases in personnel cost 
might be issuing larger amounts of short-term debt to pay for payroll for employees. In contrast, 
an increase in the amount of spending on salaries and wages reduces the issuance of short-term 
debt for villages and reduces the amount issued for town governments. Both town and village 
governments have lower levels of illiquidity at 20.9% and 30.3%, respectively, compared to 
county and city governments with 64.8% and 62.3%, respectively. These smaller levels of 
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government might rely more on growing cash reserves to pay for increases in personnel costs 
instead of issuing short-term debt.  
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that more expenditure flexibility as measured by 
capital and equipment spending increases the likelihood of issuing and issuing more short-term 
debt. A 1 percent increase in capital spending increases the likelihood of issuing short-term debt 
by 3.0%, 2.1%, 1.2%, and 1.4% for county, city, town, and village governments, respectively. 
Given our local government sample is from New York State, local governments can roll over 
bond anticipation notes and a form of bridge financing (New York State, 2008). It is likely that 
bond anticipation notes used for capital projects are issued to fund increase in capital spending. 
Thus, comparable to issuing long-term debt, the evidence suggest that local governments are 
reporting higher levels of capital spending are likely issuing short-term debt and larger amounts 
of short-term debt to fund projects.  
Fourth, an increased reliance on own-source revenue has minor impacts on the 
engagement in the short-term debt market. A greater reliance on the property tax is not supported 
to impact short-term debt. Yet, more reliance on sales tax revenues reduces the likelihood of 
issuing short-term debt for county and village governments. A greater reliance on fees and 
charges reduces the amount of short-term debt issued for county governments However, city and 
village governments gain substantial revenues from fees and charges at 22.9% and 29.9%, 
respectively. If fees and charges increase by 1 percent, city governments have an increased 
likelihood if issuing short-term debt by 2.1%. While village governments have an increased 
likelihood of issuing short-term debt by 0.6% and a 0.9% increase in the amount of short-term 
debt issued. The reliance on fees and charges which might ebb and flow with service use might 
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contribute to more dependence on issuing short-term debt for cash flow purposes. Overall, the 
issuance of short-term debt is minimally affected by changes in own-source revenues.     
Increased reliance on intergovernmental revenues predicts short-term debt at a higher 
level than own-source revenues. City, town, and village governments that have a 1 percent 
increase in state aid have a 2.1%, 2.6%, and 1.0% reduction in short-term debt issuance. This 
evidence suggests that when state aid is reduced lower levels of governments seek to issue short-
term debt to increase the lack of cash inflows. We do not find evidence that reduced reliance on 
state aid impacts county governments but that reliance on federal aid predicts short-term debt 
use. A 1 percent increase in federal aid increases the likelihood of issuing more short-term debt 
by 3.7%. Since county governments are the administrative arm of the state and are responsible 
for distributing Medicaid program funds, county governments might be motivated to increase the 
amount of short-term debt issued when receipt of program funds are delayed.  
Fifth, some evidence suggests that county and city governments that have a practice of 
using short-term liabilities to reduce cash flow deficits are more likely to issue short-term debt. 
City governments that have a 1 percent increase in other liabilities per capita have a 0.2% 
increase in issuing short-term debt. Thus, city governments that report higher proportions of 
other liabilities are likely to also issue short-term debt to increase cash flows. County 
governments have a 1 percent increase in other liabilities per capita have a 0.5% increase in the 
amount of short-term debt issued. This result indicates county governments may seek even more 
cash inflows from the short-term debt market when they have more accounts outstanding to 
suppliers in the short-term.       
Finally, all local governments increase both their likelihood to issue and issue higher 
amounts of short-term debt when long-term debt outstanding increases. This result indicates that 
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long-term debt is used in conjunction with the use of short-term debt. A 1 percent increase in 
short-term debt increases the likelihood of issuing short-term debt by 0.7%, 0.6%, 0.3%, and 
0.2% for county, city, town, and village governments, respectively. The amount of short-term 
debt is also increased by 0.7%, 1.1%, 0.5%, and 0.7% for county, city, town, and village 
governments, respectively. Therefore, higher reported long-term debt does predict the use and 
amount of short-term debt issued but at lower magnitudes than increases in employee salaries or 
capital spending.  
Several control variables are also important predictors of short-term debt issuance. Frist, 
the most impactful predictor is having issued short-term debt in the prior two years. If short-term 
debt has been issued in the prior two years, the evidence suggest that local governments have an 
over 100% chance of issuing short-term debt than those that have not engaged in the short-term 
debt market in the prior two years. This supports the notion that past experience in issuing short-
term debt might lower the barriers to want to issue in future periods. Second, county and town 
governments that have reported a deficit in the prior two years are less likely to engage in the 
short-term debt market. Third, as county and town governments grow larger in size they have a 
reduced likelihood of issuing short-term debt. This could be due to relying on future revenue 
growth per capita to cover future cash inflows than engaging in short-term borrowing. Fourth, 
village governments in a Presidential election year reduce the amount of short-term debt issued 
which could be due to being cautious about political changes. Finally, a higher likelihood of 
issuing short-term debt exists for county governments that are governed by a legislature and city 
governments with more council members. 
In Table 2.3, we present the marginal results of the hurdle models. These marginal effects 
are indicated for mean values for predictors and show the overall impact of the predictor on 
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short-term debt issuance. Ultimately, these marginal results reiterate our general findings that 
higher reported illiquidity, reductions in prior year surplus, more fees and charges, decreases in 
state aid revenue, higher amounts of salaries and wages, increases amounts of capital spending, 
more other liabilities, and more long-term debt outstanding predict short-term debt.22 Consistent 
impacts occur for control variables such as issuing short-term debt in the two preceding fiscal 
years, having a deficit reported in the prior two fiscal years, and the size of a local government.  
 
2.5.2 Instrumental Variable Probit and Instrumental Variable Tobit Results 
The IV probit models (Table 2.4) and IV tobit models (Table 2.6) report predictors that 
influence the issuance of short-term debt and higher amounts of short-term debt issued, 
respectively. Overall, most of our hypotheses are supported when addressing endogeneity 
concerns. First, hypothesis 1 of more illiquid assets increasing the expected predicted probability 
of using short-term debt is supported by county and village governments. A 1 percent increase in 
illiquidity is likely to change the expected probability of issuing short-term debt per capita by 
2.1% and 0.5% for county and village governments, respectively. These governments, therefore, 
are likely to increase their cash position by accessing the short-term debt market when liquid 
resources are hard to obtain. 
Second, hypothesis 2 has some support by county, town and village governments in 
which more prior year surplus decreases the expected probability of issuing and issuing larger 
amounts of short-term debt. Town governments and village governments have the most prior 
year surplus on average at 3.6% and 4.6%, respectively. A 1 percent decrease in surplus, would 
                                                 
22 Minor differences to the hurdle model occur with the marginal results. For instance, the impact of a 1% 
increase in sales tax revenues is not found to significantly influence short-term debt issuance and in a Presidential 
election year town governments are more likely to reduce the issuance of short-term debt.  
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increase the expected issuance of short-term debt per capita by 1.0% and 0.6% as well as 
increase the amount of short-term debt issued by 5.1% and 4.6% for town and village 
governments, respectively. Managers might be acting prudently by issuing greater amounts of 
short-term debt per capita when they anticipate prior year accumulations are reduced.  
Hypothesis 3 and 4 are somewhat supported. Hypothesis 3a of an increased expected 
likelihood of issuing short-term debt when salaries and wages spending increase is supported by 
county and city governments. Yet, hypothesis 3b is counter to expectation with all local 
governments having an increased expected likelihood of issuing, and issuing more, short-term 
debt when the proportion of capital and equipment expenditures increase. The result could 
indicate the financing of infrastructure in the short-run to not delay long-term capital 
improvements as a source of bridge financing.   
Hypothesis 4a has mixed empirical support. County governments rely heavily on the 
sales tax; thus, managers are less likely to issue short-term debt if the proportion of sales tax 
revenue increases while having increases in the proportion of property taxes and fees and charges 
does not significantly predict short-term debt use and larger amounts of short-term debt being 
issued. The lower levels of government of cities and towns are likely to issue short-term debt 
when the proportion of property taxes and sales taxes increase. This is as expected with main 
sources of revenues contributing to less cash flow uncertainty. However, when city governments 
have an increase in the proportion of fees and charges there is an increase in the issuance and the 
amount issued of short-term debt. The result being counter to the expectation might be due to the 
uncertainty of receipt of fees and charges to motivate issuing short-term debt to ensure more 
timely cash inflows. Furthermore, a higher proportion of state aid decrease the expected 
likelihood of issuing short-term debt for city, and town governments as well as decrease the 
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expected likelihood of issuing more short-term debt for city and town governments. This result 
may indicate intergovernmental aid for lower levels of government might be relied on by 
managers to generate cash inflows and factor into not engaging in the short-term debt market.  
There is no evidence to support hypothesis 5 in the instrumental variable models. Local 
governments that report a high amount of liabilities are not more or less likely to issue or issue 
more short-term debt. However, hypothesis 6 of local governments timing the debt-market is 
supported at all local government levels. An increase in long-term debt per capita increases both 
the likelihood to engage in the short-term debt market and issue larger amounts of short-term 
debt.  
The control variables that increase the expected likelihood of issuing and issuing more 
short-term debt are prior short-term debt experience (all governments), not reporting a deficit 
(county and town governments), more wealth in the county (village governments), smaller sized 
governments (towns and villages), higher percentages voting for a Republican Senator (cities), 
not being a Presidential election year (villages), and the county and city governance structure.23  
 
 
                                                 
23 A local government having issued short-term debt in the past two years has an increased expected 
likelihood of issuing short-term debt by over 100% and has an increased expected likelihood of issuing larger 
amounts of short-term debt by over 400%. County and town governments that have reported a deficit are more likely 
to not issue short-term debt by 28.4% and 12.6% and county governments are more likely to not issue large amounts 
of short-term debt by 60.4%. As wealth, or personal income per capita, increases towns and villages are likely to 
issue short-term debt while cities are less likely to issue and issue greater amounts of short-term debt. An increase in 
the size of town and village governments has a higher expected likelihood of not issuing or issuing greater amounts 
of short-term debt. Counties with an Executive for a Chief Administrative Officer, as compared to those with an 
Administrator, have a lower expected likelihood of issuing short-term debt. County governments with a legislature 
instead of a supervisor governing body are associated with a 29.5% increase in the expected likelihood of issuing 
and 76.1% expected likelihood of issuing greater amounts of short-term debt. City governments that have a Mayor-
Council and Mayor-Council-Manager as compared to a Mayor-Council-Administrator have about a 100% reduction 
in issuing short-term debt. A lower likelihood of issuing a greater amount of short-term debt is expected under a 
Mayor-Council or Mayor-Council-Manager form of government as compared to a Mayor-Council-Administrator for 
city governments.  
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2.6 Concluding Remarks  
The results suggest the expected likelihood of issuing, as well as issuing more, short-term 
debt is increased when there is more illiquidity, larger reductions in prior year surplus, less 
dependence on state aid, more dependence on federal aid, less flexibility in spending from 
employee salaries, more spending on capital and equipment, a higher proportion of other 
liabilities, and more long-term debt is issued.  
One limitation of this study is that annual values and not quarterly or monthly cash flows 
are used. Ideally, short-term debt use, measures of cash inflows (e.g., tax receipts, 
intergovernmental revenues, and fees), and cash outflows (e.g., employee payroll, capital 
spending, and debt service payments) should be collected on a short-time frame. Data on a less 
than annual basis is not made publicly available to analyze. A second limitation of this analysis 
is that legal limitations governing the amount of short-term debt issued is unknown and could 
have been implemented or changed over time. The legal limitations on short-term debt are 
unknown broadly across local levels of government unless a more detailed survey or document 
analysis is conducted to reveal if certain policies exist.  
Despite limitations, this analysis has two policy recommendations. First, financial 
managers can create and implement or refine current policies that govern the management of 
short-term debt. Policies are imperative since short-term debt is used as a cash flow management 
tool especially when cash flow surpluses are reduced, and high illiquidity of governmental assets 
exist. Policies can be created or updated to maintain a certain level of unrestricted cash surplus 
with higher thresholds with growing dependency on federal aid or increases in employee salaries. 
Second, short-term debt is expected to be issued in larger amounts with more capital spending 
and long-term debt outstanding. This signifies that bond anticipated notes are likely used and 
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thus, a secondary cost of issuing more short-term debt. Therefore, policies around the issuance of 
long-term debt can account for a higher amount of short-term debt to adequately portray the local 
government’s engagement in the debt market. This can be especially important to enact and 
understand if a local government infrequently accesses the long-term debt market and may fail to 
realize that their short-term debt burden is likely to increase as well.   
In conclusion, this study helps to develop the working capital literature by investigating 
the predictors used for engaging and using larger amounts of short-term debt at the local general 
purpose government level. Financial managers can be made aware of predictors of short-term 
debt to develop and improve policies for its management.  
  
42 
 
2.7 References  
 
Arapis, T., Reitano, V., & Bruck, E. (2017). The Fiscal Savings Behavior of Pennsylvania 
School Districts Through the Great Recession. Public Budgeting & Finance, 37(3), 47-
70. doi:10.1111/pbaf.12162 
Bahl, R., & Duncombe, W. (1993). State and Local Debt Burdens in the 1980s: A Study in 
Contrast. Public Administration Review, 53(1), 31-40. doi:10.2307/977274 
Barnard, C. I. (1938). The functions of the executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Bourgeois, L. J. (1981). On the Measurement of Organizational Slack. The Academy of 
Management Review, 6(1), 29-39. doi:10.5465/AMR.1981.4287985 
Bradbury, K. L., Mayer, C. J., & Case, K. E. (2001). Property tax limits, local fiscal behavior, 
and property values: Evidence from Massachusetts under Proposition 212. Journal of 
Public Economics, 80(2), 287-311. doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00081-5 
Breckinridge Capital Advisors. (2014). The impact of private placements & direct lending on the 
municipal market. In: Breckinridge Capital Advisors White Papers. 
Clingermayer, J. C., & Wood, B. D. (1995). Disentangling Patterns of State Debt Financing. The 
American Political Science Review, 89(1), 108-120. doi:10.2307/2083078 
Cragg, J. G. (1971). Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application 
to the Demand for Durable Goods. Econometrica, 39(5), 829-844.  
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Daniel, F., Lohrke, F. T., Fornaciari, C. J., & Turner, R. A. (2004). Slack resources and firm 
performance: a meta-analysis. Journal of Business Research, 57(6), 565-574. 
doi:10.1016/S0148-2963(02)00439-3 
Duncombe, W., & Hou, Y. (2014). The savings behavior of special purpose governments: A 
panel study of New York school districts. Public Budgeting & Finance, 34(3), 1-23. 
doi:10.1111/pbaf.12045 
Ellis, M. A., & Schansberg, D. E. (1999). The Determinants of State Government Debt 
Financing. Public Finance Review, 27(6), 571-587. doi:10.1177/109114219902700601 
Fernandez, S., & Wise, L. R. (2010). An exploration of why public organizations ‘ingest’ 
innovations. Public Administration, 88(4), 979-998. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9299.2010.01857.x 
Finkler, S. A., Smith, D. L., Calabrese, T. D., & Purtell, R. M. (2016). Financial management for 
public, health, and not-for-profit organizations: CQ Press. 
Fisher, R. C., & Wassmer, R. W. (2014). The issuance of state and local debt during the United 
States great recession. National Tax Journal, 67(1), 113-150. doi:10.17310/ntj.2014.1.04 
Gauthier, S. J. (2009). GFOA updates best practice on fund balance. Government Finance 
Review, 25(6), 68-69.  
Gianakis, G., & Snow, D. (2007). The implementation and utilization of stabilization funds by 
local governments in Massachusetts. Public Budgeting & Finance, 27(1), 86-103. 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2007.00870.x 
Gore, A. K. (2009). Why do cities hoard cash? Determinants and implications of municipal cash 
holdings. The Accounting Review, 84(1), 183-207. doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.1.183 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board. (2009). Statement No. 54: Fund Balance Reporting 
and Governmental Fund Type Definitions. Retrieved from 
http://gasb.org/resources/ccurl/313/494/GASBS%2054.pdf 
43 
 
Hand, M. L., Pierson, K., & Thompson, F. (2016). A replication study of “Why do cities hoard 
cash?” (The accounting review 2009). Public Finance Review, 44(5), 681-687. 
doi:10.1177/1091142115580130 
Hawley, Z., & Rork, J. C. (2015). Competition and property tax limit overrides: Revisiting 
Massachusetts' Proposition 2. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 52, 93-107. 
doi:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2015.02.006 
Hendrick, R. (2006). The role of slack in local government finances. Public Budgeting & 
Finance, 26(1), 14-46. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2006.00837.x 
Hendrick, R., & Crawford, J. (2014). Municipal fiscal policy space and fiscal structure: Tools for 
managing spending volatility. Public Budgeting & Finance, 34(3), 24-50. 
doi:10.1111/pbaf.12042 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The 
American economic review, 76(2), 323-329.  
Joyce, P. G. (2001). What's so magical about five percent? A nationwide look at factors that 
influence the optimal size of state rainy day funds. Public Budgeting & Finance, 21(2), 
62-87. doi:10.1111/0275-1100.00050 
Kelly, J. M. (2013). Fund balance for budget stabilization: Does the new accounting presentation 
matter? Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 25(4), 719.  
Khan, A. (2003). Learning from Experience: Cash Management Practices of a Local 
Government. In A. Khan & W. B. Hildreth (Eds.), Case studies in public budgeting and 
financial management (Second Edition, Revised and Expanded ed.). New York: Marcel 
Dekker, Inc. 
Kim, K., & Lim, S. (2017). Determinants of state long-term debt: The political market 
framework. The Social Science Journal. doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2017.11.002 
Kriz, K. A. (2002). The optimal level of local government fund balances: A simulation approach. 
Paper presented at the Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the 
Annual Meeting of the National Tax Association. 
Kroszner, R. S., & Stratmann, T. S. (2000). Congressional Committees as Reputation-building 
Mechanisms Business and Politics, 2(1), 35-52.  
Lang, K., & Jian, T. (2004). Property taxes and property values: Evidence from Proposition 212. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 55(3), 439-457. doi:10.1016/j.jue.2004.01.002 
Marlowe, J. (2005). Fiscal Slack and Counter-Cyclical Expenditure Stabilization: A First Look at 
the Local Level. Public Budgeting & Finance, 25(3), 48-72.  
Marlowe, J. (2011). Beyond 5 percent: Optimal municipal slack resources and credit ratings. 
Public Budgeting & Finance, 31(4), 93-108. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2011.00994.x 
Marlowe, J. (2013). Fiscal slack, reserves, and rainy-day funds. In H. Levine, J. Justice, & E. 
Scorsone (Eds.), Handbook of local government fiscal health: Jones & Bartlett Learning. 
Meier, K. J., & O’Toole, L. J., Jr. (2002). Public management and organizational performance: 
The effect of managerial quality. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21(4), 
629-643. doi:10.1002/pam.10078 
Migué, J.-L., Bélanger, G., & Niskanen, W. A. (1974). Toward a General Theory of Managerial 
Discretion [with Comment and Reply]. Public Choice, 17(1), 27-51. 
doi:10.1007/BF01718995 
Moak, L. L. (1982). Municipal bonds: Planning, sale, and administration: Municipal Finance 
Officers Association. 
44 
 
Moe, T. (1997). "The positive theory of public bureaucracy". In D. C. Mueller (Ed.), 
Perspectives on Public Choice. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Moulick, A. G., & Taylor, L. L. (2017). Fiscal slack, budget shocks, and performance in public 
organizations: Evidence from public schools. Public Management Review, 19(7), 990-
1005. doi:10.1080/14719037.2016.1243813 
New York State. (2008). The Credit Crunch: Implications for Local Government Short-Term 
Debt. Retrieved from Albany, NY: 
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/creditcrunch.pdf 
New York State Department of State. (2009). Local Government Handbook. In (6th ed.): New 
York State Department of State. (Reprinted from: 2011). 
New York State Department of State. (2014). What do Local Governments do? Retrieved from 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/localgovs.html#towngovs 
Nguyen-Hoang, P., & Hou, Y. (2014). Local Fiscal Responses to Procyclical Changes in State 
Aid. Publius, 44(4), 587-608. doi:10.1093/publius/pjt039 
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government: Transaction Publishers. 
Nohria, N., & Gulati, R. (1996). Is Slack Good or Bad for Innovation? The Academy of 
Management Journal, 39(5), 1245-1264.  
O'Toole, L. J., & Meier, K. J. (2011). Public management: Organizations, governance, and 
performance. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Peltzman, S. (1992). Voters as Fiscal Conservatives. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
107(2), 327-361. doi:10.2307/2118475 
Riahi-Belkaoui, A. (1994). Organizational and Budgetary Slack. Westport, CT: Quorum. 
Rose, S., & Smith, D. L. (2012). Budget slack, institutions, and transparency. Public 
Administration Review, 72(2), 187-195. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02491.x 
Snow, D., & Gianakis, G. (2009). Stabilization fund strategies in Massachusetts: A survey of 
chief financial officers. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial 
Management, 21(4), 550. doi:10.1108/JPBAFM-21-04-2009-B003 
Snow, D., Gianakis, G., & Fortess, E. (2008). Simulating Massachusetts municipalities' recession 
readiness: Early warning of a perfect storm? Public Budgeting & Finance, 28(1), 1-21. 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2008.00894.x 
Snow, D., Gianakis, G. A., & Haughton, J. (2015). The politics of local government stabilization 
funds. Public Administration Review, 75(2), 304-314.  
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997). Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments. 
Econometrica, 65(3), 557-586.  
Stewart, L. S. M. (2009). Examining factors that impact Mississippi counties' unreserved fund 
balance during relative resource abundance and relative resource scarcity. Public 
Budgeting & Finance, 29(4), 45-73. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2009.00942.x 
Stewart, L. S. M. (2011). Governmental influence on unreserved fund balances for Mississippi 
counties. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 23(4), 478-
506. doi:10.1108/JPBAFM-23-04-2011-B002 
Stewart, L. S. M., Hamman, J. A., & Pink‐Harper, S. A. (2017). The stabilization effect of local 
government savings: The case of Illinois counties. Public Budgeting & Finance.  
Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression. In J. H. 
Stock & D. W. K. Andrews (Eds.), Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: 
Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
45 
 
Su, M., & Hildreth, W. B. (2018). Does Financial Slack Reduce Municipal Short-Term 
Borrowing?: Financial Slack and Municipal Short-Term Borrowing. Public Budgeting & 
Finance, 38(1), 95-113. doi:10.1111/pbaf.12189 
Tan, J., & Peng, M. W. (2003). Organizational slack and firm performance during economic 
transitions: Two studies from an emerging economy. Strategic Management Journal, 
24(13), 1249-1263. doi:10.1002/smj.351 
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action: social science bases of administrative theory. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Trautman, R. R. (1995). The Impact of State Debt Management on Debt Activity. Public 
Budgeting and Finance, 15(2), 33-51. doi:10.1111/1540-5850.01038 
Walker, J. L. (1969). The diffusion of innovations among the American states. American 
political science review, 63(3), 880-899.  
Wang, W. (2015). The great recession and the use of fund balances in North Carolina counties. 
In Local Government Budget Stabilization (pp. 17-32): Springer. 
Wang, W., & Hou, Y. (2012). Do local governments save and spend across budget cycles? 
Evidence from North Carolina. The American Review of Public Administration, 42(2), 
152-169. doi:10.1177/0275074011398387 
Williamson, O. E. (1963). A Model of Rational Managerial Behavior. In R. M. Cyert, J. G. 
March (Ed.), A behavioral theory of the firm (pp. 237-252). Englewood Cliffs, NY: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Wintrobe, R. (1997). Modern Bureaucratic Theory. In D. C. Mueller (Ed.), Perspectives on 
Public Choice: A Handbook (pp. 429-454). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
46 
 
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics for New York Local Governments (FYE Between 1996 and 2016) 
Panel A: County Governments       
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
Outcome Variable       
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 1197 1.782 2.343 0 7.924 Bloomberg/Open Book NY 
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita (>1) 1197 0.388 0.488 0 1 “ 
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita ($) 1197 65.80 163.40 0 2762.33 “ 
Test Variables       
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 1197 64.800 15.655 19.645 100 Open Book NY 
   Prior Year Surplus/(Deficit) (as a % of TE) 1197 1.173 5.290 -32.447 53.739 “ 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  1197 20.643 5.735 7.874 42.138 “ 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 1197 20.563 7.337 0.061 44.278 “ 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  1197 16.625 7.752 2.278 50.885 “ 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  1197 13.510 3.235 5.184 31.438 “ 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   1197 10.853 3.175 2.857 26.676 “ 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 1197 33.952 5.701 14.498 57.830 NY LG & SA data 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 1197 6.191 3.828 0.432 42.076 “ 
   Liabilities Per Capita (ln) 1197 5.418 0.389 4.335 6.740 Open Book NY 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 1197 5.756 1.292 0 8.024 “ 
Control Variables        
   Unemployment Rate (County level) (ln) 1197 1.734 0.290 0.993 2.416 U.S. BLS 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 1197 10.364 0.294 9.751 11.453 U.S. BEA 
   Issued Short-Term Debt in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1197 0.478 0.500 0 1 Bloomberg 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1197 0.582 0.493 0 1 NY LG & SA data 
   Size (TR Per Capita) (ln) 1197 7.566 0.245 6.858 8.565 Open Book NY 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) 1197 37.414 9.077 17.843 62.791 NY Board of Elections 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  1197 0.238 0.426 0 1 “ 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) 1197 0.286 0.452 0 1 “ 
   Located in a Chartered County (Yes=1) 1197 0.333 0.472 0 1 NY LG Handbook 
   County CAO (Chair of Legislative Body=1) 1197 0.228 0.420 0 1 “ 
   County CAO (Executive=1) 1197 0.281 0.450 0 1 “ 
   County CAO (Manager=1) 1197 0.123 0.328 0 1 “ 
   County Legislative Body (Legislature=1) 1197 0.702 0.458 0 1 “ 
   Number of County Legislative Members 1197 17.421 6.187 7 39 “ 
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Panel B: City Governments 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
Outcome Variable       
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 1279 2.330 2.810 0 7.841 Bloomberg/Open Book NY 
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita (>1) 1279 0.423 0.494 0 1 “ 
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita ($) 1279 167.00 316.30 0 2540.63 “ 
Test Variables       
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 1279 62.287 19.732 6.794 100 Open Book NY 
   Prior Year Surplus/(Deficit) (as a % of TE) 1279 1.151 11.043 -42.522 89.103 “ 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  1279 25.377 8.350 3.551 49.018 “ 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 1279 15.402 5.750 1.725 30.959 “ 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  1279 22.860 10.863 0.748 65.021 “ 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  1279 12.899 6.189 2.088 51.730 “ 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   1279 5.249 4.762 0 31.198 “ 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 1279 49.411 9.310 23.214 78.779 NY LG & SA data 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 1279 12.626 7.801 1.409 51.211 “ 
   Liabilities Per Capita (ln) 1279 5.310 0.807 0 7.242 Open Book NY 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 1279 7.001 0.700 3.874 8.306 “ 
Control Variables       
   Unemployment Rate (County level) (ln) 1279 1.704 0.294 1.030 2.398 U.S. BLS 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 1279 10.452 0.349 9.751 11.453 U.S. BEA 
   Issued Short-Term Debt in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1279 0.523 0.500 0 1 Bloomberg 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1279 0.701 0.458 0 1 NY LG & SA data 
   Size (TR Per Capita) (ln) 1279 7.529 0.270 6.878 8.549 Open Book NY 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) 1279 35.076 8.849 17.843 57.891 NY Board of Elections  
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  1279 0.238 0.426 0 1 “ 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) 1279 0.285 0.451 0 1 “ 
   City FoG (Mayor-Council=1) 1279 0.689 0.463 0 1 NY LG Handbook 
   City FoG (Mayor-Council-Manager=1) 1279 0.180 0.384 0 1 “ 
   City FoG (Council-Manager=1) 1279 0.033 0.178 0 1 “ 
   City FoG (Mayor-Commission/-Manager=1) 1279 0.049 0.216 0 1 “ 
   Number of City Council Members 1279 6.921 2.280 2 16 “ 
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                           Panel C: Town Governments       
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
Outcome Variable       
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 19288 0.301 1.222 0 7.966 Bloomberg/Open Book NY 
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita (>1) 19288 0.061 0.239 0 1 “ 
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita ($) 19288 16.34 104.92 0 2881.02 “ 
Test Variables       
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 19288 20.877 23.083 0 100 Open Book NY 
   Prior Year Surplus/(Deficit) (as a % of TE) 19288 3.572 19.299 -79.705 544.964 “ 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  19288 46.328 17.899 0.089 94.448 “ 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 19288 13.806 14.457 0 71.903 “ 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  19288 11.100 9.687 0.017 92.012 “ 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  19288 11.826 6.917 0.053 89.051 “ 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   19288 2.466 6.401 0 82.175 “ 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 19288 38.557 9.870 0 83.145 NY LG & SA data 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 19288 15.827 12.098 0 90.555 “ 
   Liabilities Per Capita (ln) 19288 1.881 1.784 0 8.643 Open Book NY 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 19288 3.889 2.561 0 9.336 “ 
Control Variables       
   Unemployment (ln) 19288 1.754 0.279 0.993 2.416 U.S. BLS 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 19288 10.332 0.278 9.751 11.453 U.S. BEA 
   Issued Short-Term Debt in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 19288 0.084 0.278 0 1 Bloomberg 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 19288 0.610 0.488 0 1 NY LG & SA data 
   Size (TR Per Capita) (ln) 19288 6.447 0.604 3.901 9.496 Open Book NY 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) 19288 37.413 8.976 17.843 62.791 NY Board of Elections  
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  19288 0.285 0.451 0 1 “ 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) 19288 0.238 0.426 0 1 “ 
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Panel D: Village Governments       
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
Outcome Variable       
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 11526 0.415 1.536 0 12.492 Bloomberg/Open Book NY 
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita (>1) 11526 0.073 0.259 0 1 “ 
   Short-Term Debt Per Capita ($) 11526 95.94 3104.12 0 266216.20 “ 
Test Variables       
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 11526 30.280 24.794 0 100 Open Book NY 
   Prior Year Surplus/(Deficit) (as a % of TE) 11526 4.628 35.366 -100 1750.62 “ 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  11526 35.581 19.252 0 100 “ 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 11526 9.031 9.648 0 83.361 “ 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % TR)  11526 29.926 18.473 0 98.194 “ 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR) 11526 6.446 7.555 0 93.809 “ 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   11526 2.954 8.056 0 91.394 “ 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 11526 33.187 14.511 0 90.898 NY LG & SA data 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 11526 14.923 15.422 0 98.583 “ 
   Liabilities Per Capita (ln) 11526 3.007 1.972 0 10.029 Open Book NY 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 11526 5.670 2.474 0 12.598 “ 
Control Variables       
   Unemployment (ln) 11526    1.699    0.292   0.993 2.416 U.S. BLS 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 11526   10.462    0.358   9.751 11.453 U.S. BEA 
   Issued Short-Term Debt in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 11526     0.102    0.302    0    1 Bloomberg 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 11526     0.622    0.485    0    1 NY LG & SA data 
   Size (TR Per Capita) (ln) 11526     6.990    0.772    0.262    12.351 Open Book NY 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) 11526   36.627    8.887  17.843    62.791 NY Board of Elections 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  11526     0.285    0.452    0    1 “ 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) 11526     0.238    0.426    0    1 “ 
Notes: (1) TE is total expenditures and other uses, TR is total revenues and other uses, TA is total governmental assets (excluding capital, debt 
service and special district funds), ln is natural log, CAO is Chief Administrative Officer, FoG is Form of Government, Bloomberg is 
Bloomberg, L.P. terminals, Open Book NY is Openbookny.com’s local government spending data, NY LG & SA data is New York Local 
Government & School Accountability data, U.S. BLS is United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. BEA is United States Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, NY Board of Elections is New York State Board of Elections, and FYE is fiscal year end. (2) All dollar values were 
adjusted with the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator with at 2009 base. 
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Table 2.2 Linear Hurdle Models with Robust Standard Errors (FYE Between 1996 and 2016) 
 County 
Governments 
City 
Governments 
Town 
Governments 
Village 
Governments 
Outcome Model      
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) -0.001 (0.004) 0.003 (0.002) -0.0001 (0.002) -0.014*** (0.002) 
   Prior Year Surplus/(Deficit) (as a % of TE) -0.016* (0.007) -0.011** (0.004) -0.005** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.018 (0.010) 0.009 (0.007) 0.010** (0.003) 0.002 (0.004) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 0.004 (0.008) -0.012 (0.010) 0.011** (0.004) 0.018** (0.008) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % TR)  -0.027** (0.009) 0.021*** (0.006) 0.003 (0.003) 0.009** (0.003) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.010 (0.015) -0.001 (0.009) -0.021** (0.007) -0.005 (0.008) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   0.037** (0.013) 0.000 (0.011) 0.001 (0.006) 0.004 (0.006) 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 0.046*** (0.008) 0.028*** (0.007) -0.015*** (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.042*** (0.011) 0.036*** (0.005) 0.015*** (0.003) 0.020*** (0.003) 
   Liabilities Per Capita (ln) 0.471*** (0.106) -0.081 (0.057) -0.005 (0.027) 0.030 (0.292) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 0.661*** (0.080) 1.066*** (0.082) 0.456*** (0.062) 0.658*** (0.086) 
   Constant  -3.487*** (0.979) -4.311*** (0.908) 1.910*** (0.506) 0.812 (0.729) 
Selection Model      
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
   Prior Year Surplus/(Deficit) (as a % of TE) -0.020* (0.009) -0.007 (0.004) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.011 (0.013) 0.002 (0.008) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.024* (0.012) 0.022* (0.010) -0.002 (0.002) -0.008** (0.004) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % TR)  -0.001 (0.010) 0.012 (0.007) 0.003 (0.002) 0.006** (0.002) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.024 (0.021) -0.021* (0.010) -0.026*** (0.004) -0.010** (0.004) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   0.032 (0.017) 0.016 (0.010) -0.007 (0.004) -0.003 (0.003) 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 0.023* (0.010) -0.005 (0.009) -0.001 (0.003) 0.010*** (0.002) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.030* (0.014) 0.021*** (0.007) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.002) 
   Liabilities Per Capita (ln) 0.124 (0.143) 0.187** (0.065) 0.020 (0.014) 0.019 (0.015) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 0.712*** (0.097) 0.611*** (0.111) 0.249*** (0.025) 0.173*** (0.026) 
   Unemployment Rate (County level) (ln) -0.184 (0.195) 0.069 (0.159) -0.136 (0.072) 0.045 (0.082) 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) -0.085 (0.318) 0.261 (0.199) 0.318*** (0.922) 0.406*** (0.089) 
   Issued Short-Term Debt in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1.301*** (0.100) 1.447*** (0.093) 1.644*** (0.044) 1.469*** (0.048) 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) -0.246** (0.096) 0.064 (0.098) -0.142*** (0.042) -0.064 (0.048) 
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   Size (TR Per Capita) (ln) -0.784* (0.350) -0.928*** (0.286) -0.315*** (0.048) -0.066 (0.402) 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) -0.004 (0.007) -0.010 (0.006) -0.002 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  -0.051 (0.112) 0.003 (0.104) 0.032 (0.048) 0.058 (0.052) 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) -0.011 (0.113) -0.043 (0.100) -0.099* (0.048) -0.190*** (0.054) 
   Located in a Chartered County (Yes=1) 0.337 (0.227)    
   County CAO (Chair of Legislative Body=1) 0.197 (0.137)    
   County CAO (Executive=1) -0.458 (0.245)    
   County CAO (Manager=1) -0.137 (0.189)    
   County Legislative Body (Legislature=1) 0.315* (0.132)    
   Number of County Legislative Members 0.006 (0.009)    
   City FoG (Mayor-Council=1)  0.101 (0.210)   
   City FoG (Mayor-Council-Manager=1)  -0.039 (0.226)   
   City FoG (Council-Manager=1)  0.492 (0.321)   
   City FoG (Mayor-Commission/-Manager=1)  -0.673 (0.362)   
   Number of City Council Members  0.043* (0.022)   
   Constant 0.088 (3.369) -2.905 (2.624) -4.375*** (1.056) -7.579*** (1.070) 
   Ln Sigma Constant -0.139*** (0.042) -0.123*** (0.038) 0.046 (0.028) 0.137*** (0.031) 
   Sigma  0.870 (0.036) 0.884 (0.034) 1.047 (0.029) 1.146 (0.035) 
Wald χ2 =  Wald χ2(11) = 
386.67 
Wald χ2(11) = 
301.41 
Wald χ2(11) = 
324.99 
Wald χ2(11) = 
472.26 
(P > χ2 =) (P > χ2 = 0.0000) (P > χ2 = 0.0000) (P > χ2 = 0.0000) (P > χ2 = 0.0000) 
Pseudo R2 0.2824 0.2383 0.3434 0.2621 
Observations 1197 1297 19288 11526 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that the corresponding coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. (2) TE is total expenditures and other uses, TR is total revenues and other uses, TA is total governmental assets (excluding 
capital, debt service and special district funds), ln is natural log, CAO is Chief Administrative Officer, FoG is Form of Government, FYE is fiscal 
year end, and all dollar values were adjusted with the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator with at 2009 base  
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Table 2.3 Linear Hurdle Model Margins (Marginal Effects of Covariates at Means) for Mean Short-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 
Variables County 
Governments 
City 
Governments 
Town 
Governments 
Village 
Governments 
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 0.018*** (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 0.0007*** (0.0001) 0.0012*** (0.0003) 
   Prior Year Surplus (as a % of TE) -0.032* (0.014) -0.018* (0.008) -0.0006*** (0.0001) -0.0008* (0.0003) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.021 (0.018) 0.007 (0.016) 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0003 (0.0006) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.032 (0.017) 0.040 (0.020) -0.0005 (0.0002) 0.0018 (0.0011) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.009 (0.015) 0.032* (0.012) 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.0019*** (0.0005) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.037 (0.030) -0.042* (0.019) -0.0028*** (0.0006) -0.0031** (0.0012) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   0.055* (0.024) 0.032 (0.020) -0.0006 (0.0004) -0.0008 (0.0009) 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 0.044** (0.015) 0.001 (0.017) -0.0002 (0.0003) 0.0027*** (0.0006) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.054** (0.020) 0.054*** (0.013) 0.0013*** (0.0003) 0.0047*** (0.0006) 
   Liabilities Per Capita (ln) 0.304 (0.202) 0.336** (0.126) 0.0019 (0.0014) 0.0063 (0.0045) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 1.173*** (0.118) 1.585*** (0.207) 0.0287*** (0.0021) 0.0672*** (0.0059) 
   Unemployment Rate (County level) -0.255 (0.271) 0.135 (0.311) -0.0133 (0.0071) 0.0132 (0.0240) 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) -0.118 (0.441) 0.512 (0.389) 0.0309** (0.0105) 0.1178*** (0.0282)  
   Short-Term Debt Issued in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1.747*** (0.130) 2.604*** (0.142) 0.7310*** (0.0841) 1.1951*** (0.0932) 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) -0.345** (0.134) 0.125 (0.191) -0.0144** (0.0047) -0.0188 (0.0141) 
   Size (TR Per Capita) (ln) -1.088* (0.478) -1.817*** (0.560) -0.0306*** (0.0044) -0.0192 (0.0111) 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) -0.006 (0.010) -0.020 (0.013) -0.0001 (0.0003) -0.0005 (0.0009) 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  -0.150 (0.156) 0.006 (0.203) 0.0031 (0.0047) 0.0170 (0.0154) 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) -0.071 (0.155) -0.085 (0.196) -0.0097* (0.0047) -0.055*** (0.0160) 
   Located in a Chartered County (Yes=1) 0.480 (0.329)    
   County CAO (Chair of Legislative Body=1) 0.281 (0.200)    
   County CAO (Executive=1) -0.594* (0.289)    
   County CAO (Manager=1) -0.184 (0.245)    
   County Legislative Body (Legislature=1) 0.419* (0.167)    
   Number of County Legislative Members 0.008 (0.012)    
   City FoG (Mayor-Council=1)  0.197 (0.404)   
   City FoG (Mayor-Council-Manager=1)  -0.076 (690.182)   
   City FoG (Council-Manager=1)  1.007 (0.667)   
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   City FoG (Mayor-Commission/-Manager=1)  -1.120* (0.495)   
   Number of City Council Members  0.085* (0.042)   
Observations 1197 1279 19288 11526 
Notes: (1) *, **, *** indicates that the corresponding coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Coefficients 
and standard errors, in parentheses, are obtained using margins command at covariate means in Stata. Dummy variables for government 
structure/authority are represented as the discrete change from the base level.  
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Table 2.4 Instrumental Variable Probit Models with Newey’s Two-Step Estimator (FYE Between 1996 and 2016) 
Variables County 
Governments 
City 
Governments 
Town 
Governments 
Village 
Governments 
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 0.021*** (0.005) 0.0002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.005*** (0.001) 
   Prior Year Surplus (as a % of TE) -0.036** (0.012) 0.002 (0.006) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.001) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.001 (0.014) -0.058*** (0.017) -0.013* (0.006) -0.004 (0.005) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.026* (0.012) -0.106*** (0.032) -0.016* (0.006) -0.012 (0.007) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.006 (0.011) 0.026** (0.009) -0.013 (0.008) -0.001 (0.006) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.032 (0.020) -0.055*** (0.014) -0.059*** (0.013) -0.036 (0.018) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   0.024 (0.019) 0.066*** (0.018) 0.018 (0.018) 0.022 (0.013) 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 0.029** (0.011) 0.236*** (0.054) 0.007 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.041** (0.014) 0.108*** (0.021) -0.014* (0.006) -0.007 (0.007) 
   Liabilities Per Capita (ln) -0.333 (0.220) -0.067 (0.158) 0.046 (0.027) 0.013 (0.016) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 0.679*** (0.097) 1.221*** (0.182) 0.245*** (0.022) 0.179*** (0.026) 
   Unemployment Rate (County level) -0.248 (0.211)  -0.339 (0.239) -0.023 (0.083) 0.033 (0.087) 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) -0.041 (0.319) -0.775* (0.328) 0.190 (0.118) 0.395*** (0.105) 
   Short-Term Debt Issued in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1.277*** (0.105) 1.424*** (0.122) 1.634*** (0.065) 1.508*** (0.058) 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) -0.284** (0.099) -0.125 (0.133) -0.126** (0.046) -0.039 (0.051) 
   Size (TR Per Capita) (ln) -0.486 (0.382) 0.359 (0.472)  -0.372*** (0.051) -0.094* (0.048) 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) 0 (0.007) 0.035** (0.013) 0.003 (0.003)  -0.0009 (0.003) 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  0.003 (0.117) 0.003 (0.140)  0.016 (0.050) 0.065 (0.054) 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) -0.046 (0.112) 0.015 (0.132) -0.080 (0.052)  -0.165** (0.058) 
   Located in a Chartered County (Yes=1) 0.435 (0.245)    
   County CAO (Chair of Legislative Body=1) 0.157 (0.144)    
   County CAO (Executive=1) -0.501* (0.254)    
   County CAO (Manager=1) -0.049 (0.185)    
   County Legislative Body (Legislature=1) 0.295* (0.133)    
   Number of County Legislative Members 0.010 (0.010)    
   City FoG (Mayor-Council=1)  -0.937** (0.363)   
   City FoG (Mayor-Council-Manager=1)  -1.173** (0.394)   
   City FoG (Council-Manager=1)  -0.952 (0.532)   
   City FoG (Mayor-Commission/-Manager=1)  -0.613 (0.462)   
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   Number of City Council Members  0.022 (0.029)   
   Constant -0.773 (3.254) -13.873** (4.45) -1.545 (1.479) -6.217*** (1.620) 
Observations 1197 1279 18363 10969 
Notes: (1) *, **, *** indicates that the corresponding coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Coefficients and 
standard errors, in parentheses, are obtained using margins command at covariate means in Stata. Dummy variables for government structure/authority 
are represented as the discrete change from the base level. (3) Variables that are found to be likely endogenous are illiquidity (counties and towns), prior 
year surplus (counties, towns, and villages), fees and charges (towns), state aid revenue (towns and villages), federal aid revenue (towns and villages), 
salaries and wages (cities and towns), capital and equipment (towns and villages), and other liabilities (counties). Instruments for the endogenous 
variables are private sector financial industry wages per capita in each county for salaries and wages and all other are one year lagged values of the 
endogenous variables expressed in the form of ranks. 
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Table 2.5 Instrumental Variable Probit Model Margins (Marginal Effects of Covariates at Means)  
for Mean Short-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 
 
Variables County 
Governments 
City 
Governments 
Town 
Governments 
Village 
Governments 
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 0.021*** (0.005) 0 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.005*** (0.001) 
   Prior Year Surplus (as a % of TE) -0.036** (0.012) 0.002 (0.006) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.001) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.001 (0.014) -0.058*** (0.017) -0.013* (0.006) -0.004 (0.005) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.026* (0.012) -0.106*** (0.032) -0.016* (0.006) -0.012 (0.007) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.006 (0.011) 0.026** (0.009) -0.013 (0.008) -0.001 (0.006) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.032 (0.020) -0.055*** (0.014) -0.059*** (0.013) -0.036 (0.018) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   0.024 (0.019) 0.066*** (0.018) 0.018 (0.018) 0.022 (0.013) 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 0.029** (0.011) 0.236*** (0.054) 0.007 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.041** (0.014) 0.108*** (0.021) -0.014* (0.006) -0.007 (0.007) 
   Liabilities Per Capita (ln) -0.333 (0.220) -0.067 (0.158) 0.046 (0.027) 0.013 (0.016) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 0.679*** (0.097) 1.220*** (0.182) 0.245*** (0.022) 0.179*** (0.026) 
   Unemployment Rate (County level) -0.248 (0.211) -0.339 (0.239) -0.023 (0.083) 0.033 (0.087) 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) -0.041 (0.319) -0.775* (0.328) 0.190 (0.118) 0.395*** (0.105) 
   Short-Term Debt Issued in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1.277*** (0.105) 1.424*** (0.122) 1.634*** (0.066) 1.508*** (0.058) 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) -0.284** (0.099) -0.125 (0.133) -0.126** (0.046) -0.039 (0.051) 
   Size (TR Per Capita) (ln) -0.486 (0.382) 0.359 (0.472) -0.372*** (0.051) -0.094* (0.048) 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) 0 (0.007) 0.352* (0.013) 0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  0.003 (0.117) 0.003 (0.140) 0.016 (0.050) 0.065 (0.539) 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) -0.046 (0.112) 0.015 (0.132) -0.080 (0.052) -0.165** (0.058) 
   Located in a Chartered County (Yes=1) 0.435 (0.245)    
   County CAO (Chair of Legislative Body=1) 0.156 (0.144)    
   County CAO (Executive=1) -0.501* (0.254)    
   County CAO (Manager=1) -0.049 (0.185)    
   County Legislative Body (Legislature=1) 0.295* (0.133)    
   Number of County Legislative Members 0.010 (0.010)    
   City FoG (Mayor-Council=1)  -0.937** (0.363)   
   City FoG (Mayor-Council-Manager=1)  -1.173** (0.394)   
   City FoG (Council-Manager=1)  -0.952 (0.532)   
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   City FoG (Mayor-Commission/-Manager=1)  -0.613 (0.462)   
   Number of City Council Members  0.022 (0.029)   
Observations 1197 1279 18363 10969 
Notes: (1) *, **, *** indicates that the corresponding coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Coefficients and 
standard errors, in parentheses, are obtained using margins command at covariate means in Stata. Dummy variables for government structure/authority 
are represented as the discrete change from the base level. 
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Table 2.6 Instrumental Variable Tobit Regression Models with Newey’s Two-Step Estimator (FYE Between 1996 and 2016) 
Variables County 
Governments 
City 
Governments 
Town 
Governments 
Village 
Governments 
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 0.057*** (0.014) 0.003 (0.011) 0.024* (0.011) 0.033*** (0.007) 
   Prior Year Surplus (as a % of TE) -0.106** (0.033) -0.007 (0.017) -0.051*** (0.009) -0.046*** (0.011) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.016 (0.037) -0.151** (0.054) -0.065* (0.026) 0.024 (0.029) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.061 (0.033) -0.264** (0.102) -0.081** (0.029) -0.014 (0.039) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.025 (0.029) 0.112*** (0.029) -0.067* (0.029) 0.057 (0.030) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.096 (0.053) -0.142** (0.045) -0.340*** (0.062) 0.021 (0.034) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   0.085 (0.046) 0.210*** (0.055) 0.079 (0.089) 0.222* (0.088) 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 0.098*** (0.029) 0.699*** (0.152) 0.029 (0.023) 0.021 (0.023) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.132*** (0.036) 0.335*** (0.058) -0.070*** (0.033) -0.038 (0.051) 
   Liabilities Per Capita (ln) -0.531 (0.582) -0.132 (0.327) 0.015 (0.095) 0.120 (0.115) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 2.215*** (0.263) 4.846*** (0.701) 1.472*** (0.124) 1.550*** (0.187) 
   Unemployment Rate (County level) -0.907 (0.546) -0.861 (0.707) 0.069 (0.425) 0.312 (0.624) 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) -0.187 (0.827) -1.989* (1.001) 1.246* (0.602) 2.930*** (0.743) 
   Short-Term Debt Issued in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 4.106*** (0.311) 5.448*** (0.426) 8.945*** (0.368) 11.360*** (0.468) 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) -0.604* (0.257) -0.405 (0.426) -0.592* (0.242) -0.380 (0.360) 
   Size (TR Per Capita) (ln) -1.340 (1.011) 0.502 (1.431) -1.878*** (0.273) -0.077 (0.306) 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) -0.005 (0.019) 0.103** (0.039) 0.014 (0.017) 0.002 (0.025) 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  -0.062 (0.304) -0.151 (0.417) 0.155 (0.265) 0.533 (0.388) 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) -0.066 (0.292) -0.096 (0.421) -0.354 (0.274) -1.207** (0.412) 
   Located in a Chartered County (Yes=1) 1.052 (0.635)    
   County CAO (Chair of Legislative Body=1) 0.391 (0.397)    
   County CAO (Executive=1) -1.356* (0.665)    
   County CAO (Manager=1) -0.161 (0.508)    
   County Legislative Body (Legislature=1) 0.761* (0.358)    
   Number of County Legislative Members 0.015 (0.024)    
   City FoG (Mayor-Council=1)  -2.85** (1.053)   
   City FoG (Mayor-Council-Manager=1)  -3.715** (1.163)   
   City FoG (Council-Manager=1)  -2.30 (1.511)   
   City FoG (Mayor-Commission/-Manager=1)  -2.451 (1.478)   
   Number of City Council Members  0.029 (0.090)   
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   Constant  -4.928 (8.650) -51.701*** (14.190)   -12.379 (7.311) -59.408*** (9.871) 
Observations 1197 1218 18363 10969 
Left Censored observations (≤ 0) 732 702 17231 10151 
Notes: (1) *, **, *** indicates that the corresponding coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (2) Models are estimated 
with instrumental variable (IV) tobit with Newey’s (1987) two-step estimator for all governments. (3) Likely endogenous variables are illiquidity 
(counties and towns), prior year surplus (counties, towns and villages), sales taxes (cities), state aid (towns), federal aid (towns and villages), salaries 
and wages (cities and towns), capital expenditures (towns and villages), other liabilities (counties), and long-term debt (cities). Instruments for the 
endogenous variables are private sector financial industry wages per capita in each county for salaries and wages (cities) and all other are one year 
lagged values of the endogenous variables expressed in the form of ranks.  
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Chapter 3:  What Influences Working Capital Management? A Survey of New York Local 
Government Financial Officers 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Working capital management (WCM) is an integral part of organizational health and 
successful operations. WCM is a managerial strategy that monitors and utilizes current assets 
(e.g., cash, accounts receivable, and inventory) and current liabilities (e.g., accounts payable and 
notes payable) to ensure smooth operations. The primary purpose of WCM is for managers to 
maintain cash flows to meet short-term operating expenses and obligations; short-term implies, 
by convention, any duration less than a year.  
WCM traditionally appears in corporate finance textbooks with a vast body of literature 
supporting its importance (Afza & Nazir, 2007; Aktas, Croci, & Petmezas, 2015; Boisjoly & 
Izzo, 2009; Kieschnick, Laplante, & Moussawi, 2013; Knauer & Wöhrmann, 2013; Kroes & 
Manikas, 2014; Ross, Westerfield, & Jordan, 2016; Tiruvengadam & Beruvides, 2017). The 
main assertion is that WCM is beneficial to manage liquidity and firm value (Knauer & 
Wöhrmann, 2013). However, WCM can also be beneficial to manage liquidity and sustain 
uninterrupted services for public organizations.  
Typically, governments pay for services to residents leading to cash outflows and collect 
taxes for cash inflows. To manage cash outflows and inflows, WCM strategies can engage the 
use of internal resources (e.g., unrestricted cash balances, savings, budget stabilization funds, 
interfund borrowing, transfers, and delaying payments) and/or external sources of financing (e.g., 
receivables, line of credit, direct lending arrangements, and short-term debt). Public managers 
continually select WCM strategies to implement irrespective of economic shocks. The choice of 
different WCM strategies has a short-term direct effect on a government’s liquidity (or cash 
flow) position. For example, if managers choose a strategy allowing payments for services to be 
postponed, payables increase but cash outflows will be needed at a later point in time. Inversely, 
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if governments allow for late or credit payments from suppliers, cash inflows are delayed. Given, 
that governments usually collect property taxes infrequently, such as twice a year, cash balances 
may already be low to motivate the use of short-term debt for supplemental cash inflows (Lofton 
& Kioko, 2018). Therefore, to effectively manage cash flows, it is imperative managers 
understand the range of available WCM strategies as well as the associated costs and risks of 
using strategies. 
Public finance textbooks provide little guidance about available strategies for WCM, 
tradeoffs when selecting strategies, and how often governments implement strategies (Bartle, 
Hildreth, & Marlowe, 2013; Finkler, Smith, Calabrese, & Purtell, 2016; Kioko & Marlowe, 
2017). Scholars have evaluated managers’ savings practices (Arapis, Reitano, & Bruck, 2017a; 
Duncombe & Hou, 2014; Hendrick, 2006; Hendrick & Crawford, 2014; Marlowe, 2005; 
Moulick & Taylor, 2017; Stewart, Hamman, & Pink‐Harper, 2017; Wang, 2015; Wang & Hou, 
2012), perceptions about fund management strategies (Snow & Gianakis, 2009), and attitudes 
towards adopting new government reporting practices (Frank & Gianakis, 2010) but not a wide 
range of strategies used for WCM. Our underdeveloped knowledge about public WCM naturally 
raises the following questions. What strategies for WCM are available to public managers? Do 
managers have a preferred WCM strategy? To what extent, are managers implementing their 
preferred WCM strategy? Does the selection and implementation of strategy (or strategies) differ 
by type of government? The aim of this essay is to provide answers to these questions to improve 
practice-oriented theory.  
This essay summarizes findings of a survey designed to ascertain the preferred and 
implemented WCM strategies of public managers. I assert that the modified pecking order 
theory, preferring the use of internal funds over external borrowing, can be applied to WCM 
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strategies. Findings indicate an internal resource of unrestricted cash is preferred and 
implemented to mitigate a cash flow deficit for all local governments. Village government 
managers prefer the use of internal resources (e.g., unrestricted cash and delaying payments and 
transfers out) before external financing (e.g., speeding up collections of receivables and issuing 
short-term debt). Among strategies that rely on internal resources, managers prefer and 
implement the lowest cost and risk strategy. Except for city managers that prefer the use of short-
term debt, local government managers prefer the lowest cost and risk strategy among those that 
rely on external sources of financing. However, the strategy most often implemented is to reduce 
unrestricted cash and issue short-term debt to mitigate a cash flow deficit for county, city, and 
village government managers. 
The remainder of this article is in five parts: First, section 3.2 describes how public 
finance professionals conduct cash flow management and the broader concept of working capital 
management, as well as motivate the use of strategies. Second, section 3.3 offers classifications 
of WCM strategies that rely on internal resources or external sources of financing and reasons 
why different strategies are preferred by managers. Third, section 3.4 provides information on 
the survey, characteristics of responding managers, and hypotheses to test the rank-ordering of 
strategies preferred and implemented. Fourth, section 3.5 states the survey results for several 
types of local government managers. Finally, section 3.6 offers concluding remarks.  
 
3.2 Cash Flow Management and Working Capital Management  
 
One important public finance professional is the chief financial officer who is authorized 
to monitor day-to-day financial operations and is responsible for proper management of 
resources. While different titles exist for a government’s chief financial officer (e.g., 
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Comptroller, Controller, Commissioner of Finance, Director of Finance, or Treasurer),24 the 
broad term of manager will be used. Ultimately, they are responsible for prudent management of 
financial resources which necessitates cash flow management and working capital management.  
 Cash flow management may be viewed as “the development of procedures to accelerate 
cash receipts and control disbursements to keep cash available as long as possible” (Khan, 2003).  
First, managers create a cash budget to assess if the government has sufficient cash for 
operations. A cash budget reports estimates of cash receipts (inflows) and cash disbursements 
(outflows), usually on a monthly or quarterly basis. Cash inflows include tax receipts, bond 
proceeds, grants, other revenue from fees, and maturities of investment securities. Cash outflows 
include payments for employee payroll or benefits, payouts to vendors for goods and services, 
and debt service payments. Due to the uneven cash flows, managers are motivated to plan and 
forecast cash balances for a given time frame. The forecasted estimates are based on timing and 
trend data (e.g., property tax collections and sales taxes remitted) primarily from the previous 
three to five years of cash flows (Peng, 2013). Knowing that, unanticipated variations in 
economic conditions and emergencies could produce deviations from these projections.  
Secondly, managers think about the organization’s liquidity position, which is the 
government’s ability to manage cash flows. Liquidity is often determined by the pattern of cash 
                                                 
24 The Comptroller (or Controller), who is typically elected, serves as the chief fiscal officer who advises 
the chief executive officer and governing body about the government’s fiscal condition and examines all financial 
matters. These functions could include recommendations for programs and operations, fiscal policies, and financial 
transactions. A Comptroller often serves at the state, county, or city levels of government. The Commissioner of 
Finance (or Director of Finance) oversees the fiscal and administrative responsibilities which include 
superintendence over fiscal affairs, budget management, and auditing. The Commissioner of Finance often serves at 
the county or city levels of government. The Treasurer maintains funds, can issue checks and prepares annual 
financial reports. The Treasurer often serves at the town and village level of government as the chief fiscal officer. 
The chief financial officer should understand the funds available and the legal ways to use them, methods of 
financing, financial policies and procedures, and best practices of similar jurisdictions (Bartle et al., 2013). The CFO 
can be elected by citizens, appointed by the chief elected official, appointed by the governing body, or hired by a 
designated manager. Each of these positions can be the chief financial officer of the government and thus, ultimately 
responsible for the oversight of financial management practices of the government.  
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inflows, cash outflows, cash reserves, and the availability of temporary loans (Moak, 1982). If 
cash inflows are greater than cash outflows, a cash flow surplus occurs, in which cash balances 
are positive. When excess cash is present, scholars recommend policies be established to invest 
the idle cash in interest bearing accounts, investment pools, certificates of deposit, repurchase 
agreements, or securities that minimize exposure to risk while maximizing the potential 
investment earnings (Johnson & Mikesell, 2003; Khan, 1996; Khan & Hildreth, 2003; Larson, 
2004; Lienert, 2009; Peng, 2013).  
Conversely, a cash flow deficit occurs when cash inflows are less than cash outflows in a 
given period. A cash flow deficit can occur without a structural deficit, a budget deficit in which 
expenditures are greater than revenues for multiple fiscal years. However, it could be more likely 
a government will have a cash flow deficit if there is a structural deficit. Cash inflows do not 
include prior cash balances. Therefore, governments with varying patters of cash flows or even 
cash flow deficits can use available prior cash balances, unrestricted cash, to keep operations 
active. Although, if the available prior cash balance is added to cash inflows and cash outflows 
are still greater, a net cash flow deficit occurs. While managers can wait for more cash receipts to 
address an expected cash flow deficit, actions or a set of actions can be enacted such as using 
reserve funds, accelerating the collection of revenues, prompt settlement of the receipt of 
intergovernmental revenues, adjusting the basis of accounting,25 and maintaining enough fund 
balance for current needs (Moak, 1982).  
                                                 
25 There exist differences between full accrual, modified accrual, and cash basis accounting which can 
cause larger amounts of unappropriated surplus for working capital to be maintain, respectively. Each government 
can use a different accounting basis for internal use or external reporting purposes. It is advocated to maintain 
reasonable working capital funds and discourage budgetary gimmicks that produce temporary changes in the fiscal 
year such as taking advantage of one-time surpluses to have the appearance of a favorable financial condition 
(Moak, 1982).  
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Working capital management (WCM) may be viewed as a broader process than cash flow 
management in which cash flows, reserves, and short-term obligations are strategically used to 
maintain liquidity and sustain operations. WCM requires: (1) awareness of how to pursue a goal 
of positive cash flows, (2) an understanding of the consequences of strategies chosen, and (3) 
learning by adapting to changes in the environment, gaining knowledge from prior actions, and 
building capacity for future unanticipated challenges. Ultimately, WCM can be an ideal practice 
to guide cash flows throughout the budget period. The implementation of WCM focuses on 
pragmatic actions carried out within the context of governmental legal frameworks and 
mandates. Managers, therefore, need to understand the strategies available, their associated cost 
and risk, and the tradeoffs among chosen strategies for prudent WCM. 
 
3.3 Working Capital Management Strategies  
 
Every working capital management strategy used by a manager can have a specific cost 
and risk. Cost is defined as the monetary and non-monetary price (all transaction costs) incurred 
with implementing a strategy. The cost of a strategy can include time cost for approval of use, 
cost to gain financial capacity or information, cost to build relationships with a third party, and 
interest cost. Risk is defined as the exposure to loss which can include loss of optionality to use 
funds for another purpose, loss of reputational standing, and loss of surplus in other funds. Each 
strategy is associated with a different cost and risk. No one strategy is superior to another 
however, I hypothesize that the lowest cost and risk strategy is preferred, if available to 
managers. In this section, lower cost and risk strategies are presented first and classified as 
relying on internal resources or external sources of financing. Table 3.1 summarizes each 
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strategy according to the potential cost, risk, and use of an internal resource or external source of 
financing.  
 
3.3.1 Strategies: Internal Resources and External Sources of Financing  
 
Strategies can be classified as those relying on internal resources or accessing external 
sources of financing to maintain liquidity. Internal resources include use of unrestricted cash 
balances; accessing prior savings and budget stabilization funds; relying on interfund borrowing; 
interfund transfers including transfers from fund sweeps; and delaying payments of 
disbursements. Generally, strategies that use internal resources are under managers’ discretion 
but some might require certain authority or approval from a governing body (e.g., budget 
stabilization funds and interfund transfers). These strategies impose low transaction costs, but 
minor risk persist from receiving funds in a timely manner following the requisite approval.   
Conversely, strategies that use external sources of financing involve accessing a party 
outside of government (e.g., a financial institution or financial markets) such as speeding up the 
collection of receivables, accessing a line of credit, engaging in a direct lending arrangement, 
and the issuance of short-term debt. As compared to strategies that rely on internal resources, the 
use of external sources of financing typically require more management expertise, prior planning 
before accessing resources, and the risk that resources will not be received before the expected 
temporary cash deficit. Therefore, strategies that use external sources of financing are usually 
higher in cost and risk compared to strategies that use internal resources.  
I hypothesize that managers likely prefer a lower cost and risk strategy or combination of 
strategies. The modified pecking order theory can be applied to support this assertion. As 
originally asserted, pecking order theory suggests a preference ranking of financial sources in 
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which internal financing sources are used first, then debt, and last equity (Myers, 1984; Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). The behavioral choices behind this ordered ranking are that firms perceive 
internal sources as having lower costs, less information asymmetry, and fewer underinvestment 
problems, and thus, prefer their use. If external sources are necessary, firms prefer debt for its 
lower cost and risk before equity is utilized.  
Since public organizations do not report equity, modified pecking order theory is applied 
to evaluate the ranking of internal before external financing sources (Myers, 1984; Myers & 
Majluf, 1984) and scholars find internal funds are preferred over external borrowing (Bowman, 
2002; Calabrese, 2011; Denison, 2009; Yan, Denison, & Butler, 2009). One study has applied 
the modified pecking order theory to governments to find an internal source of financing, 
financial slack, reduces a city’s probability of using an external source of financing, issuing 
short-term debt (Su & Hildreth, 2018). However, managers’ revealed preferences of a range of 
WCM strategies and implementation practices have not been evaluated for local governments.  
This work contributes to the existing literature as the first to apply the modified pecking 
order theory to an identified managers’ preferences of WCM strategies and implementation 
practices. The remainder of this section describes strategies that use internal resources and 
external sources of financing. I hypothesize preferred and frequently implemented strategies are 
the lowest perceived cost and risk available to a manager and thus, expected low cost and risk 
strategies are presented first in each classification.  
 
3.3.2 Internal Resource: Unrestricted Cash Balance 
 
Managers can choose to use unrestricted cash holdings. This strategy has no cost since 
managers have full discretion over unrestricted cash balances and no approval is required from a 
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governing body. Minimal risk exists from loss of the optionality to use unrestricted cash for 
another purpose (e.g., gaining potential interest from investing idle cash or organizational 
innovation for more efficient operations). Governments are more likely to accumulate cash 
balances with higher variation in revenues, fewer sources of revenues, higher population growth, 
higher levels of administrative costs, and under property tax limits (Gore, 2009; Hand, Pierson, 
& Thompson, 2016; Kioko, 2015). The existence of large cash holdings is a proxy for more 
competent managers (Hand et al., 2016; Meier & O’Toole, 2002; O'Toole & Meier, 2011).  
It is expected that the use of unrestricted cash is the preferred managerial choice to 
reduce a cash flow deficit. The literature suggests this will be supported since municipal 
governments are more likely to draw down “free cash” balances to maintain service levels during 
a one-time reduction in state aid than reducing budget stabilization funds (Giankis & Snow, 
2007). Therefore, the use of unrestricted cash can be used to supplement temporary shortfalls in 
cash inflows and is likely to be prioritized in use over other strategies.  
 
3.3.3 Internal Resource: Savings - Budget Stabilization Fund (or Unassigned Fund Balance)  
 
A budget stabilization fund (BSF) is often created from enabling legislation to serve as a 
government-wide reserve (Hou, 2013). This formal policy instrument is used to operate counter-
cyclically in which a government sets aside resources in prosperous years to be used when 
revenues fall short of forecasts. Jurisdictions with greater unrestricted cash balances and the 
financial management capacity to accumulate budget surpluses have higher BSF balances 
(Giankis & Snow, 2007; Snow, Gianakis, & Haughton, 2015). A recent survey finds managers’ 
perceptions of BSFs are embedded components of revenue management strategies in which 
BSFs are used: (1) as a counter-cyclical strategy, (2) as a capital planning and budget strategy, 
and (3) as an override to statutory property tax level limit strategy (Snow & Gianakis, 2009). 
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Although reluctant to tap into BSFs as the first line of defense, managers with savings in an 
established BSF might maintain savings to maximize their credit rating since credit rating 
agencies consider formal reserves when making rating decisions (Snow & Gianakis, 2009; 
Standard & Poor's Global Ratings, 2016).26  
While a useful resource, managers will likely have limited access to funds in a BSF. 
Often, appropriation of funds requires prior approval. Moreover, reductions to a BSF could result 
in a negative credit rating change similar to unassigned fund balances (Marlowe, 2011). Not all 
local governments have established BSFs. Widespread use is unlikely because governments must 
have (1) budgetary conditions conducive to establishing savings, (2) political actors willing to 
create the funds and compel savings, and (3) officials who can achieve budgetary smoothing 
through decisions that have the same effect as an explicit savings fund (Wolkoff, 1987).  
For a majority of local governments, savings are often informal and measured by the 
General Fund unassigned fund balance (UFB) (Arapis, Reitano, & Bruck, 2017b; Duncombe & 
Hou, 2014; Hendrick, 2006; Marlowe, 2005; Moulick & Taylor, 2017; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et 
al., 2017; Wang, 2015; Wang & Hou, 2012). The Government Finance Officers Association 
recommends governments establish formal policies defining conditions warranting fund balance 
use, dictating a reserve requirement to be maintained, and planning to replenish the fund balance 
should it decrease below the prescribed level (Government Finance Officers Association, 2015). 
                                                 
26 Standard and Poor’s (S&P) states, “a clearly articulated policy and steady funding of reserves is 
important” and they conduct “an analysis of how the size of the reserve compares to historical revenue and spending 
patterns and gaps and of the track record of funding the reserve, including any replenishment mechanisms.”  
Furthermore, S&P reviews “financial reserves and balances identified in funds outside of the state’s main operating 
fund or general fund that may be available for budget purposes” which can include budget stabilization funds 
(Standard & Poor's Global Ratings, 2016). Moody’s ratings for US local governments are based on the key factors 
of (1) economy/tax base (30%), finances (30%), management (20%), and debt/pensions (20%). Within finances, 
evaluated sub-factors are all reserves in fund balances, 5-year dollar changes in fund balance, operating fund net 
cash as a percentage of operating revenues and 5-year dollar changes in cash balances as a percent of revenues 
(Moody's Investors Service, 2016).    
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UFB can be cost-free due to its use for any purpose with no approval cost. However, some 
governments with formal fund balance policies might have cost to document and construct a plan 
to replenish if use drops the level below reserve requirements. Furthermore, the use of UFB 
could increase the risk of a negative credit rating change (Marlowe, 2011). Managers might 
perceive a higher cost and risk associated with using savings than unrestricted cash and thus, use 
it less frequently during a cash flow deficit. 
 
3.3.4 Internal Resource: Interfund Borrowing 
 
Interfund borrowing allows managers to reallocate resources through loaning monies 
between individual funds.27 For example, the City of Flagstaff, Arizona initiates interfund 
borrowing for “short-term loans to cover temporary cash deficits in various funds” (City of 
Flagstaff Arizona, 2016). The City conducted interfund borrowing in which $3,000,000 was 
transferred to the General Fund from Other Governmental Funds in FY 2016. The fund from 
which cash is borrowed has monies returned and sometimes interest paid. Governments typically 
have an internal policy establishing the use of interfund borrowing. However, it is important to 
note, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) mandates interfund loans must be 
repaid.28 If repayment is not expected, the interfund borrowing should be reclassified as a fund 
transfer (Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 1999). 
                                                 
27 Interfund activity that occurs between governmental, proprietary, and fiduciary funds is reported as 
reciprocal (exchange or exchange-like transactions) or nonreciprocal (nonexchange transactions) interfund activity 
(Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 1999). One type of reciprocal interfund activity is an interfund loan 
while one type of nonreciprocal interfund activity is a interfund transfer. 
28 According to GASB’s Statement 34, interfund loans are “amounts provided with a requirement for 
repayment,” but if repayment is not expected within a reasonable time “the amount that is not expected to be repaid 
should be reported as a transfer from the fund that made the loan to the fund that received the loan” (Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board, 1999). 
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The use of interfund borrowing often requires managers to obtain authorization and 
sometimes pay interest to the fund monies was borrowed. Interfund borrowing is therefore, a 
higher cost option relative to utilizing unrestricted cash or savings. Generally, there is minimal 
risk to this strategy if the loan is fully repaid. The use of interfund borrowing is simply a shift of 
when resources are used. However, if the government is reluctant to repay the loan, higher cost 
and risk occur to report and reclassify as a transfer. 
 
3.3.5 Internal Resource: Interfund Transfers and Fund Sweeps  
 
Managers can permit the use of interfund transfers and fund sweeps. GASB defines 
interfund transfers as “flows of assets (such as cash or goods) without equivalent flows of assets 
in return and without a requirement for repayment” (Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 
1999). Fund sweeps occur when the positive balance that accumulate in a fund are transferred to 
another fund, usually the General Fund, where it can be appropriated for a different purpose. For 
example, proceeds from a bond can increase resources in a special revenue fund to then be swept 
into the General Fund (Bifulco, Bunch, Duncombe, Robbins, & Simonsen, 2012). The use of 
both interfund transfers and fund sweeps reduce the amount of surplus resources in the 
transferring fund. The fund transferred from has a loss of extra resources that can be used in 
future periods, since the monies are not repaid. The use of interfund transfers or fund sweeps 
have the risk of potentially allowing other funds to incur cash flow problems. Furthermore, 
frequent use can mask reoccurring deficits by allowing regular inflows of cash which risks the 
public perception of appropriate budgetary transparency.      
Managers must make sure any interfund transfer or fund sweep is legally allowed, 
authorized, and fully disclosed in financial statements. The cost associated with use of this 
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strategy should not be taken as trivial since failures to fully disclose can lead to monetary and 
criminal penalties. For example, on September 14, 2016, the City of Miami and former Budget 
Director, Michael Boudreaux, were convicted of securities fraud by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for providing materially false and misleading statements and omissions 
about certain interfund transfers as well as reporting false and misleading information in two 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports. Specifically, the City of Miami’s General Fund was 
increased with transfers from the Capital Improvement Fund and a Special Revenue Fund 
totaling to about $37.5 million, which included legally restricted dollars. The transfers were to 
mask increasing deficits in the General Fund and to maintain the City’s goal of $100 million in 
reserves to be above the 20% required by City law before triggering the adoption of a plan to 
restore reserves to the threshold. The interfund transfer was complete before $153.5 million in 
bond offerings were rated favorably by credit rating agencies and sold to investors at a 
potentially better interest rate (Herzinger, 2016; "Securities and Exchange Commission v. City of 
Miami, Florida and Michael Boudreaux," 2016; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2013).29  This court case signifies the importance of understanding the cost and risk of using 
interfund transfers appropriately to manage cash flows. It might be expected that the use of a 
interfund transfer or fund sweep during a cash flow deficit be of higher cost and risk compared to 
use of unrestricted cash, and thus be used less frequently.  
 
 
                                                 
29 This was the first federal jury trial in which the SEC charged a municipality or one of its officers for 
violations of the federal securities laws. A month after the jury verdict, the Miami’s City Commission voted to pay a 
$1 million civil penalty to end litigation with the SEC. This court case reveals that importance of prudent financial 
management practices for the government, its financial officers, and most significantly the taxpayers who will 
ultimately bear the burden.  
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3.3.6 Internal Resource: Delay Payments  
 
Delaying payments is altering when cash disbursements are made to those the 
government owes money (e.g., suppliers of services or goods) to have more available receipts at 
a point in time. This strategy primarily leverages the capacity of the government (e.g., personnel 
to contact suppliers, reputation of the government, and relationships forged with suppliers) and is 
within the control of a government to reduce cash outflows. This strategy is predicated on the 
fact that managers can delay payments with little or no long-term financial penalties or 
consequences. For example, managers might not be able to delay payments for salaries and 
wages or to creditors that enact large monetary costs. Even if managers can delay payments to 
creditors before financial penalties arise, this strategy has significant reputational risk. A 
government could become known for the continued practice of delaying payments and perceived 
as being illiquid, could face higher prices from future supplies, or could have a negative credit 
rating change if they default on several payments (Standard & Poor's Global Ratings, 2016).30  
Moreover, managers can use discretion about which payments can be delayed but might 
need approval to delay legally required payments. For example, as a response to a $20 million 
deficit, the City of Bridgeport, Connecticut was granted the authority by Senate Bill 42, in 2016, 
to delay the City’s full pension payments to save about $26 million over the next six years. 
Nearly half of the City’s deficit was created by transferring City employees to the State’s 
Municipal Employees Retirement System (MERS) in which more than $90 million was paid to 
join the plan (Dixon, 2016; Ganim, 2016).31 Due to the potential financial penalty costs and 
                                                 
30 As an important component of a government’s overall credit profile, Standard & Poor’s evaluates the 
liquidity position of a government. Cash monitoring can be evaluated as weaker if a government is “meeting certain 
obligations only by deeply delaying payment on other obligations” (Standard & Poor's Global Ratings, 2016).   
31 However, the upfront payment was not enough to cover police and fire personnels’ service credits, and 
thus an additional $7.5 million per year was required in payment for the next 27 years. The legislature granted 
reduced payments into the plan (35% for the next four years and 65% for the proceeding two years) will be followed 
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reputational risks, delaying payments is likely to be practiced less frequently than other strategies 
that use internal resources. 
 
3.3.7 External Source: Receivables  
 
Managers have the option to speed up the collection of receivables in which parties that 
owe the government provide those payments to reduce a cash flow deficit. In contrast to delaying 
payments, managers are likely to have less control over when collections are received to classify 
this choice as relying on an external source. This strategy is predicated on three aspects. First, the 
local government must have the financial capacity to devote to contacting parties that owe the 
government. Managers must spend time interacting with parties that have outstanding obligations 
which could divert their time or hinder them from completing other tasks. Second, the contacted 
parties must have the ability and willingness to pay during the period of the cash flow deficit. A 
party that owes the government can either have an overdue payment or a payment not yet due, in 
which there is no obligation for early payment. Managers can incentivize payment by imposing 
high cost penalties for those with overdue payments and offering discounts for early payments. 
Finally, the government might not receive a full payment in the same time frame in which a cash 
flow deficit occurs. Even if managers devote resources to accelerating the collection of 
receivables and secures early payment, the period in which there was a cash flow deficit could 
have passed. Consequently, the strategy of speeding up the collection of receivables best 
operates when there is enough financial capacity, parties can and are willing to pay before the 
deadline, and the process can be completed swiftly.      
                                                 
by more than 20 years of the City paying higher amounts (125% and 175% of annual requirement) into the MERS 
(Dixon, 2016; Ganim, 2016). 
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This option is of higher cost and risk than using unrestricted cash or reserves in a BSF. 
The manager and finance personnel might have to divert their time and energy to accelerating the 
collection of receivables. This could be very costly especially for smaller sized governments with 
only a few finance department employees. This strategy has the risk of harming the 
government’s reputation. If those that owe the government believe that they will be called on to 
make early payments, they might not want to do future business. Furthermore, there is a risk that 
the desired amount of cash receipts might not be received, either in a timely manner or at all 
during the temporary cash flow deficit. 
 
3.3.8 External Source: Line of Credit 
 
A line of credit (LOC) is a prearranged loan that establishes a maximum loan balance that 
a financial institution will permit the borrower to maintain. The borrower, the local government, 
can draw down on a LOC at any time, as long as they do not exceed the maximum set in the 
agreement. A local government that has a LOC can access funds when a cash deficit occurs to 
allow for smooth financial operations. For example, managers can access their LOC for the exact 
amount of the cash flow deficit. During a period of cash flow surplus, managers can payback the 
amount that was used. Managers are required to pay the associated costs for the establishment of 
the LOC which could impose barriers for governments with low financial management capacity. 
However, the fees and interest costs are significantly lower than the costs associated with issuing 
short-term debt.  
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3.3.9 External Source: Direct Lending Arrangement 
 
Managers can use direct bank loans as a form of direct lending. A bank loan is borrowing 
a lump-sum of money from a commercial bank. Direct lending has increased in recent years with 
banks almost doubling the amount of municipal holdings from $225 billion in 2009 to $425 
billion in 2014 (Farmer, 2014). Bank loans have the advantages of simplicity compared to 
accessing a public market for financing, fewer issuance costs, low ongoing compliance 
requirements, and flexibility in the timing of when the money can be drawn on as well as the 
repaid, which can often be renegotiated within reasonable limits (Government Finance Officers 
Association, 2013; Moak, 1982).  
According to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, in some cases private 
placements of debt and bank loans are substituting for temporary cash flow borrowings such as 
revenue anticipation notes (Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, 2011). Direct lending is 
likely to continue by municipal lenders as a strategy to reduce a cash flow deficit. The use of 
direct lending arrangements might be costly to establish especially for managers that lack 
expertise to approach an institution to engage in direct lending arrangements. Smaller local 
governments or others with low managerial expertise might avoid the use of direct lending in 
favor of accumulating large unrestricted cash holdings.   
 
3.3.10 External Source: Short-Term Debt 
 
 Short-term debt is typically borrowing money from banks under a written 
acknowledgment of debt due using unsecured notes32 that constitutes a conditional or 
                                                 
32 Typically, a note can be issued in anticipation of long-term bonds to be issued, taxes to be collected, 
nontax revenues to be received, or for unforeseen expenditures to be called a bond anticipation note, tax anticipation 
note, revenue anticipation note, and budget note, respectively. These short-term notes usually have a maturity of one 
year or less after the date of issuance. 
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unconditional promise to pay from only specified resources of the issuing government (Moak, 
1982). Each note is an explicit agreement which must be engaged in by the government and 
another party and thus, the use of short-term debt is an external source of financing. The amount 
of short-term notes issued by local governments has increased to a peak of over $32.01 billion in 
2003 with a steady decline since 2009 to just above $20 billion in 2014 (The Bond 
Buyer/Thomson Reuters, 2015). The issuance of short-term debt has the following potential 
benefits: (1) demonstrates the government has access to credit markets other than the commercial 
bank (2) offers lower rates, sometimes, with the capital market than by a local bank and (3) 
provides a benchmark for comparison of rates between the securities of the government and that 
being paid by other governments (Moak, 1982). The use of short-term debt is motivated with 
increased spending on salaries, higher spending on long-term debt, more illiquidity of assets, and 
growing dependence on federal aid whereas, more financial slack in the form of UFB and prior 
year surpluses reduce the likely issuance of short-term debt (Lofton & Kioko, 2018; Su & 
Hildreth, 2018).  
In contrast to the use of direct lending arrangements, the issuance of short-term debt 
requires that the government access an external market as well as interact with an external party. 
The use of this option, therefore, can have several costs: (1) acquire financial capacity of having 
or hiring professionals with knowledge of how to access the market, (2) incur several months of 
prior planning to access the market that include determining the amount debt that should be 
issued and the timing of issuance to take advantage of low interest costs, (3) forge relationships 
with institutions and underwriters that will aid in accessing the market, and (4) incur monetary 
costs of payment of fees for issuance and credit rating determinations. Hence, this strategy is 
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predicated on being able to bear these costs while accepting the risk of timely receipt of funds to 
hinder the broad use of this strategy.  
Larger governments with more financial capacity are more likely to select this strategy. 
Medium-sized and larger jurisdictions are more likely to have established relationships with 
commercial banks and prior issuance of short-term debt to allow for advantages in understanding 
how to access the market (Moak, 1982). Smaller jurisdictions might pay higher short-term 
interest rates to issue short-term debt (Moak, 1982). These jurisdictions are likely to have lower 
financial management capacity to motivate obtaining more professional assistance to issue short-
term debt, and thus higher costs. Therefore, smaller jurisdictions are likely to use this strategy 
infrequently and seek alternative sources of financing.  
 
3.4 Survey and Responding Manager Characteristics 
The purpose of this article is to improve our understanding of WCM strategies available, 
preferred, and implemented by managers. A survey of local government managers is used to 
further our knowledge. Surveys have been utilized in the financial management literature to 
evaluate UFBs (Marlowe, 2005), perceptions of BSF management strategies (Snow & Gianakis, 
2009), and attitudes towards adopting new government reporting (Frank & Gianakis, 2010). This 
survey focuses on WCM preferences and practices of managers which has not been explored in 
the literature.  
 
3.4.1 Hypotheses and Survey Implementation  
 The survey results strive to support the following asserted hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis 1: Managers prefer (and implement) an active WCM strategy instead of not 
making changes to mitigate a cash flow deficit. 
Hypothesis 2: Managers prefer (and implement) a strategy with internal resources before 
the use of a strategy with external sources of financing to mitigate a cash 
flow deficit, that is, a pecking order exists for WCM strategies. 
Hypothesis 3a: Among strategies that rely on internal resources, managers prefer (and 
implement) the lowest cost and risk strategy.  
Hypothesis 3b: Among strategies that reply on external sources of financing, managers 
prefer (and implement) the lowest cost and risk strategy. 
Hypothesis 4: Smaller sized local governments are more likely to rely on strategies that 
use internal resources than external sources of financing to mitigate a cash 
flow deficit.  
A survey was given to local government managers in the State of New York in 2016. The 
State of New York is chosen because of the comprehensive nature of their local general purpose 
governments (e.g., county, city, town, and village) and that each government has their own 
governing body and taxing authority. Therefore, general purpose government managers can 
differ on their strategies through having the autonomy to create unique financial management 
policies. The State of New York has a total of 57 counties, 61 cities, 931 towns, and 544 villages, 
excluding New York City and the boroughs that make up New York City. The survey coverage 
error is low with only three towns and three villages with missing information on their manager 
or government address and thus, not included in the sample frame.33 
                                                 
33 Two towns operate as contiguous town/villages in which they only operate at a village government level. 
Thus, there are a total of 929 unique operating town governments.  
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Dillman’s (2007) tailored design method was implemented with all local government 
managers being contacted at least four times.34 The analysis incorporates information from a 
total of 426 managers that consented and completed, or partially competed, the survey (26.78% 
of all New York local governments) of which managers from 33 counties (57.89% of all 
counties), 40 cities (65.57% of all cities excluding New York City), 211 towns (22.71% of all 
towns) and 142 villages (26.10% of all villages) consented.35 The usable response rates for 
counties and cities are higher than the previous literature of about 38% in Frank and Gianakis 
(2010), 32% in Marlowe (2005) and 21% in Snow, Gianakis, and Fortess (2008).  
 
3.4.2 Characteristics of Responding Managers   
Table 3.2 compares each type of local government by size (total revenues per capita), the 
number of governments in the population, and the number of responding mangers. The size 
classifications can be thought of as being small, small-medium, medium, and large for each 
government type. Responding county and town mangers are overrepresented (a 3% or larger 
positive difference between the governments responding in the survey and the amount 
                                                 
34 This method included sending each manager: (1) a pre-notice letter, (2) cover letter with questionnaire, 
(3) thank you letter, (4) cover letter with replacement questionnaire sent to non-respondents, and (5) priority U.S. 
mailing of a cover letter and questionnaire. If an email address could be identified for the manager, an electronic 
version of the survey was sent via Qualtrics and then mail copies of each form of contact were sent to managers 
without identified emails. County and city governments were sent mailed copies for (4) and (5) contact materials to 
likely increase response rates of these governments. Town and village governments were emailed for items 4 and 5.  
The Syracuse University Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved this survey project along with all 
materials that were used to contact each local government. The New York local governments that were identified 
and contacted are 57 counties (which exclude Bronx, Kings, Manhattan, Richmond, and Queens), 61 cities (which 
exclude New York City), 926 towns (excluding 3 towns in which contact information could not be acquired and 2 
towns that are town/village governments and operate their government at the village level), and 541 villages 
(excluding 3 villages in which contact information could not be acquired). Due to financial constraints, only county 
and city governments were sent a fifth mode of contact of a priority U.S. mailing of the questionnaire.   
35 Of the 1,585 governments contacted, a total of 472 governments responded to the survey (29.78% of 
governments contacted) of which 33 counties (57.89% of counties contacted), 42 cities (68.85% of cities contacted), 
237 towns (25.59% of contacted towns) and 160 villages (29.57% of contacted villages) responded to either consent 
or decline participation in the survey.  
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represented in the population) in large sized governments and underrepresented (a 3% or larger 
negative difference from the amount represented in the population) in medium sized 
governments. Therefore, county and town results might favor managers operating with larger 
budgets who might have more access to multiple working capital management strategies. In 
contrast, city and village managers are more overrepresented in small-medium and small sized 
governments, respectively. This leads to results being more indicative of the views of those 
managing smaller amounts of resources.36  
Select characteristics of mangers are averaged for each type of local government in Table 
3.3. Overall, responding local governments, on average, have managers that are between 53 and 
61 years of age. Thus, these managers are nearing retirement age. Most local government 
mangers reported their gender identity as male with the exception of village managers in which 
79% identified as female. Managers worked in their current position for about 9 years and the 
public finance profession for about 14 years. Town managers tended to have fewer years in their 
current position and in the public finance position to connote less experience than other mangers. 
This might also impact their lower levels of satisfaction with their profession as compared to 
other local government managers. County and city managers worked in finance departments that 
employed about 40 full-time employees while town and village managers typically had about 5 
full-time employees. Cities had the most part-time employees with about 44 part-time employees 
(more than the average number of full-time employees). 
                                                 
36 Responding managers are overrepresented if they are more than 3 percent above the proportion 
represented in the population and are underrepresented if they are more than 3 percent below the proportion 
represented in the population. For example, 6 out of 33 (about 18%) responded from large sized county 
governments. Yet, large sized county governments only represent 8 out of 57 governments (about 14%). Therefore, 
a larger than 3% difference exists and there is overrepresentation from large sized county mangers.  
83 
 
Over 70% of responding county and city managers have a college degree and over 20% 
have one type of financial certification. In towns and villages, managers reported much lower 
rates of college degree attainment, slightly above 40%, and less than 20% have at least on 
certification. Therefore, most managers do not have a certification recognizing special 
knowledge and skills in areas such as budgeting, auditing, or financial reporting for 
governments. This important fact could lead to more costly and risky strategies not being 
selected due to lack of knowledge about accessing and implementing strategies.37  
Table 3.4 indicated the financial resources that were accumulated in responding 
managers’ governments for fiscal year 2016. On average, village government managers had the 
largest unrestricted cash balances at $339 per capita while towns had the lowest balances at $282 
per capita. In contrast, county governments held the most resources in unassigned fund balances 
at $270 per capita while city managers had access to only $199 per capita in UFB. Finally, city 
governments issue the most short-term debt with $272 per capita and village governments issues 
the second most with $253 per capita. County and town governments had fewer short-term debt 
with $70 and $12 per capita in 2016. These financial measures reported at the end of the year can 
be put into context of the surveyed preferences reported earlier in the financial year.  
 
 
3.5 Results  
 
The survey asked various questions about the use of available WCM strategies, 
preferences for using strategies, and implemented strategies given current constraints during a 
cash flow deficit.38 The use (or policies regarding use) of WCM strategies is indicated in Table 
                                                 
37 For more detailed results by each type of local government, request information from the author. 
38 See survey for specific questions asked in Appendix 3.2 Survey Instrument.  
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3.5. In terms of internal resources, a little over half of all local governments have a policy about 
managing unrestricted cash balances. Village governments who have the most unrestricted cash 
per capita report only 48.15% of governments have a policy. In contrast, on average, county 
governments have the highest reported UFB and indicate an establish policy to maintain UFB in 
about 67% of governments. City, town, and village governments report lower levels of UFB and 
report significantly lower levels of established polices at about 40%. Interfund borrowing is 
permitted in a majority of county and city governments (over 70%), and is permitted in about 
half of town and village governments. The use of unrestricted cash balances and delaying 
payments and transfers out are selected as two internal resources that could be relied on during a 
cash flow deficit. 
Managers can implement strategies that use external sources of financing such as the use 
of a LOC or engaging in direct lending arrangements. However, local governments in New York 
do not often implement these alternative strategies. For the 376 managers reporting, only 1.4% 
indicate that they have a LOC with about 76% of those with a LOC stating they do not use their 
line of credit. Of 379 managers reporting, only 9.5% engage in direct lending arrangements in 
the past year with about 65% of them using direct lending arrangements in the past two years. 
Therefore, the use of a LOC and direct lending arrangements are not pervasive WCM strategies 
used by New York local governments, and thus not evaluated in the preference ranking.  
The survey results suggest that all four hypotheses are partially supported. Managers 
were asked to rank order their most likely managerial strategy to be implemented to address a 
cash flow deficit. Table 3.6 ranks manager preferences according to the Borda Count. The Borda 
Count is an election based method that is used to rank overall preferences. More points are 
awarded to higher ranked voter selections and the outcome is determined by gaining the most 
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points. For this calculation, the first ranked choice was given 5 points (n), the second ranked was 
given 4 points (n-1), and so forth for all five options. 39 All points are totaled and the option with 
the most points is ranked first. Using this ranking method, county and city government managers 
ranked fifth, or last, the strategy to wait and not make changes to current assets or liabilities.40 
Therefore, the first finding is that larger governments prefer to have an active strategy to mitigate 
a cash flow deficit. However, town and village government mangers ranked fourth, or second to 
last, waiting to make changes. These managers rank the use of short-term debt last which can 
indicate an aversion to engaging in the short-term debt market.  
Second, there is supportive evidence of the modified pecking order theory in which a 
strategy of using an internal resource is preferred over a strategy of using an external source of 
financing. Managers prefer to use unrestricted cash during a cash flow deficit. Table 3.6 
indicates that overall managers of all local governments, as well as each type of government, 
ranked first the use of unrestricted cash. Per the survey results, 65.7% of managers ranked first 
the use of unrestricted cash with more than 55% of managers from each type of local government 
ranking the strategy the most preferred.41 Moreover, in Panel A of Table 3.7, 75.0% of all 
managers preferred the use of unrestricted cash when asked if only asset management strategy 
could be used to reduce a cash flow deficit. Additionally, over 70% of managers from each type 
of government preferred the use of unrestricted cash. This provides further support that an 
internal resource is most preferred during a cash flow deficit.  
                                                 
39 For the calculation in Table 3.6, the first ranked choice was given 5 points (n), the second ranked was 
given 4 points (n-1), and so forth for all five options. A modified Borda Count was also calculated for partially 
ranked options in which 1 point was giving to the most preferred option if only one most preferred option was 
selected (Emerson, 2013).  
40 The measure for all local governments uses survey weights to account for the total number of 
governments in each type of local government.  
41 This result is indicated in Appendix 3.1 that shows the full results prior to conducting the Borda Count. 
86 
 
Finally, for village managers, the use of internal resources is preferred to the use of 
external sources of financing during a cash flow deficit. Table 3.6 suggests that village managers 
prefer to use first unrestricted cash, then delay payments, speed up the collection of receivables, 
and finally issue short-term debt. This results fully supports the modified pecking order theory in 
which both strategies relying on internal resources are preferred to any external source of 
financing. Moreover, village government managers might perceive lower cost and risk strategies 
rely on internal resources than strategies relying on external sources of financing which 
necessitate more financial capacity.  
The survey results state that county and town managers prefer to speed up collection of 
receivables before delaying payments. Managers in county governments have more full-time 
staff, on average about 42 employees, which might allow for greater capacity to accelerate the 
collection of receivables than smaller sized village governments. Moreover, county and town 
government managers might be more risk-averse to delaying payments that could have higher 
financial penalties. City governments are different from other governments in that issuing short-
term debt is preferred after the use of unrestricted cash. These governments have the highest 
educated, more certified, and largest personnel employed in finance departments which could 
increase their capacity to issue short-term debt to manage cash flows.    
In practice, managers likely make multiple changes during a cash flow deficit. The 
managers were asked, given their current constraints, what type of managerial strategy best 
matched their current practices. Overall, managers more frequently selected the practice of 
drawing down unrestricted cash balances as well as issuing short-term debt with 39.5% of 
managers selecting this strategy, in Table 3.8. This signifies that managers might prefer the use 
of unrestricted cash balances as an internal resource but want to also depend on an external 
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source of financing to guarantee the necessary cash inflows are obtained. County, city, and 
village managers favored this approach with 39.4%, 41.7%, and 35.5%, respectively, selecting 
this as the implemented practice. Yet, 40.4% of the responding town managers have a practice of 
using unrestricted cash balances as well as delaying payments. Therefore, town government 
managers might be more risk averse and only use internal resources that have lower cost and 
risk.  
Most managers prefer the use of short-term debt in conjunction with unrestricted cash 
during a cash flow deficit. In practice, 62.4% of responding local governments reported the use 
of short-term debt in the past two years, as noted in Table 3.9. The use of short-term debt is 
identified by all local government managers as primarily being issued for other reasons such as 
capital projects (29.6%), when receivables have not been received (22.6%), for other reasons that 
were not for capital projects (22.04%), and in the absence of unrestricted cash (17.8%).42 In the 
State of New York, bond anticipation notes (BANs) are issued to finance capital expenditures for 
up to five years and are often redeemed or replaced by long-term debt (New York State, 2008). 
The use of short-term debt in the form of BANs allow for local governments to pay for capital 
project startup costs before the capital project is supported with a means of long-term financing. 
The advantage is that interest rates on short-term debt are usually lower than long-term financing 
options but the disadvantage is that during unfavorable markets long-term interest rates could be 
higher at the end of the project when the short-term debt is being replaced (Moak, 1982).  
County governments primarily use short-term debt when receivables have not been 
received (36.8%). This might be due to the fact that county governments have historically 
provided economic assistance, such as Medicaid and Aid to Dependent Children, in which 
                                                 
42 Some examples of other reasons for short-term debt use provided are issuing short-term debt to cover a 
deficit, to try to control for tax increases, and to purchase vehicles and/or large equipment. 
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reimbursements are obtained from the state and federal government (New York State, 2009). 
Thus, short-term debt might be issued more often for cash flow purposes of providing cash 
receipts when waiting for reimbursements to be received.   
Although short-term debt is issued, a formalized internal operating procedure or policy 
governing the management of short-term debt use is only established in 31.4% of all local 
governments, as noted in Table 3.5. The lack of an established formalized policy hinders 
financial decision-making about when is appropriate to issue short-term debt and for what 
purposes the government is best positioned to issue short-term debt. Since most governments 
have issued short-term debt in the past two years, managers should codify rules into their 
administrative code regarding the best practices surrounding their most recent issuance of short-
term debt. Therefore, successful policies and procedures regarding short-term debt can continue 
to be implemented consistently.   
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
The findings of this survey of local government finance professionals expands our 
knowledge of public sector working capital management in three major ways. First, available 
strategies are identified as those relying on internal resources (e.g., unrestricted cash, savings, 
budget stabilization funds, interfund borrowing, transfers, and delaying payments) and those 
relying on an external source of financing (e.g., receivables, line of credit, direct lending 
arrangements, and short-term debt). It is important to understand these strategies because 
managers frequently select strategies to manage liquidity and sustain uninterrupted services. I 
hypothesize the strategies with the lowest perceived cost and risk will be more preferred and 
implemented by managers.  
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Second, the findings of this study support the assertion that managers have a preference 
ranking, or pecking order, to use an internal resource of unrestricted cash before external sources 
of financing during a cash flow deficit. In practice, a majority of managers reported preferring to 
use unrestricted cash during a cash flow deficit. Managers, therefore, need to establish rule-based 
policies and operating procedures regarding the accumulation, management, and use of 
unrestricted cash. Participants only had an internal operating procedure or policy in 56.2% of 
governments regarding the use of unrestricted cash. Consequently, a substantial portion of local 
governments might need to establish a formalize policy regarding saving unrestricted cash This 
to mitigate cash flow deficits. Without a formalized policy, governments will be susceptible to 
loss of institutional knowledge and best practices. This fact is especially important for small 
sized governments with more part-time employees and managers nearing retirement.  
Finally, there is supportive evidence that local governments have managers who prefer to 
address a cash flow deficit differently. Village government managers typically prefer and 
implement strategies that use unrestricted cash and delaying payments and transfers out before 
external sources of financing. City government managers have a higher preference to issue and 
actually issue the most short-term debt to manage cash flows. In contrast, town and village 
governments would rather not make any changes during a cash flow deficit than to issue short-
term debt. This could be due to the higher cost and risk associated with issuing short-term debt 
for smaller sized governments. Differences in working capital management practices could also 
be due to lower educational attainment, lack of certifications, and fewer employees to have the 
financial capacity to rely on higher risk and cost strategies.  
Although scholars have surveyed managers about local finances (Frank & Gianakis, 
2010; Marlowe, 2005; Snow & Gianakis, 2009), this is the first article to evaluate the WCM 
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strategies preferred and practiced by local government managers. This study reduces the 
intellectual bifurcation between public administration and management research and the subfield 
of public financial management research (Kioko et al., 2011) by demonstrating the importance of 
understanding administrative decision-making around working capital management. There are 
clear advantages to this type of study, but there are also disadvantages. Primarily, survey 
research typically has some non-response bias in that non-respondents may have differing 
behaviors that remain unknown. An initial study can make a positive contribution, but 
differences in manager preferences and practices across states could limit generalizations of 
these findings. That shortcoming notwithstanding, the responses reflected in this survey reflect 
the attitude of New York local government managers based on actual experiences. The use of 
New York State as a case study is a starting point. Yet, more studies of managers that describe 
cash flow management practices and the broader working capital management process could 
further contribute to practice-oriented theory.  
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Table 3.1 Working Capital Management Strategies  
WCM Strategy Potential Cost Potential Risk Type of Resource 
Unrestricted Cash 
Balance 
Cost-free Low-risk with minimal 
loss of the optionality 
to use monies for other 
purposes 
Internal resource 
Savings: 
Budget Stabilization 
Fund (BSF) 
 
Unassigned Fund 
Balance (UFB) 
BSF: Time cost for 
request and approval of 
use 
 
UFB: Cost-free if no fund 
balance policy  
 
Under a policy, cost to 
devise and enact a plan to 
replenish if reduce balance 
below the reserve 
requirement  
BSF: Approval will not 
be complete in a timely 
manner 
 
UFB: Minimal loss of 
the optionality to use 
monies for other 
purposes 
 
BSF and UFB: Use 
could result in a 
negative credit rating 
change 
Internal resource 
Interfund Borrowing 
Time cost for request and 
approval of use 
 
Potential interest cost 
 
Cost to fully document 
and disclose in financial 
reports 
Low risk since only a 
temporary loss of 
surplus in the 
transferring fund  
 
More risk if reluctant 
to repay the borrowed 
funds and have to be 
reclassified to an 
internal transfer 
Internal resource 
Interfund Transfers 
and Fund Sweeps 
Time cost for request and 
approval of use 
 
Cost to fully document 
and disclose in financial 
reports which could have 
monetary and criminal 
penalties if improperly 
reported 
Loss of surplus in 
transferring fund which 
could create temporary 
cash flow problems for 
the fund 
 
Loss of public 
perception of 
appropriate budget 
transparency if 
frequently used  
Internal resource 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delay Payments 
Financial capacity (e.g., 
personnel available, time 
to contact suppliers, and 
relationships forged with 
suppliers)  
Loss of government’s 
reputation or credibility 
as being able to make 
on-time payments  
 
Internal resource 
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Approval to delay legally 
required payments  
 
Financial penalties 
especially if there are 
defaults on several 
payments  
 
Potentially charged higher 
future costs from suppliers 
Loss of perception of 
being liquid by credit 
rating agencies if 
continually practiced  
 
Risk of incurring a 
negative credit rating 
change if continually 
practiced 
 
  
Receivables 
Financial capacity (e.g., 
personnel available to 
accelerate the collection of 
receivables, time to 
contact parties that owe 
the government, and build 
relationships with parties 
with outstanding 
obligations)  
 
Cost to provide incentives 
for early payment 
(typically in the form of 
discounts offered) or 
enacting high penalties for 
overdue payments  
Risk of parties with 
outstanding obligations 
not being able and/or 
willing to make 
payments early 
 
Risk of full payment 
not being received 
during the expected 
cash flow deficit period  
 
Reputational risk of 
having to call on 
parties with obligations 
for early payment that 
might discourage 
future interactions with 
the government  
External source of 
financing  
Line of Credit 
(LOC) 
Financial capacity (e.g., 
expertise to establish and 
maintain a LOC, 
knowledge about when to 
use and pay down the 
LOC, and maintain a 
relationship with the 
financial institution) 
 
Monetary cost (e.g., fees 
and interest costs) to 
establish and maintain 
access to a LOC at a 
financial institution  
Low-risk if able to 
make on-time 
payments of fees and 
interest  
 
More risk if monetary 
costs are not paid on-
time and defaults 
negatively impact the 
government’s credit 
rating  
 
 
 
 
 
External source of 
financing 
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Direct Lending 
Arrangement 
Financial capacity (e.g., 
expertise to establish and 
maintain, knowledge 
about when to use and 
make payments, and 
maintain a relationship 
with the lender) 
 
Monetary cost (e.g., fees 
and interest costs) to 
establish and maintain 
compliance  
 
Cost to document and 
disclose the direct lending 
arrangement  
 
 
 
Low-risk if able to 
make on-time 
payments of fees and 
interest  
 
More risk if monetary 
costs are not paid on-
time and defaults 
negatively impact the 
government’s 
reputation with the 
lender  
External source of 
financing 
Short-Term Debt 
Financial capacity (e.g., 
having or hiring 
professionals to access and 
understand the market, 
forecast the amount of 
short-term debt needed for 
expected cash flow deficit, 
and forge relationships 
with financial institutions 
and underwriters) 
 
Monetary costs (e.g., fees, 
and interest cost) for 
issuance  
 
Time cost for prior 
planning of issuance   
 
Cost to document and 
disclose debt issued  
Risk of monies not 
being received during 
the expected cash flow 
deficit period  
 
External source of 
financing 
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Table 3.2 Responding Financial Managers from New York Local Governments  
Panel A: County Governments 
Size Rage  
(Revenues per capita) 
Total Number in 
Population 
Total Number of 
Respondents* 
$3,000 and larger (large) 8 6 
$2,500 – $3,000 (medium) 12 6 
$2,000 – $2,500 (small-medium) 22 13 
Less than $2,000 (small) 15 8 
 57 33 
Panel B: City Governments 
Size Rage  
(Revenues per capita) 
Total Number in 
Population 
Total Number of 
Respondents* 
$3,500 and larger (large) 8 6 
$2,750 – $3,500 (medium) 9 5 
$2,000 – $2,750 (small-medium) 29 21 
Less than $2,000 (small) 15 8 
 61 40 
Panel C: Town Governments 
Size Rage (Revenues per 
capita) 
Total Number in 
Population 
Total Number of 
Respondents* 
$1,350 and larger (large) 172 49 
$950 – $1,350 (medium) 143 26 
$550 – $950 (small-medium) 354 77 
Less than $550 (small) 260 59 
 929 211 
Panel D: Village Governments 
Size Rage (Revenues per 
capita) 
Total Number in 
Population 
Total Number of 
Respondents* 
$2,500 and larger (large) 99 25 
$1,700 – $2,550 (medium) 94 26 
$850 – $1,700 (small-medium) 211 45 
Less than $850 (small) 140 46 
 544 142 
Notes: *Responding governments are those that completed or partially completed the survey and 
provided consent to be in the study. Population data was based on the 2016 population provided by the 
publicly available New York Local Government and School Accountability dataset. 
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Table 3.3 Characteristics of New York Local Government Managers 
 Notes: (1) For more detailed results by each type of local government, request information from the author. Total 
responding and consenting governments are listed as the sample size. However, some consenting town and village 
government managers partially completed the survey. Survey results were weighted based on the proportion of 
each government type in the full New York local government population. (2) Years and persons are rounded up. (3) 
Credentials include Certified Public Accountant, Certified Government Financial Manager, Certified Public 
Finance Officer, Certified Public Finance Officer, Certified Public Finance Administrator, Certified Financial 
Advisor, Licensed Securities Trader, and other identified certifications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristics of Managers 
Managers of Each Local Government Type 
County 
(n=33) 
City 
(n=40) 
Town 
(n=211) 
Village 
(n=142) 
Current Age (average) 56 53 61 55 
Gender Identity: Female 36.36% 39.47% 23.60% 79.09% 
Years in Current Position (average) 10 8 7 10 
Years in Public Finance Profession 
(average) 18 15 9 15 
Highest Level of Education is College 
Degree or Beyond 72.73% 92.50% 48.34% 43.26% 
At Least One Certification of 
Credentials 21.21% 37.50% 10.90% 15.49% 
Professional Satisfaction of Extremely 
Satisfied 57.58% 40.00% 33.33% 43.97% 
Professional Satisfaction of Somewhat 
Satisfied 39.39% 50.00% 46.19% 45.39% 
Full-time Personnel Employed in 
Finance Department (average) 43 39 4 5 
Part-time Personnel Employed in 
Finance Department (average) 10 44 4 4 
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Table 3.4 Financial Characteristics of New York Local Governments for Responding Managers    
Notes: (1) Financial data is reported from Openbook New York for fiscal year 2016. Short-term debt amounts were 
collected from Bloomberg terminals for fiscal year 2016. The full issuance amount is indicated on a per capita basis. 
Values are averages of only governments in which managers responded to the survey, when available. (2) All 
governments are the governments in which managers replied to the survey and financial data was available for 2016.   
 
 
 
 
  
Resource County  City  Town  Village  All  
General Fund Unrestricted Cash Balance (end of 
year average per capita)  $319 $308 $282 $339 $313 
General Fund Unassigned Fund Balance (end of 
year average per capita) $270 $199 $217 $248 $234 
Short-Term Debt Issued (amount indicated by 
Bloomberg, per capita) $70 $272 $12 $253 $167 
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Table 3.5 Use (or Policy for Use) of Working Capital Management Strategies  
by New York Local Government Managers  
Type of WCM 
Strategy 
Managers of Each Local Government Type* 
County (n=33) City (n=40) Town (n=211) Village (n=142) 
Unrestricted 
Cash Balance 
 
57.58% 
 
Have a policy to 
manage 
 
55.00% 
 
Have a policy to 
manage 
 
65.15% 
 
Have a policy to 
manage 
 
48.15% 
 
Have a policy to 
manage 
Savings: 
Unassigned 
Fund Balance 
(UFB) 
 
66.67% 
 
Have a policy 
about 
maintaining 
General Fund 
balances 
 
43.59% 
 
Have a policy 
about 
maintaining 
General Fund 
balances 
 
41.98% 
 
Have a policy 
about 
maintaining 
General Fund 
balances 
 
33.03% 
 
Have a policy 
about 
maintaining 
General Fund 
balances 
Interfund 
Borrowing 
 
72.73% 
 
Allow use 
 
If allowed, used 
in the past two 
years: 70.83% 
 
86.84% 
 
Allow use 
 
If allowed, used 
in the past two 
years: 70.97% 
 
47.78% 
 
Allow use 
 
If allowed, used 
in the past two 
years: 53.09% 
 
52.80% 
 
Allow use 
 
If allowed, used 
in the past two 
years: 47.69% 
Line of Credit 
(LOC) 
 
0% 
 
Had a LOC in 
the past year 
 
2.56% 
 
Had a LOC in 
the past year 
 
2.22% 
 
Had a LOC in 
the past year 
 
0.83% 
 
Had a LOC in 
the past year 
Direct Lending 
Arrangement 
 
3.03% 
 
Engaged in 
direct lending in 
the past year  
 
12.82% 
 
Engaged in 
direct lending in 
the past year  
 
14.29% 
 
Engaged in 
direct lending in 
the past year  
 
12.8% 
 
Engaged in 
direct lending in 
the past year  
Short-Term 
Debt 
 
60.61% 
 
Issued in past 
two years 
 
39.39% 
 
Have a policy 
regarding using 
short-term debt 
 
79.49% 
 
Issued in past 
two years 
 
27.50% 
 
Have a policy 
regarding using 
short-term debt 
 
30.77% 
 
Issued in past 
two years 
 
28.96% 
 
Have a policy 
regarding using 
short-term debt 
 
46.46% 
 
Issued in past 
two years 
 
24.81% 
 
Have a policy 
regarding using 
short-term debt 
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Table 3.6 Borda Count Ranking of Preferred Working Capital Management Strategy 
Type of WCM Strategy All 
(n=349) 
Counties 
(n=33) 
Cities 
(n=39) 
Towns 
(n=165) 
Villages 
(n=112) 
Unrestricted Cash Ranked 1 Ranked 1 Ranked 1 Ranked 1 Ranked 1 
Delay Payments/Transfers Out Ranked 3 Ranked 3 Ranked 3 Ranked 4 Ranked 2 
Receivable Collections Ranked 2 Ranked 2 Ranked 4 Ranked 2 Ranked 3 
Issue Short-Term Debt Ranked 5 Ranked 4 Ranked 2 Ranked 5 Ranked 5 
Wait and Not Make Changes Ranked 4 Ranked 5 Ranked 5 Ranked 3 Ranked 4 
Notes: (1) The highest ranked strategy is bolded. (2) The Borda Count is an election based method that ranks 
voters’ selections in order of preference. The outcome of the election is indicated by gaining the most points. For 
this calculation the first ranked option was given 5 points (n), the second ranked was given 4 points (n-1), and so 
forth for all five options. All values are totaled and the option with the most points is ranked highest. A modified 
Borda Count was calculated for partially ranked options in which 1 point was giving to the most preferred option 
if only one most preferred option was selected (Emerson, 2013). The overall rankings were the same for both the 
Borda Count and Modified Borda Count with the exception that village government managers tied in the number 
of points given to delaying payments and transfers out and speeding up the collections of receivables, being 
ranked second or third. 
 
Table 3.7 Asset and Liability Management Strategies Likely to be Implemented 
Panel A: Asset Management Strategy 
 Unrestricted 
Cash 
Wait and Not Make 
Changes 
Speed Up Collections 
All Governments (n=347) 75.0% 10.8% 14.2% 
Counties (n=33) 78.8% 6.1% 15.2% 
Cities (n=38) 71.1% 13.2% 15.8% 
Towns (n=160) 78.7% 11.0% 11.0% 
Villages (n=106) 73.2% 17.0% 9.8% 
Panel B: Liability Management Strategy 
 Delay Payments 
and Transfers 
Out  
Wait and Not Make 
Changes 
Issue Short-Term 
Debt 
All Governments (n=336) 47.2% 17.8% 36.1% 
Counties (n=33) 48.5% 21.2% 30.3% 
Cities (n=37) 48.7% 8.1% 46.0% 
Towns (n=161) 40.0% 28.8% 31.9% 
Villages (n=107) 45.3% 54.7% 26.4% 
Note: (1) The highest percentage value given to a specific strategy is bolded. 
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Table 3.8 Top Two Strategies for Current Working Capital Management Practices Implemented 
 Unrestricted Cash 
and Issue Short-Term 
Debt 
Unrestricted Cash and 
Delay Payments and 
Transfers Out 
All Governments (n=337) 39.5% 36.3% 
Counties (n=33) 39.4% 36.4% 
Cities (n=36) 41.7% 36.1% 
Towns (n=161) 36.7% 40.4% 
Villages (n=107) 35.5% 32.7% 
  Note: (1) The highest percentage value given to a specific strategy is bolded. 
 
 
 
Table 3.9 Primary Reason for Issuing Short-Term Debt 
 Receivables 
have not 
been 
received 
Absence of 
unrestricted 
cash on 
hand 
Higher than 
expected 
expenditures 
A more 
favorable 
long-term 
debt market 
Other: 
Capital 
Projects 
Other: Other 
Reasons 
All (n=159)  22.6% 17.8% 2.9% 15.4% 29.6% 22.0% 
Counties (n=19) 36.8% 15.8% 5.3% 10.5% 31.6% 15.8% 
Cities (n=30) 16.7% 20.0% 0% 20.0% 30.0% 23.3% 
Towns (n=52) 9.6% 25.0% 9.6% 7.7% 17.3% 30.8% 
Villages (n=58) 12.1% 10.3% 5.2% 13.8% 27.6% 31.0% 
Notes: (1) The highest percentage value given to a specific reason is bolded. (2) Respondents indicated the use of 
short-term debt in the past two years and provided a reason for issuance. managers issued short-term debt in the past 
two years from all governments (n=381) 62.38%, counties (n=33) 60.61%, cities (n=39) 79.49%, towns (n=182) 
30.77%, and villages (n=127)46.46%. (3) Managers were asked if they had an internal operating procedure or policy 
regarding the use of short term debt. Policies were reported in all governments (n=385) 31.42%, counties 
(n=33)39.39%, cities (n=40) 27.50%, towns (n=183) 28.96%, and villages (n=129) 24.81% had a policy.
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Appendix 3.1 Preference for Working Capital Management Strategy Summary of Results 
Panel A: All Local Governments (n=349)  
WCM Strategy Ranked 
1 
Ranked 
2 
Ranked 
3  
Ranked 
4 
Ranked 
5 
Left 
Blank 
Borda 
Count 
Unrestricted Cash 65.7 7.6 15.5 3.7 3.9 3.7 Ranked 1 
Delay Payments/Transfers Out 8.9 25.2 15.4 23.5 13.0 14.0 Ranked 3 
Receivable Collections 13.3 21.2 24.0 13.6 10.4 17.5 Ranked 2 
Issue Short-Term Debt 10.1 18.5 17.7 19.1 23.5 11.1 Ranked 5 
Wait and Not Make Changes 5.5 12.3 9.5 19.7 32.4 20.7 Ranked 4 
Panel B: County Governments (n=33)  
WCM Strategy Ranked 
1 
Ranked 
2 
Ranked 
3  
Ranked 
4 
Ranked 
5 
Left 
Blank 
Borda 
Count 
Unrestricted Cash 75.8 6.1 15.2 0 0 3.03 Ranked 1 
Delay Payments/Transfers Out 9.1 24.2 12.1 33.3 12.1 9.1 Ranked 3 
Receivable Collections 12.1 30.3 27.3 9.1 6.1 15.2 Ranked 2 
Issue Short-Term Debt 6.1 15.2 15.2 24.2 24.2 15.2 Ranked 4 
Wait and Not Make Changes 0 12.1 15.2 15.2 36.4 21.2 Ranked 5 
Panel B: City Governments (n=39)  
WCM Strategy Ranked 
1 
Ranked 
2 
Ranked 
3  
Ranked 
4 
Ranked 
5 
Left 
Blank 
Borda 
Count 
Unrestricted Cash 56.4 5.1 20.5 7.7 5.1 5.2 Ranked 1 
Delay Payments/Transfers Out 10.3 23.1 15.4 17.9 10.3 23.1 Ranked 3 
Receivable Collections 15.4 15.4 17.9 12.8 12.8 25.6 Ranked 4 
Issue Short-Term Debt 15.4 23.1 20.5 15.4 15.4 10.3 Ranked 2 
Wait and Not Make Changes 7.7 10.3 0 17.9 35.9 28.2 Ranked 5 
Panel D: Town Governments (n=165)  
WCM Strategy Ranked 
1 
Ranked 
2 
Ranked 
3  
Ranked 
4 
Ranked 
5 
Left 
Blank 
Borda 
Count 
Unrestricted Cash 70.3 14.5 4.8 2.4 6.1 1.8 Ranked 1 
Delay Payments/Transfers Out 4.2 25.5 22.4 17.0 23.6 7.3 Ranked 4 
Receivable Collections 10.9 16.4 24.8 27.9 12.1 7.9 Ranked 2 
Issue Short-Term Debt 7.3 14.5 19.4 17.6 33.3 7.9 Ranked 5 
Wait and Not Make Changes 9.1 20.6 18.8 23.6 19.4 8.5 Ranked 3 
Panel E: Village Governments (n=112)  
WCM Strategy Ranked 
1 
Ranked 
2 
Ranked 
3  
Ranked 
4 
Ranked 
5 
Left 
Blank 
Borda 
Count 
Unrestricted Cash 62.5 13.4 9.8 2.7 8.9 2.7 Ranked 1 
Delay Payments/Transfers Out 8.0 33.9 18.8 18.8 15.2 5.4 Ranked 2 
Receivable Collections 12.5 17.9 33.0 16.1 13.4 7.1 Ranked 3 
Issue Short-Term Debt 7.1 17.0 14.3 17.9 38.4 5.4 Ranked 5 
Wait and Not Make Changes 10.7 11.6 15.2 34.8 21.4 6.3 Ranked 4 
Notes: (1) All values are in percentages. The highest percentage value given to a specific ranking of 1 to 5 
for a strategy is bolded and shaded. (2) Left Blank means that the financial manager did not rank the given 
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option with a value of 1 to 5. (3) The Borda Count is an election based method that ranks voters’ 
selections in order of preference. The outcome of the election is indicated by gaining the most points. For 
this calculation the first ranked option was given 5 points (n-1), the second ranked was given 4 points (n-
1), and so forth for all five options. All values are totaled and the option with the most points is ranked 
highest. A modified Borda Count was calculated for partially ranked options in which 1 point was giving 
to the most preferred option if only one most preferred option was selected (Emerson, 2013). The overall 
rankings were the same for both the Borda Count and Modified Borda Count with the exception that 
village government managers tied in the number of points given to delaying payments and transfers out 
and speeding up the collections of receivables, being ranked second or third. 
2016 NEW YORK LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SURVEY 
106 
 
Appendix 3. 2 Survey Instrument 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE RETAIN INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR YOUR RECORDS 
 
 
 
PLEASE RETURN INFORMED CONSENT SIGNATURE PAGE  
WITH YOUR COMPLETED SURVEY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE  
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This survey has been distributed to high ranking financial officers in several hundred local 
governments throughout New York State. Filling out this voluntary questionnaire indicates 
that you give your informed consent to be a subject in this study.  
To the best of your knowledge, please CHECK the most appropriate box as well as write 
(or attach/email additional sheets to mllofton@syr.edu) for extended open-ended answers 
when requested.  
 
Professional Profile 
 
1) What is your current position? 
 Chief Fiscal Officer  
 Comptroller (or Controller) 
 Commissioner (Director) of Finance 
 Treasurer  
 Clerk – Treasurer  
 Other (please specify): _______________ 
2) How many years have you been in the 
position? __________________ 
3) How many years have you been in the 
public finance profession? 
_________________ 
4) Please indicate your current level of 
professional satisfaction. 
 Extremely satisfied  
 Somewhat satisfied  
 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
 Somewhat dissatisfied  
 Extremely dissatisfied 
5) Please indicate the highest level of 
education completed (Please check all that 
apply):     
 Some high school, no degree 
 High school degree 
 Some college   
 Four-year college degree  
 Master of Business Administration (MBA) 
 Master of Public Administration (MPA) 
 Other Master degree  
 Juris Doctor (J.D.) or equivalent 
 Ph.D. or equivalent 
6) Please indicate whether you currently hold 
any of the following credentials (Please 
check all that apply):  
 Certified Public Accountant (CPA) 
 Certified Government Financial 
Manager (CGFM) 
 Certified Public Finance Officer 
(CPFO) 
 Certified Public Finance 
Administrator (CPFA) 
 Certified Financial Advisor  
 Licensed Securities Trader 
 Other (please specify): 
_______________ 
General Financial Management 
Characteristics 
 
7) How is the chief financial officer (or 
highest ranking financial officer) selected? 
 Elected   
 Appointed by chief elected official   
 Appointed by governing board   
 Hired by appointed 
manager/administrator   
 Other (please specify): 
________________ 
 
8) Approximately how many people are 
employed in your government’s finance 
department? ______________ (full time)  
_________________________ (part time)   
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9) Has your government issued any long-term 
debt (e.g., general obligation, revenue-
backed, or any other long-term debt) 
within the past 5 years?  
 Yes 
 No 
If no, please skip to question 12. If yes, 
please answer question 10.  
 
10) Is your local government rated on any of 
its outstanding General Obligation (GO) 
debt? 
 Yes 
 No 
If no, please skip to question 12. If yes, 
what is your current GO bond rating?  
 Aaa/AAA 
 Aa1/AA+ 
 Aa2/AA 
 Aa3/AA- 
 A1/A+ 
 A2/A 
 A3/A- 
 Baa1/BBB+ 
 Baa2/BBB 
 Baa3/BBB- 
 Below Baa3/BBB- 
 
11) If your debt (GO or Revenue) is rated 
security, how often do you interact with 
credit rating agency officials within a 
budgeting cycle? 
 Once a quarter 
 Semi-annually 
 Annually 
 Other (please specify): 
__________________ 
 
 
 
Working Capital Management Decisions 
 
This study focuses on how you make decisions 
when managing working capital (current 
assets and current liabilities). Current assets 
include unrestricted cash, marketable 
securities, and receivables. Current liabilities 
include accounts payable and short-term debt 
(i.e., bond anticipation, tax anticipation, 
revenue anticipation, budget notes, direct-
lending arrangements, or a line of credit).    
12) Given the above context, do you feel 
limited in your discretion by state 
regulations in managing current assets, 
which include unrestricted cash, 
marketable securities, and receivables?  
 No  
 Yes  
 
13) Does your jurisdiction have an internal 
operating procedure or policy on how to 
manage unrestricted cash? 
 Yes  
 No 
If no, please skip to question 14. If yes, 
please briefly describe what operating 
procedure(s) or policy (policies) that exist 
or please attach/email copies of the 
documents to mllofton@syr.edu.  
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14) Do you feel limited by internal operating 
procedures or policies to use your 
discretion in managing current assets, 
which include unrestricted cash, 
marketable securities, and receivables?  
 Yes  
 No 
 
15) Given the initial context, do you feel 
limited in your discretion by state 
regulations in managing current liabilities, 
which include accounts payable and short-
term debt (i.e., bond anticipation notes, tax 
anticipation notes, revenue anticipation 
notes, and budget notes, direct-lending 
arrangements, or a line of credit)?  
 No  
 Yes  
 
16) Does your jurisdiction have an internal 
operating procedure or policy on how to 
manage short-term debt? 
 Yes 
 No 
If no, please skip to question 17. If yes, 
please briefly describe what operating 
procedure(s) or policy (policies) that 
exist or please attach/email copies of the 
documents to mllofton@syr.edu?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17) Do you feel limited by internal operating 
procedures or policies to use your 
discretion in managing current liabilities, 
which include accounts payable and short-
term debt?  
 Yes  
 No 
 
18) Has your government issued any short-
term debt (i.e., bond anticipation notes, tax 
anticipation notes, revenue anticipation 
notes, and budget notes) within the past 2 
years? 
 Yes 
 No 
If no, skip to question 19. If yes, is the 
short-term debt issued primarily 
because there is:  
 Receivables have not been received  
 An absence of unrestricted cash on hand 
 Higher than expected expenditures 
 A more favorable long-term debt market 
is about to occur in a few months  
 Other (please specify): 
___________________ 
 
19) Local governments have increasingly 
engaged in direct bank loans as a form of 
direct lending. Direct lending is any 
arrangement in which a single lender (e.g., 
bank, pension fund, and mutual fund) 
makes a loan to a municipal issuer. Has 
your government engaged in direct-lending 
arrangements in the past year?  
 Yes 
 No 
If no, please skip to question 21. If yes, 
please answer question 20.  
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20) Please indicate the time period within 
which your jurisdiction has used direct-
lending arrangements in the recent past.  
 In the last 2 years 
 Between 2 and no more than 3 
years 
 Between 3 and no more than 4 
years 
 More than 4 years (please specify 
the number of years): 
__________________ 
 
21) A line of credit (LOC) is a prearranged 
loan that establishes a maximum loan 
balance that a financial institution will 
permit the borrower to maintain. The 
borrower can draw down on the LOC at 
any time, as long as they do not exceed the 
maximum set in the agreement. Did your 
jurisdiction have a line of credit with a 
bank in the past year? 
 Yes 
 No 
If no, skip to question 23. If yes, please 
answer question 22?  
 
22) Please indicate the time period within 
which your jurisdiction has used your bank 
line of credit in the recent past.  
 In the last 2 years 
 Between 2 and no more than 3 
years 
 Between 3 and no more than 4 
years 
 More than 4 years (please specify 
the number of years): 
__________________ 
 
 
 
 
23) Inter-fund borrowing occurs when one 
fund loans money to another fund and the 
amounts provided are required to be 
repaid. Does your jurisdiction allow for 
inter-fund borrowing?  
 Yes 
 No 
If no, skip to question 25. If yes, please 
answer question 24.     
 
24) Please indicate the time period within 
which your jurisdiction has used inter-fund 
borrowing in the recent past.  
 The past year 
 Between 1 and no more than 2 
years 
 Between 2 and no more than 3 
years 
 Between 3 and no more than 4 
years 
 More than 4 years (please specify 
the number of years): 
__________________ 
 
25) A cash flow deficit is when cash 
disbursements are greater than cash 
receipts. Should a cash flow deficit occur, 
which, if any, of the following measures are 
you likely to implement to address the 
deficit? (Rank in order of likelihood of use, 
1 being most frequent use and 5 being least 
frequent.) 
_____ Draw down unrestricted cash balances  
_____ Delay payments of accounts payable  
_____ Speed up collections on receivables 
_____ Do not take action to make changes to 
current assets or current liabilities  
_____ Increase short-term borrowing (e.g., 
issue more notes payable) 
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26) A cash flow deficit is when cash 
disbursements are greater than cash 
receipts. Given your current constraints, 
suppose there is a cash flow deficit, which 
of the following asset management 
strategies are you more likely to make to 
lower the cash flow deficit? 
 Draw down unrestricted cash balances in 
the amount of the cash flow deficit  
 Wait and not make changes to assets 
(e.g., unrestricted cash, marketable 
securities, and receivables)  
 Speed up the collection of receivables  
 
 
27) Given your current constraints, suppose 
there is a cash flow deficit, which of the 
following liability management strategies 
are you more likely to make to reduce the 
cash flow deficit? 
 Delay payments and transfers out 
 Wait and not make changes to current 
liabilities  
 Issue short-term debt (e.g., bond 
anticipation notes, tax anticipation notes, 
revenue anticipation notes, and budget 
notes) in the amount of the cash flow 
deficit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28) Given your current constraints, suppose 
there is a cash flow deficit, which of the 
following management strategies do you 
prefer to make to reduce the cash flow 
deficit at your local government? Choose 
one strategy that best fits your current 
practices.  
 Draw down unrestricted cash balances as 
well as issue short-term debt to total the 
amount of the cash flow deficit  
 Wait and not make changes to current 
assets and current liabilities 
 Draw down unrestricted cash balances as 
well as delay payments and transfers out 
to total the amount of the cash flow 
deficit 
 Speed up the collection of receivables as 
well as issue short-term debt to total the 
amount of the cash flow deficit 
 Speed up the collection receivables as 
well as delay payments and transfers out 
 
29) Does your jurisdiction have a 
policy/policies regarding the maintenance 
of its general fund balance? This includes a 
positive balance in any or all of the 
following fund balance categories: 
nonspendable, restricted, committed, 
assigned, and unassigned.  
 Yes  
 No 
If no, please skip to question 30. If yes, 
please briefly describe what policy 
(policies) that exist or please attach/ 
email copies of the documents to 
mllofton@syr.edu. 
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30) Does your government have a 
policy/policies regarding the creation and 
maintenance of enterprise fund or 
proprietary fund balances, which include a 
policy/policies for a positive balance in any 
or all of the following fund balance 
categories: nonspendable, restricted, 
committed, assigned, and unassigned? 
 Yes 
 No  
If no, please skip to question 31. If yes, 
please briefly describe what policy 
(policies) that exist or please attach/ 
email copies of the documents to 
mllofton@syr.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31) Are you willing to be interviewed by phone 
or in person about your working capital 
management strategies? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
32) Please feel free to provide any additional 
comments you would like to make 
regarding cash management or the use of 
short-term debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographic Characteristics 
 
33) What is your current age? 
__________________ 
 
34) What is your current gender identity?  
 Female  
 Male 
 Transgender  
 Prefer not to answer  
 
35) Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish 
origin? 
 No 
 Yes  
 
36) What is your race? (Please check all that 
apply):     
 African-American or Black 
 American Indian or Alaskan Native 
 Caucasian 
 East Asian or Asian American  
 South Asian or Indian American  
 Middle Eastern or Arab American  
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander  
 Other  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate! 
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Chapter 4:  The Impact of Excess Taxing Capacity on Short-Term Resources 
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4.1 Introduction 
In the United States, local governments are creatures of the state in which state 
governments grant legal powers and impose laws further limiting the authority of local 
governments. Since the tax revolts in the early 1970’s, legislation imposing tax and expenditure 
limits (TELs) have been established in several states to constrain growth and reduce the size of 
local governments.43 TELs can be classified according to their constraints on overall property tax 
rates, a specific property tax rate, the property tax levy, a cap on general revenue or general 
expenditure, assessment increases, and full disclosure requirements (Joyce & Mullins, 1991). 44  
In the twenty-eight states that have property tax levy limitations (hereinafter referred to 
as tax limits) on local governments (Mullins & Wallin, 2004), financial managers can increase 
property taxes up to a specified levy limit. The difference between the levy limit and selected 
property tax level subject to the limit is the excess taxing capacity (ETC). Managers may choose 
to increase property taxes, thereby reducing the ETC, to generate more revenues without having 
to create a new tax or gain voter approval. In this sense, the ETC is a slack resource to serve as a 
cushion of actual resources used to adapt successfully to internal or external pressures for change 
(Bourgeois, 1981). Increased amounts of slack in the form of ETC has been found to reduce 
general fund unreserved balances and increase budget stabilization funds, school spending, and 
the likelihood of winning an override vote (Bradbury, Mayer, & Case, 2001; Hawley & Rork, 
2015; Nguyen-Hoang & Hou, 2014; Snow, Gianakis, & Haughton, 2015). Managers might also 
have an incentive to maintain this slack resource because its use has a political cost to increase 
property taxes on residential and commercial property.  
                                                 
43 As of 2015, twenty-eight states have at least one TEL (Tax Policy Center, 2016).  
44 Alternative classifications exist for the measurement of TELs using an index of state-level TEL 
restrictiveness or stringency (Amiel, 2009; Poulson, 2005).   
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Slack resources also manifest as short-term resources which can include the use of 
unrestricted cash (particularly resources reported in the general fund), the use of interfund 
transfers (accessing unrestricted cash in other funds), and the use of short-term debt (an external 
source of funds). Evidence supports that short-term resources are used to mitigate cash flow 
deficits (Lofton, 2018), to buffer against revenue reductions especially if heavily dependent on 
intergovernmental aid (Arapis, Reitano, & Bruck, 2017; Gianakis & Snow, 2007; Hendrick, 
2006; Lofton & Kioko, 2018; Stewart, 2009; Stewart, Hamman, & Pink‐Harper, 2017; Wang, 
2015), and to stabilize expenditures or spending volatility (Hendrick & Crawford, 2014; 
Marlowe, 2005). 
A prime concern for financial managers is sustaining government operations. Since cash 
receipts (inflows) and cash disbursements (outflows) are unevenly received, managers may need 
to use slack resources to sustain operations. For instance, a cash flow deficit occurs when cash 
inflows are less than cash outflows. When a temporary cash flow deficit is expected to occur, 
managers have the expertise to recognize that slack resources can be used to reduce or eliminate 
the cash flow deficit.  
In the context of expected cash flow deficits, financial managers can choose to use slack 
resources in the form of short-term resources or ETC. We might expect managers to use short-
term resources when deficits are temporary and of a small amount. For example, a cash deficit 
created by the need to pay higher than expected employee salaries could be mitigated by using 
unrestricted cash reserves. However, a cash deficit produce by the need to purchase vehicles or 
initially support capital projects could be financed through issuing short-term debt (Lofton, 
2018). While cash flow deficits that are more sustained and of larger amounts are likely to be 
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mitigated by reducing the ETC. For example, a cash flow deficit in four consecutive years from 
reductions in sales tax receipts might motivate a jurisdiction to increase property tax revenues.  
While prior research has contributed to our understanding of the impact of slack 
resources, a central decision-making question has been ignored. That question is: Do managers 
tradeoff the use of slack in the form of excess taxing capacity and short-term resources to 
manage cash flows? It is imperative to evaluate this question to broaden our understanding of the 
use of slack resources to manage internal and external challenges. For example, a financial 
manager could access short-term resources to mitigate temporary cash flow deficits and access 
ETC to address sustained structural deficits. Thus, our knowledge of slack resources is expanded 
if financial managers are trading off accessing different types of slack under tax limits.  
The present study extends our knowledge by focusing on the relationship between short-
term resources and excess taxing capacity. In contrast to the existing literature (Gore, 2009; 
Hand, Pierson, & Thompson, 2016; Kioko, 2015), an alternative specification is used for the 
short-term resource of cash holdings, General Fund unrestricted cash. This more restrictive 
measurement of cash holdings allows for only cash resources completely under managerial 
discretion to be influenced by ETC. Furthermore, this study is the first to evaluate the impacts of 
ETC on short-term obligations which include short-term debt issuance, internal borrowing from 
a state, interfund transfers-in, and overdrafts of cash reserves. By evaluating two short-term 
resources used for cash flow management, our understanding of the use of different slack 
resources can be furthered.  
The main conjecture is that managers use low cost short-term resources instead of 
increasing property tax revenues (i.e., decreasing their excess taxing capacity) to sustain 
operations. Using data of New York county, city, and village governments under tax limits as a 
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case study,45 the results indicate managers are more likely to reduce General Fund unrestricted 
cash holdings instead of increasing property tax revenues (i.e., decreasing their ETC). Findings 
here are contrary to the seminal work by Gore (2009) – that is, managers are more likely to seek 
to maximize their ETC for precautionary reasons rather than hoarding cash. Similarly, more 
competent managers might use short-term obligations instead of accessing ETC. This work finds 
evidence of slack in the form of short-term obligations being utilized while slack in the form of 
ETC is increased.       
The implications of this study are that managers can actively use slack in the form of 
short-term resources while building up slack to mitigate long-term fiscal imbalances. Since using 
ETC has a political cost, a government is not likely to repeatedly decrease ETC (i.e., increase 
property tax revenues) during several consecutive fiscal years. Therefore, it is imperative to gain 
more knowledge about a wider array of slack resources (e.g., unrestricted cash holdings and 
short-term debt capacity) managers frequently use to be responsive to internal and external 
challenges.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the existing literature 
on the impact of state-imposed TELs on local governments. Section 4.3 details the literature on 
the impact of ETC on local governments. Section 4.4 describes two TELs established in New 
York and gives motivations for the use of short-term resources instead of ETC with testable 
hypotheses. Section 4.5 discusses the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4.6 presents the 
results, and concluding remarks are asserted in Section 4.7.  
                                                 
45 Only county, city, and village governments in New York State are subject to a constitutional tax limit 
which limits the authority to impose property taxes. Therefore, other New York local governments (e.g., towns, 
school districts, library districts, fire districts, and other special purpose governments) are excluded from the 
analysis. In 1986, New York repealed the constitutional property tax levy limits imposed on small city school 
districts. The empirical evidence finds the repeal had no significant immediate or gradual impact on average 
spending for the whole group of small city school districts or for those nearing the limit (Nguyen-Hoang, 2013). 
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4.2 Local Governments and Tax Limits 
The primary purpose of TELs is to restrict or decrease the growth of revenues and public 
expenditures. Several studies have investigated if TELs achieve this purpose to find state-
imposed TELs reduce revenues and spending of local governments (Brown, 2000; Chapman & 
Gorina, 2012; Dye & McGuire, 1997; Dye, McGuire, & McMillen, 2005; Figlio, 1998; Springer, 
Lusby, Leatherman, & Featherstone, 2009). Local governments have responded by reducing 
reliance on property taxes (Brown, 2000; Hoene, 2004; Shadbegian, 1999; Skidmore, 1999; 
Springer et al., 2009) and shifting their revenue structure towards reliance on revenues not 
subjected to limitations (e.g., sales taxes, income taxes, miscellaneous revenues, and user fees 
and charges) (Hoene, 2004; Joyce & Mullins, 1991; Lang & Jian, 2004; Shadbegian, 1999; Sun, 
2014; Thompson & Green, 2004).  
We might expect, under tax limits, local government mangers are likely to increase 
reliance on revenues not subject to the property tax limit, as a long-term solution if cash flow 
deficits are reoccurring. Moreover, managers are likely to react to tax limits by altering the 
maintenance of slack resources, and thus changing local government savings behavior. We find 
evidence that tax limits impact slack resources in the form of cash holdings (Kioko, 2015). For 
county governments, cash holdings (unrestricted cash holdings and proceeds of bond issues) is 
found to be reported in significantly lower levels when subject to TELs (Kioko, 2015).  
It might also be expected that local government managers under tax limits alter budgetary 
strategies given their shifts in revenue structure. Potentially binding TELs are more formidable 
constraints implied by the physical ceiling and public sentiment for taxation; while potentially 
nonbinding TELs are less restrictive if a local government can circumvent limitations (Joyce & 
Mullins, 1991). Cities with more stringent TELs are allotted larger amounts of intergovernmental 
aid, higher debt service expenditures, and acquire less net capital during the Great Recession 
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(Park, Park, & Maher, 2018). These budgetary impacts can alter financial planning if more 
intergovernmental aid and debt are continually relied upon. In local governments under TELs, 
strategies used by officials to respond to the budget crisis during the Great Recession were to 
shift from property tax increases to implement personnel-related cuts, increases in user fees, 
other non-tax strategies, and short-term borrowing to raise revenues and pay for services 
(Jimenez, 2017).  
Local governments substitute on a less than dollar-for-dollar basis of miscellaneous 
revenue for tax revenue (Shadbegian, 1999). Therefore, shifts in revenue structure to diversify 
revenues might be limited especially for smaller sized governments. Even though local 
governments had both a diversified (evenly balanced total revenues among selected revenue 
categories) and complex structure (multiple sources of revenue), greater revenue volatility rather 
than stability can persist (Carroll, 2009). Moreover, St. Clair (2012) finds Colorado’s 1992 
Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, a state-imposed TEL, has increased revenue and expenditure volatility 
for local governments. The ability to conduct financial planning becomes more challenging for 
managers with both revenue and expenditure volatility. This volatility could create temporary 
cash flow deficit problems and motivate the use of slack resources instead of long-term changes 
in revenue structure under tax limits.  
 
4.3 Local Governments and Excess Taxing Capacity 
Excess taxing capacity, the difference between the levy limit and actual property tax level 
subjected to the limit, has been evaluated for local governments in Massachusetts under 
Proposition 2½. The ETC is found to increase school spending (Bradbury et al., 2001) and 
 
120 
 
reduce override voting behavior (Hawley & Rork, 2015; Wallin & Zabel, 2011).46 These uses of 
excess taxing capacity are to control for providing leeway to raise revenues without overriding 
the limit. This use is a different conceptualization than managers choosing the slack resource to 
manage cash flows and sustain services.  
 A few studies evaluate the impact of the ETC on slack resources in the form of budget 
stabilization funds (BSFs) and “free cash” 47 (a proxy measure for General Fund unreserved fund 
balances). First, in Massachusetts under Proposition 2½, no substitution effects are found 
between raising taxes (i.e., using excess taxing capacity) and larger stabilization fund balances. 
In fact, managers increase ETC while growing BSFs (Gianakis & Snow, 2007; Nguyen-Hoang & 
Hou, 2014; Snow et al., 2015) and thus revenue reserves are significant in building up 
stabilization funds. Second, Nguyen-Hoang and Hou (2014) find the fiscal constraint of the levy 
limit measured as the property-tax levy to the levy limit (i.e., one minus the excess taxing 
capacity percentage ratio) leads to lower reported free cash. Further, increases in ETC yield 
higher balances when combining both stabilization fund balances and free cash (Gianakis & 
Snow, 2007). Overall, these findings suggest that local governments increase ETC in conjunction 
with increasing BSFs, unreserved fund balances, and a combined measure of discretionary slack 
resources. However, this invites the question: What specific resources are managers altering to 
establish slack resources for these positive relationships?   
 The current study differs from the existing literature (Nguyen-Hoang & Hou, 2014; Snow 
et al., 2015) in several ways. First, the impact of ETC is investigated for slack resources within 
                                                 
46 ETC has also been used to restrict the sample (Lang & Jian, 2004) and as an instrumental variable for 
changes in housing prices (Bradbury et al., 2001).  
47 According to Gianakis and Snow (2007), free cash is defined as the difference between end of year 
revenues and expenditures on a budgetary or cash basis. This measure is used as a proxy for an audited fund balance 
or Unreserved General Fund Balances on a GAAP basis. However, this measure may omit some unpaid liabilities 
and uncollected revenues from the current fiscal year. For more detail on this measure, see footnoted one in 
Gianakis and Snow (2007).   
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full discretion of managers. BSFs are established by law with rules governing their use and are 
accessed only after gaining approval (Hou, 2013). “Free cash” (an approximation of unreserved 
general fund balances) is the difference between assets and liabilities which blurs if changes are 
occurring to assets or liabilities to create a positive balance. The use of “free cash” is also 
investigated prior to Statement 54 from the Governmental Accounting Standards Board which 
altered the categorization of fund balance (Nguyen-Hoang & Hou, 2014). Although the 
classification of unreserved fund balance was not limited to any specific purpose, governments 
could express intentions of its use by designate a portion of unreserved fund balance to a 
particular manner (Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 2006). Therefore, this 
categorization of fund balance might not indicate the substantive amount of savings available to 
managers or the amount that can be used to mitigate volatility in cash flows. Moreover, a 
government could report large unreserved fund balance to increase their likelihood of a higher 
credit rating (Marlowe, 2011; Moody's Investors Service, 2016) while discouraging managers 
from using savings to supplement cash inflows. Due to these points, I investigate slack resources 
in which managers have a higher level of discretion regarding their use, the General Fund 
unrestricted cash balance and short-term borrowing.   
 Second, to further the literature, I use a refined measure of slack resources that managers 
have full discretion over their use. The work of Gore (2009) and accompanying replication by 
Hand et al. (2016) use slack in the form of total cash and marketable securities48 from the United 
States Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Governments. Kioko (2015) adds to this measure by 
including proceeds of bond issues to the measure of cash reported in the United States Census 
Bureau’s Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances. One disadvantage of using 
                                                 
48 This measure of cash includes cash held in bond funds but excludes cash within pension plans. This 
measure is also deflated by operating and interest expenditures. 
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this Census Bureau’s measure of cash holdings is that no designations in cash reserves are 
reported such as cash for capital projects or special revenue funds. Therefore, our knowledge of 
the level of cash reserves held by local governments is likely overestimated (Kioko, 2015). This 
present study seeks to provide an alternative source of data and alternative specification of cash 
reserves to more accurately measure this key slack resource. I measure cash holdings as only 
cash reported as General Fund unrestricted cash. This allows for a refined measure of cash 
holdings that allows for only cash within the sole discretion of managers to be evaluated. 
Furthermore, the present study contributes to the literature by evaluating the impact of 
ETC on short-term borrowing. Prior studies have used cash management notes (Su & Hildreth, 
2018) and a broader array of short-term notes (Lofton & Kioko, 2018) as a measurement of 
short-term borrowing. This form of borrowing, however, only captures market transactions. Yet, 
governments may also borrow from non-market sources such as their state government and 
between funds. Thus, this study considers a wider definition of borrowing to include internal 
borrowing from the state and interfund transfers-in. We, then, can assess tradeoffs made by 
managers to borrow broadly in the short-term or to access the slack in their taxing capacity to 
sustain government operations.  
 
4.4 New York Local Governments’ Use of Short-Term Resources and ETC 
The State of New York imposes two TELs on local governments. First, the New York 
Constitution establishes a legal limit on the maximum amount of real property tax that can be 
levied in county, city, and village governments. This constitutional tax limit (CTL) constrains the 
taxing power of county governments to 1.5 percent of the five-year average full valuation and 
city and village governments to 2 percent of the five-year average full valuation (New York 
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State, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d).49 A local government can levy an amount lower than the CTL to 
preserve excess taxing authority to access in future periods. The difference between the CTL and 
the tax levy subject to the limit can be conceptualized as a slack resource in which the excess tax 
capacity can be used to increase revenues without having to gain voter approval (Giankis & 
Snow, 2007; Nguyen-Hoang & Hou, 2014; Snow & Gianakis, 2009; Snow, Gianakis, & Fortess, 
2008; Snow et al., 2015).   
Second, under Governor Andrew M. Cuomo in 2011, New York State established a limit 
to the property tax levied for local governments in which the annual growth rate of the property 
tax is held to two percent or the rate of inflation, whichever is lower (New York State, 2017a). 
The governments subjected to this TEL are general purpose governments (e.g., counties, cities, 
towns, and villages) and most single purpose governments (e.g., all independent school districts 
and most special districts), excluding New York City. Although the property tax cap limits levy 
growth, the governing body of a local government can override the tax cap with at least 60 
percent of the body voting in favor of increasing the property tax above the mandated limit.50 
 
                                                 
49 The measure of five-year average uses the last completed assessment roll and four preceding rolls added 
together and divided by five to establish the five-year average full valuation. County governments can pass a 
resolution approved by either (1) two-thirds of its legislative body or (2) by a majority of the board and a mandatory 
referendum to increase the tax limit to a maximum rate of 2 percent. As of 2017, 40 counties are subject to 1.5%, 14 
counties are subject to 2%, and three are in between. County, city, and village governments can enact a local law, 
subject to a mandatory referendum, to establish a lower tax limit but enactment does not affect the constitutional tax 
limit (CTL) to reduce the threshold in which the State Comptroller is required to withhold certain local assistance 
payments (New York State, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d). The Constitution and related statutes allow for taxes levied for 
certain purposes to be excluded and not subject to the CTL. The exclusion items permissible are taxes in the amount 
to pay principal and interest on a government’s indebtedness (e.g., revenue producing improvement bonds and notes, 
water bonds and notes, capital notes, bond anticipation notes, and bonds issued for purposes other than revenue-
producing improvements, water supply improvements, joint sewage projects, and joint drainage projects) and taxes 
in the amount to pay of direct budgetary appropriations for most capital expenditures (see Local Finance Law 
11.00[a]) (New York State, 2017d).  
50 As well as the override, Chapter 97 of the Laws of 2011 which established the tax levy limit (tax cap) 
does allow local governments and school districts to levy an additional amount for certain excludable expenditures. 
A local government has the ability to carryover “unused” levy limit amounts, up to 1.5 percent, from one prior fiscal 
year in fiscal years after 2013 (New York State, 2017a).  
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Given that some New York local governments are subject to two types of constraints, 
these jurisdictions are ideal to investigate the relationship between ETC and short-term 
resources. Each locality can vary their managerial response due to having their own taxing and 
governance authority. Under tax limits, New York local government managers are likely 
incentivized to build up ETC (i.e., exhaust less of their constitutional tax limit) to appease 
stakeholders (e.g., taxpayers, political leaders, and auditors).  
Governments likely incur a political cost from stakeholders when reducing any excess 
taxing capacity since it requires an increase in the property taxes levied on citizens and 
businesses. A local government manager can be motivated to exhaust a greater percentage of 
their CTL by desiring to have more revenues to keep pace with growing expenditures, having 
greater pressure to increase property taxes when access to non-property tax revenue streams are 
diminished, and having a declining or stagnating tax base (New York State, 2017d). Exhausting 
more of the tax limit reduces flexibility in revenue structure and optionality to sustain current 
service levels. The Office of the Comptroller considers county governments that have exhausted 
over 80 percent and 90 percent of their CTL to be in the caution or danger zone, respectively 
(New York State, 2017d). With a significant lack of ETC, the ability of governments to increase 
their property tax is severely limited and minor changes in exclusions or real property valuation 
could cause the CTL to be exceeded. Managers, therefore, strive to maintain and build up excess 
taxing capacity to provide greater flexibility over their taxing authority.   
Furthermore, ETC can be conceived as a form of unabsorbed slack, or a currently 
uncommitted resource (Tan & Peng, 2003). Local government managers strive to increase 
unabsorbed slack, in other forms such as UFB and BSFs, to use as a primary source of 
discretionary slack (Hendrick, 2006), to be a countercyclical fiscal tool (Marlowe, 2005; Stewart 
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et al., 2017), buffer against cuts in state aid or budget shocks (Gianakis & Snow, 2007; Moulick 
& Taylor, 2017), and increase the likelihood of a higher credit rating (Marlowe, 2011; Moody's 
Investors Service, 2016; Snow & Gianakis, 2009). Unabsorbed slack, however, is highly visible 
and closely monitored by stakeholders such as taxpayers, political leaders, auditors, interest 
groups, and the media (Moulick & Taylor, 2017). Therefore, New York local government 
mangers are likely to use resources that are less visible and monitored as a substitute for 
accessing ETC.  
The selection of alternative resources to ETC might depend on the value each local 
government places on reducing the less visible and monitored resource. I developed a series of 
hypotheses based on strategies managers would likely engage in to build up ETC through 
minimizing transaction costs, maximizing cash flows, and encumbering low political costs. One 
such strategy is to draw down on cash balances which are less visible to citizens and exclusively 
within the discretion of managers. Slack resources in the form of large cash balances are a proxy 
for more competent managers (Hand et al., 2016; Meier & O’Toole, 2002; O'Toole & Meier, 
2011) because having more unrestricted cash allows for more optionality such as innovation, use 
as a buffer to the external environment, and potentially higher credit ratings (Gianakis & Snow, 
2007; Lofton, 2018; Moody's Investors Service, 2016; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Managers may 
prefer to access unrestricted cash balances to build up ETC due to its low pollical cost for use 
and being in full discretion of managers. I assert governments are more likely to deplete cash 
balances if they report more excess taxing capacity, all else held constant. This hypothesis is at 
the core of the analysis and important when evaluating strategic planning practices of financial 
managers. Formally, my first hypothesis is as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: Governments that report more excess taxing capacity will likely have 
lower unrestricted cash balances. 
 A second strategy is to use short-term borrowing capacity to build up ETC. In contrast to 
BSFs and UFB, the use of short-term debt is less visible and monitored by stakeholders. Credit 
rating agencies such as Moody’s measure the gross debt burden which includes “GO [General 
Obligation] bonds, notes, loans, capital leases, and any third-party debt backed by the local 
government’s GO guarantee” (Moody's Investors Service, 2016). However, stakeholders such as 
taxpayers, political leaders, and the media are likely to have less knowledge of the use of short-
term borrowing by local governments than knowledge about property tax levels. Therefore, 
increases in short-term borrowing can occur while building up ETC with less opposition from 
stakeholders. Formally, my second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Governments that report more excess taxing capacity will likely have 
higher levels of short-term borrowing. 
The following section describes the data and model specifications to test these two 
hypotheses. 
 
4.5 Data and Methods  
4.5.1 Data 
The use of General Fund unrestricted cash and short-term borrowing by a wide array of 
local governments is not known at a national level due to the lack of reporting of individualized 
balance sheet data. The State of New York publicly provides data regarding short-term resources 
from the balance sheet, revenues and expenditures, and debt issuance for its local governments. 
This allows for the evaluation of short-term resources at the local government level. 
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Furthermore, New York local governments have their own governing body and taxing authority 
and thus, managers are more likely to have the freedom to alter their use of unrestricted cash and 
short-term borrowing in response to changes in ETC (New York State Department of State, 
2014).51,52,53   
This study relies on data on from 672 general purpose governments including 57 
counties, 61 cities, and about 554 villages in New York State for fiscal years between 1996 and 
2016.54 The dataset is created using information from a number of publicly available resources 
including New York Local Government and School Accountability, Open Book New York, New 
York State Board of Elections, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, and the Local Government Handbook from the New York Department of State. In 
addition, data from Bloomberg L.P. terminals was used to collect for a portion of the short-term 
borrowing measure. Variables were adjusted for inflation using the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) deflator with a base year of 2009. 
 
                                                 
51 County governments are the largest and most inclusive form of local government that provide many state 
mandated services such as Medicaid and manage prisons. City governments have the authority of home rule and 
have the authority to provide residents local government services such as water infrastructure, public safety, 
economic development, and social services. Town governments exist within a county to provide both town-wide 
services such as highway maintenance or police services and partial town services but cannot provide fire services 
town-wide and thus, create and administer special districts to provide this service. Village governments exist within 
a town and are created or dissolved by local initiative to truly exist through the discretion of residents (New York 
State Department of State, 2014).  
52 The counties that comprise the boroughs of New York City (New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens, and 
Richmond) are excluded as well as New York City which are outliers and significantly different. New York City is 
larger in size than the five counties that are located within, which would distort the regression analysis.  
53 The villages of East Nassau (1998), Sagaponack (2006), South Blooming Grove (2007), Woodbury 
(2007), and Mastic Beach (2011) were created over the study period and the village of Andes (2004), Pike (2010), 
Limestone (2011), East Randolph (2012), Perrysburg (2012), Randolph (2012), Seneca Falls (2012), and Altmar 
(2005 but officially dissolved in 2013) were dissolved over the study period. The last year of financial data for 
villages dissolved or the first year of financial data for villages created is indicated by the year in above parentheses. 
Villages were included when they were in existence and financial data was reported.  
54 The number of villages range from 558 in 1996 to 547 in 2016 due to dissolution of villages and some 
lack of reporting to the state. The total number of local governments range from 676 in 1996 to 665 in 2016.    
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4.5.1.1 Outcome Variables 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.3 indicate the descriptive statistics for county, city, and village 
governments for the use of unrestricted cash and short-term borrowing, respectively. The first 
outcome variable is cash holdings measured as unrestricted General Fund cash standardized by 
operating and debt interest expenditures. In Table 4.1, the reported descriptive statistics for 
General Fund cash as a proportion of operating expenditures and debt interest is, on average, 
12.52% for county governments, 14.49% for city governments, and 28.56% for village 
governments.  
To contextualize the reported cash holdings, Table 4.2 presents a comparison of local 
government cash measures in the literature. As stated previously, this study reports General Fund 
unrestricted cash holdings while the prior literature reports a broader measure of cash holdings. 
New York county governments report months of unrestricted cash that are about 30% of cash 
holdings and bond proceeds reported by counties nationwide in Kioko (2015). However, on a per 
capita basis New York county governments hold higher levels of median unrestricted cash 
($158.56 per person) than county governments nationwide ($94.21 per person). Given a sample 
of U.S. city governments from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Governments, Hand et al. 
(2016) and Gore (2009) report median months of cash as 10.93 and 8.34 months, respectively.55 
New York city governments report months of unrestricted cash as between 12% and 16% of 
months of cash holdings reported in Hand et al. (2016) and Gore (2009). Although General Fund 
unrestricted cash holdings of village governments have not been addressed in the literature, New 
York village governments are consistent with the prior finding that smaller municipalities report 
higher levels of cash holdings (Gore, 2009). Therefore, I expect impacts on General Fund 
                                                 
55 The reported values are for the test sample used. The medians for the full Census Bureau sample are 
9.25% (Gore, 2009) and 11.19% (Hand et al., 2016).  
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unrestricted cash holdings in New York county and city governments to be more generalizable to 
other United States large municipalities while impacts on village governments might look more 
like smaller jurisdictions.  
The second outcome variable is short-term borrowing and is measured by the four 
components of market short-term debt, borrowing from the state government, internal borrowing, 
and bank overdrafts. The first component is the market value of short-term obligations which is 
collected from Bloomberg L.P.’s workstations. This component is the full amount issued in the 
fiscal year of general obligation unlimited notes, general obligation limited notes, revenue notes, 
bond anticipation notes, tax anticipation notes, revenue anticipation notes, budget notes, 
certificates of participation, and warrants. The second component is the amount of internal 
borrowing that local governments have with the State of New York. This includes the current 
year issuance of capital notes, deficiency notes, installment purchase contracts, and state or 
authority loans. The third component is transfers-in from other governmental funds to the 
General Fund to allow for internal borrowing. The final component is the amount of negative 
cash reported from Open Book New York at the end of the fiscal year for governmental funds.56 
Since negative cash values might be overdrafts of bank accounts that are obligated to be paid 
back to be bank, the amount of negative cash should also be included in short-term borrowing 
obligations.57 These four components comprise the measure of short-term borrowing and are 
standardized by the total population and presented in natural log form. 
                                                 
56 All governmental funds are included except for the capital fund, debt service fund, and special district 
funds. These are excluded because they are distinctly created for specific purposes and the governmental fund 
included are more representative of everyday governmental activities.  
57 In the data, 40 observations (1 county, 4 cities, and 35 villages) from the fiscal years between 1996 and 
2016 had some amount of negative cash reported.    
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In Table 4.1, the descriptive statistics for short-term borrowing indicate, on average, city 
(4.469), county (3.976), and village (2.059) governments issue the most short-term borrowing 
per capita in natural log form, respectively. For improved interpretability, the amount of short-
term borrowing is $124.14, $246.92, and $154.47 per capita for county, city, and village 
governments, respectively. Table 4.4 compares this broader short-term borrowing measure to the 
use of market short-term debt (Lofton & Kioko, 2018) and cash flow management notes (Su & 
Hildreth, 2018). Since this measure is a wider representation of borrowing, more local 
governments engage in borrowing but for smaller amounts each year. Short-term borrowing is 
engaged in by 1,161 county observations for a median amount of $5.94 million, 1,245 city 
observations for a median amount of $2.63 million, and 6,954 village observations for a median 
amount of $69,000. In contrast, market short-term debt engagement is observed for a smaller 
number of observed governments but for a larger amount. The use of cash flow notes for 182 
California city observations is for a median amount of $6.36 million (Su & Hildreth, 2018) while 
and a wider array of short-term notes for 541 city observations is for a median amount of $7.28 
million. Therefore, the broadly defined short-term debt measure is engaged in by more local 
governments for smaller amounts.  
 
4.5.1.2 Test Variable  
The variable of interest, excess taxing capacity, is the slack in that taxing authority of a 
jurisdiction. ETC is measured as the constitutional tax limit minus the property tax levy subject 
to the limit standardized by the constitutional tax limit, in percentage form. This excess taxing 
capacity variable ranges from a value of 0 indicating the full constitutional tax limit is exhausted, 
or no slack in the taxing authority, to a value of 100 indicating none of the limit has been 
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utilized.58 ETC is tested for endogeneity in determining each outcome variable. Test results 
indicate that ETC is not likely to be endogenous for determining unrestricted cash models and in 
determining short-term borrowing for county and city governments. However, for determining 
short-term borrowing in village governments, ETC is likely endogenous.  
The proposed instrument for ETC is a lagged value of the endogenous variable expressed 
in ranks that has been used by previous researchers (Duncombe & Hou, 2014; Kroszner & 
Stratmann, 2000). Initially, the amount of ETC is lagged for one year for village governments. 
Then, ranks are created by dividing the distribution of the lagged variable into thirds to assign a 
value of “1” to the lowest third of the distribution, a value of “2” to the middle third of the 
distribution, and a value of “3” to the highest third of the distribution. The rankings are to be 
strongly correlated ETC but not correlated to the error term. Although the observations close to 
the points that switch from one value to another might be correlated, there are only two cross 
over points to another value and thus, might minimize this concern. However, for an instrument 
to be considered a better measure, the instrument should be tested to determine if it is highly 
correlated with the endogenous variable. The results of this test determine that the instrument is 
not a weak instrument.59  
                                                 
58 Few jurisdictions effectively exhausted the full constitutional tax limit. A total of 213 observations report 
a tax margin (constitutional tax limit minus levy subject to the limit) greater than the constitutional tax limit (6 
county observations, 6 city observations, and 201 village observations). The following areas in the sample have less 
than 1% of excess taxing capacity: City of Gloversville (2005), Village of Haverstraw (2002), Village of Herkimer 
(2013), and Village of Monticello (2005).  
59 The variable that is instrumented is excess taxing capacity for village governments. A one-year lagged 
ranked measure was used. The following tests were evaluated, first, following Duncombe and Hou (2014), partial F-
statistics from the first-stage regressions can be calculated then determined if they are above 10 for the instruments 
to be acceptable (Staiger & Stock, 1997). Second, the ivreg2 Stata command is preformed to evaluate the 
endogeneity test of each regressor. Third, comparing the Kleibergen-Papp rk Wald statistic to critical values 
established by Stock and Yogo (2005) are done to test if the instrument is likely weak. According to ivreg2 results 
for village governments, ETC was rejected as exogenous. A IV regression was conducted and regular regression 
results are presented in Table 4.5. The lagged ranked instrument has a Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic of 15,000, a 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic of 16,000, and a Stock-Yogo weak Id test of credical values of 16.38 which is 
greater than the 10% maximal IV size.  According to ivreg2 results for county and village governments, internal 
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In Figure 4.1 the average excess taxing capacity is depicted overtime by the sample of 
New York local governments. On average, excess taxing capacity is largest for villages with 
about 73.34% of their capacity unused, while counties have 61.75% and cities have 53.52% of 
their taxing authority available. Historically, ETC has declined in recessionary years especially 
for county and city governments after the 2001 recession.60 This might indicate that larger 
governments use excess taxing capacity by have higher taxes subject to the levy limit post-
recession.  
 
4.5.1.3 Control Variables   
Several control variables are used for both of the outcome variables. First, since a 
property tax cap was implemented during the study period, I control for its implementation. The 
property tax cap is measured as a dummy variable that is indicated as 1 for 2012 and after to 
denote implementation. Second, I include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
jurisdiction successfully voted to override the tax cap and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for 
lessening the constraint of the additional TEL. Finally, per capita personal income is used to 
control for differences in wealth between jurisdictions in all models.   
The control variables that are specific for determining unrestricted cash borrow heavily 
from Gore (2009), Hand et al. (2016), and Kioko (2015). First, the coefficient of variation in 
revenue is measured as the ratio of standard deviation of total revenue to mean total revenue over 
the current and previous four years. Within the New York local government sample, larger 
differences exist across governments between the coefficient of variation with county and city 
                                                 
transfers was close to the threshold of being rejected as endogenous (0.062). A IV regression was conducted and 
regular regression results are presented in Appendix A 
60 In addition to the 2001 recession, the local governments in New York State had some funding diverted 
from the State to help rebuild New York City after September 11th, 2001.  
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governments having lower variations at about 48% while village governments have a variation of 
90%. Second, limited revenue is measured as the revenue diversification index, Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index, used by researchers (Carroll, 2009). This is computed as the product of the 
fraction of total revenue from each source (property taxes, sales taxes, other sources, and 
intergovernmental revenue).61 This is interpreted as a value of 1 indicating complete 
diversification among each source of revenue. New York county and city governments have 
more diversification of revenues (above 91%) than village governments (about 84%). Third, 
differences in the proportion of revenue bases is controlled for such as property tax, sales tax, 
other tax, fees and charges, state aid and federal aid revenue as a proportion of total revenues. 
Forth, the natural log of long-term debt outstanding per capita controls for differences in debt 
burdens.  
Fifth, the proportion of spending on administration and capital equipment, which might 
produce differences in cash holdings, are controlled. Six, control variables are used for 
population and population density are used to account for differences in the sizes of 
governments. Seventh, I add to the controls for determining cash holdings with the variables of 
internal transfers and the natural log of short-term borrowing. A manager might be more likely to 
use unrestricted cash if the government makes larger transfers from governmental funds to other 
funds as either the result of repayment from previous transfers or a legal or contractual 
requirement. Village governments have a heavy practice of transferring funds from governmental 
funds as a proportion of their liabilities (32.75%) as compared to city (24.49%) and county 
(12.72%) governments. Furthermore, supplemental resources can be accumulated from short-
                                                 
61 The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index measure of revenue diversification is calculated as 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 1− ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
2𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
1−(100%/𝑛𝑛)
 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖is the proportion of total revenue generated from each source and n represents the total number of revenue 
sources selected for measuring diversification (Carroll, 2009). 
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term borrowing and not the savings of cash. Therefore, these two additional variables are 
controlled.  
The differences in the composition of assets, reliance on revenue sources, and non-
discretionary spending impact my expectations about short-term borrowing use across local 
governments. I expect county government results to be more generalizable to other United States 
large municipalities than city and village governments that are largely influenced by unique 
residential preference. County and city governments have over 60% of their assets in non-cash 
sources while only about 30% of village governments have illiquid resources. All three local 
government types rely the most on property taxes but the second most relied upon own-source 
revenue is the sales tax for county (20.56%) and fees and charges for city (22.86%) and village 
(29.93%) governments. State and federal aid revenue is most relied on by county governments 
who are the administrative arm of the state for mandated services such as Medicaid. Salaries and 
wages expenditures comprise 49.41%, 35.95% and 33.19% of total expenditure for city, county, 
and village governments, respectively. 
Given these differences, the additional control variables of interest for short-term 
borrowing are the motivating factors to use short-term borrowing which are largely based on the 
work of Lofton and Kioko (2018) and Su and Hildreth (2018). The first control variable is 
illiquidity since communities with a relatively large proportion of assets that are not easily 
converted into cash are likely to use more short-term debt. A measure of illiquidity is constructed 
as the proportion of assets not easily convertible into unrestricted cash (e.g., accounts receivable, 
due from other governments, inventory, and restricted cash) standardized by total expenditures.62 
                                                 
62 Total governmental fund assets (excluding capital, debt service and special district funds) minus the 
amount of cash and marketable securities is the measure of illiquidity. Total expenditure is indicated but total 
expenditure and other uses is what is used to standardized as reported by the government unit. This value is used to 
standardized when prior year surplus, categories of expenditures, and illiquidity are measured. 
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Second, cash flow surplus (or deficit if the value is negative) is measured as the prior fiscal 
year’s total revenues minus total expenditures standardized by total expenditures. Third, 
expenditure flexibility can be measured by both less flexibility (spending for employee salaries 
and wages standardized by total expenditures) and more flexibility (spending on capital and 
equipment standardized by total expenditures) in expenditures. Forth, cash inflows from property 
tax, sales tax, fees and charges, state aid, and federal aid standardized by total revenues are used. 
Fifth, dummy variables taking a value of 1 are used for using short-term borrowing in the past 
two years or having a total expenditures greater than total revenues in the past two years. Finally, 
demographic and political variables are controlled for as well such as the unemployment rate, 
size of the government, percent voted for a Republican senator of the county, a governor election 
year, a presidential election year, and forms of government.63 
 
4.5.2 Methods  
The empirical strategy of this work is to use regression analysis to predict the influence 
of ETC on short-term resources. Since local government officials make decisions about the level 
of excess taxing capacity to have each year and the level of short-term resources, simultaneity of 
                                                 
63 Control variable used are unemployment rate at the county level, the natural log of the total revenues per 
capita to measure the size of government, percent voted for a Republican Senator, years a Governor or President was 
elected, and form of government dummy variables. Form of government variables include the city form of 
government, the number of city council members, an indicator for a community located in a chartered county, an 
indicator of the type of governance type utilized by the county chief administrative official, an indicator of the 
county legislative body type, and the number of county legislative members The city form of government is 
measured as 1 if indicated and  0 otherwise for each mayor council, mayor council manager, council-manager, and 
mayor commission/mayor commission managers with the omitted reference category of mayor council 
administrator. The indicator of a community located in a chartered county is measured as a 1 if in a chartered county 
and 0 otherwise. A chartered county means that the county has adopted home rule charters by local initiative and 
action (Nassau, Westchester, Suffolk, Erie, Oneida, Onondaga, Monroe, Schenectady, Broome, Herkimer, Dutchess, 
Orange, Tompkins, Rensselaer, Albany, Chemung, Chautauqua, Putman, and Rockland). The indicator for the type 
of chief administrative governance is measured as 1 if indicated and 0 otherwise for a Chair, Executive, and 
Manager with the omitted Administrator classification. The indicator for the county legislative body type is 
measured as 1 for a Legislature and zero otherwise for the omitted Supervisors type. All measurements are taken 
from 2009 numbers and used over the period (New York State Department of State, 2009).    
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decision-making can occur to allow for potential endogeneity challenges. Therefore, ETC is 
tested with a lagged ranked measure to determine if it is likely an exogenous variable.  
In the regression models to determine predictors of unrestricted cash holdings the null 
cannot be rejected and thus, ETC can be treated as an exogenous variable. Below indicates the 
regression equation used to determine unrestricted cash holdings.  
   𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (Equation 1) 
where 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the General Fund unrestricted cash holdings where i indicates a specific 
community (e.g., a county, city, or village) and t indicates year, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 represents the excess taxing 
capacity (key test variable), 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of exogenous regressors (exogenous control 
variables), and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the stochastic error terms.  
ETC is also tested to determine if it is likely an exogenous variable for regression models 
to determine predictors of short-term borrowing. For county and city governments, the null 
cannot be rejected and ETC is treated as an exogenous variable. A tobit regression model is used 
to determine the amount short-term borrowing. Equation (2) represents the equations used for 
county and city governments.64 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,          𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ~ 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2)      (Equation 2) 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗    if 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ > 0
0   if 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 0
 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  represents the latent amount of short-term borrowing engaged in which we observe 
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 with a continuous value of short-term borrowing that can be below, at, or above the latent 
amount of short-term borrowing used where i indicates a specific community (village 
                                                 
64 This equation is also presented in Table 4.4 for village governments. However, Stata command ivreg2 
with endogenous option determined that excess taxing capacity should be rejected as exogenous. Therefore, an 
instrumental variable model is also presented.  
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government) and t indicates year, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is the test variable (excess taxing capacity), 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a 
vector of exogenous variables (exogenous control variables), and ε is a stochastic error term.  
ETC for village government’s use of short-term borrowing was rejected as being 
exogenous. Thus, an instrumental variable approach is only reported for village government’s 
use of short-term borrowing. Equation (3) and (4) are developed for the instrumental variable 
tobit model for villages governments which is presented along with a tobit model in Table 4.4. 
The instrumental variable tobit regression model has the following form:  
       𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = y2𝑖𝑖t𝛽𝛽 + 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖γ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖               (Equation 3) 
𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Π1 + 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Π2 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                      (Equation 4) 
 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �
𝑎𝑎
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗
𝑏𝑏
    𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑎𝑎
       𝑎𝑎 ≤ 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗
    𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ > 𝑏𝑏
≤ 𝑏𝑏 
 
where 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  represents the latent amount of short-term borrowing engaged in which we observe 
𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 with a continuous value that can be below, at, or above the latent amount of short-term 
borrowing used where i indicates a specific community (village government) and t indicates 
year, y2𝑖𝑖t is the endogenous variable (excess taxing capacity), 𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of exogenous 
variables (exogenous control variables), 𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of additional instruments (additional 
control variables), and ε is a stochastic error term. The equation for 𝑦𝑦2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is written in reduced 
form.  
 
4.6 Results  
 The overall results indicate that excess taxing capacity is correlated with the use of 
General Fund unrestricted cash and short-term borrowing at the local government level. ETC is 
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likely to reduce the amount of cash holdings by local governments while ETC is likely to 
increase short-term borrowing for larger local governments.  
 With respect to the use of unrestricted cash, the evidence suggests that an increase in 
excess taxing capacity reduces the proportion of unrestricted cash to operating spending. As 
displayed in Table 4.5, a 1 percent increase in the extra taxing capacity decreases the amount of 
cash per spending by 0.14% for counties and by 0.11% for villages, at the 10% statistical 
significance level. Thus, county and village governments in New York seem to support 
hypothesis 1 by drawing down on cash reserves before relying on tapping into their excess taxing 
capacity. Furthermore, although there is no empirical evidence that changes in ETC at the city 
government level impact unrestricted cash, city governments reduce the percent of unrestricted 
cash to operating spending by 7.27% when they elect to override the tax cap. Village 
governments also experience a similar relationship with a lower magnitude than city 
governments.  
Consistent with the literature (Gore, 2009; Hand et al., 2016; Kioko, 2015), cash holdings 
are reduced from more state aid (villages) and long-term borrowing (villages) while cash 
holdings are increased from more variation in revenues (counties), diversification of revenues 
(counties), a larger proportion of revenue from sales taxes (villages), and more spending on 
administration and capital projects (villages). In contrast to Kioko (2015), I find evidence that 
General Fund unrestricted cash is negatively correlated with a higher proportion of property 
taxes (villages), fees and charges (cities), federal aid (counties and villages), and short-term 
borrowing per capita (villages). These opposite results can be explained by the fact that 
managers might rely on primary sources of revenue (e.g., property taxes and fees and charges) 
being collected instead of saving extra slack resources as unrestricted cash. Managers might also 
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use unrestricted cash to sustain operations and buffer against delays in larger proportions of 
federal aid being received. Furthermore, short-term borrowing, which includes transfers and 
loans from the State government, can be used my managers for cash flow management instead of 
relying on saving large unrestricted cash holdings.  
Table 4.6 presents the results of the impact of ETC on short-term borrowing. The 
evidence suggests that, on average, a 1 percent increase in excess taxing capacity increases the 
expected percent change in short-term borrowing per capita by 1.0% for counties and 1.2% for 
villages.65 Consequently, hypothesis 2 is partially supported at the county level of government. 
Short-term borrowing, therefore, is frequently used instead of relying on tapping into excess 
taxing capacity, which has a higher political cost for its use.  
However, results for cities display no statistically significant evidence of the impact of 
ETC on short-term borrowing. City governments may differ because of their more extensive use 
and purpose for external borrowing. City governments in New York issue short-term debt 
primarily for capital projects unlike counties governments that issue to manage receivables and 
village governments that issue for other purposes (Lofton, 2018). The differential use of higher 
levels of external short-term borrowing could hinder the impact of ETC on borrowing.     
Consistent with the existing literature, short-term borrowing increases with higher 
proportions of illiquidity, salaries and wages expenditures, capital spending, long-term debt, and 
prior use of short-term borrowing while short-term borrowing decreases with more prior year 
surplus, proportion of own-source revenues, and larger populations (Lofton & Kioko, 2018; Su 
& Hildreth, 2018). Furthermore, after that tax cap was implemented city and village governments 
                                                 
65The log-level regression results are interpreted as a unit change in x produces a %∆𝑦𝑦 = 100 ∗ (𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽1 − 1). 
Which is estimated here to be  %∆𝑦𝑦 = 100 ∗ (𝛽𝛽1 − 1) since beta values range from -0.1 to 0.1. Village 
government IV results are reported.   
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increased the amount of short-term borrowing per capita engaged in by 31.1% and 18.4%, 
respectively. Furthermore, the city managers that are able to advocate for overriding the tax cap 
did not take engage in an increasing amount of short-term borrowing but tend to reduce their 
borrowing by 41.7% if they elected to override the tax cap. The form of government impacts the 
use of short-term borrowing for county governments. Counties that have charters, a chair of the 
legislative body, and had Chief Administrative Officers who are Managers are encouraged to 
borrow more while those with a legislature and Executives are encouraged to borrow less. 
Consequently, county governance and expertise of the officers can promote or discourage more 
short-term borrowing.  
Overall, the results further our knowledge of slack resources used by local governments. 
Snow et al. (2015) find evidence Massachusetts municipalities that obtain more excess taxing 
capacity have higher stabilization funds. Excess taxing capacity, therefore, is not a substitute for 
healthy stabilization funds. However, the current results depict that more excess tax capacity is 
likely traded off when using unrestricted cash and engaging in short-term borrowing. Managers 
are likely substituting short-term resources for the preservation of excess taxing capacity to be 
used as a buffer for future internal and external challenges.    
 
4.7 Challenges and Limitations  
This study expands our knowledge of slack resources at the local government level. 
However, this study is not without challenges and limitations. First, one limitation of this 
analysis is that the property tax cap is measured as an indicator variable. Therefore, the nuance of 
the policy change is not being captured. The indicator measurement allows for the time period in 
which the policy was in place to be captured but other differences during post 2012 (e.g., lagged 
 
141 
 
effects of the Great Recession and political changes) could also be influencing results since they 
are not controlled.    
 Second, this study focuses on two types of short-term resources yet, local governments 
could be reacting to changes in ETC with various other external sources of financing (e.g., bank 
loans or direct lending arrangements) which are not captured within this analysis. Yet, the use of 
these mechanisms has been reported to be very infrequent with about 1.4% of New York local 
governments reporting having a line of credit and 9.5% engaging in direct lending arrangements 
(Lofton, 2018).  
 Finally, this study relies on New York local governments which have some unique 
factors to limit generalizations. Local governments have their own taxing and governance 
authority which provides more flexibility over the use of short-term resources. For governments 
in which the state imposes restricts on internal resources accumulation such as cash or the extent 
to the capacity to borrow, the use of short-term resources in reactions to ETC is more limited. 
Furthermore, the State of New York allows for local governments to borrow internally from the 
state and issue externally borrowed bond anticipation notes for up to five years before redeeming 
or replacing notes with long-term debt (New York State, 2008). This practice might encourage 
more short-term borrowing by New York local governments than a more representative sample 
of local governments. Yet, with the lack of a national sample of local governments’ use of short-
term resources, New York local governments are a starting point to investigate the impact of 
ETC on short-term resources.     
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4.8 Conclusion 
This paper measures the effects of excess taxing capacity on local government short-term 
borrowing and General Fund unrestricted cash holdings. Overall, my findings suggest local 
government mangers build up excess taxing capacity by reducing unrestricted cash and engaging 
in short-term borrowing. I find increases in excess taxing capacity tend to increase the amount of 
short-term borrowing for county governments and reduce the amount of short-term borrowing 
engaged in by village governments. By investigating a broader measure of short-term borrowing 
from internal and external sources, our understanding about this short-term resource is expanded. 
Additionally, local government financial managers tend to build up cash balances when they 
have reductions in their taxing capacity. This is evidence that local governments are not just 
hoarding cash as suggested by Gore (2009) but managers are competent in saving (Hand et al., 
2016; Meier & O’Toole, 2002; O'Toole & Meier, 2011) for the precautionary reason of having 
exhausted more of their taxing capacity. Ultimately, the findings represent an important addition 
to our knowledge of the impacts of slack resources used by local governments.   
 
  
 
143 
 
4.9 References 
 
Amiel, L., Deller, S. C., & Stallmann, J. (2009). The construction of a tax and expenditure 
limitations index for the US (Staff Paper No. 536). In. University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics. 
Arapis, T., Reitano, V., & Bruck, E. (2017). The Fiscal Savings Behavior of Pennsylvania 
School Districts Through the Great Recession. Public Budgeting & Finance, 37(3), 47-
70. doi:10.1111/pbaf.12162 
Bourgeois, L. J. (1981). On the Measurement of Organizational Slack. The Academy of 
Management Review, 6(1), 29-39. doi:10.5465/AMR.1981.4287985 
Bradbury, K. L., Mayer, C. J., & Case, K. E. (2001). Property tax limits, local fiscal behavior, 
and property values: Evidence from Massachusetts under Proposition 212. Journal of 
Public Economics, 80(2), 287-311. doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00081-5 
Brown, T. (2000). Constitutional tax and expenditure limitation in Colorado: The impact on 
municipal governments. Public Budgeting & Finance, 20(3), 29-50.  
Carroll, D. A. (2009). Diversifying Municipal Government Revenue Structures: Fiscal Illusion or 
Instability? Public Budgeting and Finance, 29(1), 27-48. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
5850.2009.00922.x 
Chapman, J., & Gorina, E. (2012). Effects of the Form of Government and Property Tax Limits 
on Local Finance in the Context of Revenue and Expenditure Simultaneity: Chapman and 
Gorina/Effects of the Form of Government and Property Tax Limits. Public Budgeting & 
Finance, 32(4), 19-45. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2012.01022.x 
Duncombe, W., & Hou, Y. (2014). The savings behavior of special purpose governments: A 
panel study of New York school districts. Public Budgeting & Finance, 34(3), 1-23. 
doi:10.1111/pbaf.12045 
Dye, R. F., & McGuire, T. J. (1997). The effect of property tax limitation measures on local 
government fiscal behavior. Journal of Public Economics, 66(3), 469-487. 
doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00047-9 
Dye, R. F., McGuire, T. J., & McMillen, D. P. (2005). Are property tax limitations more binding 
over time? National tax journal, 58(2), 225;215;-225.  
Figlio, D. N. (1998). Short-term effects of a 1990s-era property tax limit: Panel evidence on 
Oregon's measure 5. National tax journal, 51(1), 55-70.  
Gianakis, G., & Snow, D. (2007). The implementation and utilization of stabilization funds by 
local governments in Massachusetts. Public Budgeting & Finance, 27(1), 86-103. 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2007.00870.x 
Giankis, G. J., & Snow, D. (2007). The implementation and utilization of stabilization funds by 
local governments in Massachusetts. Public Budgeting & Finance, 27(1), 86-103.  
Gore, A. K. (2009). Why do cities hoard cash? Determinants and implications of municipal cash 
holdings. The Accounting Review, 84(1), 183-207. doi:10.2308/accr.2009.84.1.183 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board. (2006). Fund Balance: It May Not Be What You 
Think It Is. Retrieved from 
https://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?cid=1176156737123&d=&pagename=GASB%2
FGASBContent_C%2FUsersArticlePage 
Hand, M. L., Pierson, K., & Thompson, F. (2016). A replication study of “Why do cities hoard 
cash?” (The accounting review 2009). Public Finance Review, 44(5), 681-687. 
doi:10.1177/1091142115580130 
 
144 
 
Hawley, Z., & Rork, J. C. (2015). Competition and property tax limit overrides: Revisiting 
Massachusetts' Proposition 2. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 52, 93-107. 
doi:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2015.02.006 
Hendrick, R. (2006). The role of slack in local government finances. Public Budgeting & 
Finance, 26(1), 14-46. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2006.00837.x 
Hendrick, R., & Crawford, J. (2014). Municipal fiscal policy space and fiscal structure: Tools for 
managing spending volatility. Public Budgeting & Finance, 34(3), 24-50. 
doi:10.1111/pbaf.12042 
Hoene, C. (2004). Fiscal Structure and the Post‐Proposition 13 Fiscal Regime in California's 
Cities. Public Budgeting & Finance, 24(4), 51-72. doi:10.1111/j.0275-
1100.2004.00347.x 
Hou, Y. (2013). Subnational Government Tools for Budget Stabilization. In State Government 
Budget Stabilization (pp. 31-73): Springer. 
Jimenez, B. S. (2017). Institutional Constraints, Rule‐Following, and Circumvention: Tax and 
Expenditure Limits and the Choice of Fiscal Tools During a Budget Crisis. Public 
Budgeting & Finance, 37(2), 5-34. doi:10.1111/pbaf.12152 
Joyce, P. G., & Mullins, D. R. (1991). The Changing Fiscal Structure of the State and Local 
Public Sector: The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Limitations. Public Administration 
Review, 51(3), 240-253.  
Kioko, S. N. (2015). Impact of tax and expenditure limitations on local government savings. In 
Y. Hou (Ed.), Local Government Budget Stabilization (pp. 141-169): Springer, Cham. 
Kroszner, R. S., & Stratmann, T. S. (2000). Congressional Committees as Reputation-building 
Mechanisms Business and Politics, 2(1), 35-52.  
Lang, K., & Jian, T. (2004). Property taxes and property values: Evidence from Proposition 212. 
Journal of Urban Economics, 55(3), 439-457. doi:10.1016/j.jue.2004.01.002 
Lofton, M. L. (2018). What Influences Working Capital Managment? A Survey of New York 
Local Government Financial Officers. In. 
Lofton, M. L., & Kioko, S. N. (2018). The Use of Short-Term Debt By General Purpose 
Governments.  
Marlowe, J. (2005). Fiscal slack and counter‐cyclical expenditure stabilization: A first look at the 
local level. Public Budgeting & Finance, 25(3), 48-72. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
5850.2005.00367.x 
Marlowe, J. (2011). Beyond 5 percent: Optimal municipal slack resources and credit ratings. 
Public Budgeting & Finance, 31(4), 93-108. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2011.00994.x 
Meier, K. J., & O’Toole, L. J., Jr. (2002). Public management and organizational performance: 
The effect of managerial quality. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21(4), 
629-643. doi:10.1002/pam.10078 
Moody's Investors Service. (2016). Rating Methodology: US Local Government General 
Obligation Debt. In. 
Moulick, A. G., & Taylor, L. L. (2017). Fiscal slack, budget shocks, and performance in public 
organizations: Evidence from public schools. Public Management Review, 19(7), 990-
1005. doi:10.1080/14719037.2016.1243813 
Mullins, D. R., & Wallin, B. A. (2004). Tax and Expenditure Limitations: Introduction and 
Overview. Public Budgeting & Finance, 24(4), 2-15. doi:10.1111/j.0275-
1100.2004.00344.x 
 
145 
 
New York State. (2008). The Credit Crunch: Implications for Local Government Short-Term 
Debt. Retrieved from Albany, NY: 
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/creditcrunch.pdf 
New York State. (2017a). Property Tax Cap: Summary of the Legislation.  Retrieved from 
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/realprop/pdf/legislationsummary.pdf 
New York State. (2017b). Understanding the Constitional Tax Limit: Villages.  Retrieved from 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/finreporting/villages.pdf 
New York State. (2017c). Understanding the Constitutional Tax Limit: Cities.  Retrieved from 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/finreporting/cities.pdf 
New York State. (2017d). Understanding the Constitutional Tax Limit: Counties.  Retrieved 
from http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/finreporting/counties.pdf 
New York State Department of State. (2009). Local Government Handbook. In (6th ed.): New 
York State Department of State. (Reprinted from: 2011). 
New York State Department of State. (2014). What do Local Governments do? Retrieved from 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/localgovs.html#towngovs 
Nguyen-Hoang, P. (2013). Tax limit repeal and school spending. National tax journal, 66(1), 
117-148.  
Nguyen-Hoang, P., & Hou, Y. (2014). Local Fiscal Responses to Procyclical Changes in State 
Aid. Publius, 44(4), 587-608. doi:10.1093/publius/pjt039 
Nohria, N., & Gulati, R. (1996). Is slack good or bad for innovation? Academy of management 
Journal, 39(5), 1245-1264. doi:10.2307/256998 
O'Toole, L. J., & Meier, K. J. (2011). Public management: Organizations, governance, and 
performance. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Park, J. H., Park, S., & Maher, C. S. (2018). The Effects of Tax and Expenditure Limitations 
(TELs) On Municipal Fiscal Outcomes During a Period of Fiscal Distress. Public 
Finance and Management, 18(1), 84-110.  
Poulson, B. (2005). Grading the states' tax and expenditure limits: A fiscal discipline report card. 
Americans for Prosperity Foundation.  
Shadbegian, R. J. (1999). The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on the Revenue 
Structure of Local Government, 1962–87. National tax journal, 52(2), 221-237.  
Skidmore, M. (1999). Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Relationships between 
State and Local Governments. Public Choice, 99(1/2), 77-102. 
doi:10.1023/A:1018311425276 
Snow, D., & Gianakis, G. (2009). Stabilization fund strategies in Massachusetts: A survey of 
chief financial officers. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial 
Management, 21(4), 550. doi:10.1108/JPBAFM-21-04-2009-B003 
Snow, D., Gianakis, G., & Fortess, E. (2008). Simulating Massachusetts municipalities' recession 
readiness: Early warning of a perfect storm? Public Budgeting & Finance, 28(1), 1-21. 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2008.00894.x 
Snow, D., Gianakis, G. A., & Haughton, J. (2015). The politics of local government stabilization 
funds. Public Administration Review, 75(2), 304-314.  
Springer, J. D., Lusby, A. K., Leatherman, J. C., & Featherstone, A. M. (2009). An Evaluation of 
Alternative Tax and Expenditure Limitation Policies on Kansas Local Governments. 
Public Budgeting and Finance, 29(2), 48-70. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2009.00928.x 
St. Clair, T. (2012). The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on Revenue Volatility: 
Evidence from Colorado: St. Clair/The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on 
 
146 
 
Revenue Volatility. Public Budgeting & Finance, 32(3), 61-78. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
5850.2012.01016.x 
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997). Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments. 
Econometrica, 65(3), 557-586.  
Stewart, L. S. M. (2009). Examining factors that impact Mississippi counties' unreserved fund 
balance during relative resource abundance and relative resource scarcity. Public 
Budgeting & Finance, 29(4), 45-73. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5850.2009.00942.x 
Stewart, L. S. M., Hamman, J. A., & Pink‐Harper, S. A. (2017). The stabilization effect of local 
government savings: The case of Illinois counties. Public Budgeting & Finance.  
Stock, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression. In J. H. 
Stock & D. W. K. Andrews (Eds.), Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: 
Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Su, M., & Hildreth, W. B. (2018). Does Financial Slack Reduce Municipal Short-Term 
Borrowing?: Financial Slack and Municipal Short-Term Borrowing. Public Budgeting & 
Finance, 38(1), 95-113. doi:10.1111/pbaf.12189 
Sun, R. (2014). Reevaluating the Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations: An Instrumental 
Variable Approach. Public Finance Review, 42(1), 92-116. 
doi:10.1177/1091142112459210 
Tan, J., & Peng, M. W. (2003). Organizational slack and firm performance during economic 
transitions: Two studies from an emerging economy. Strategic Management Journal, 
24(13), 1249-1263. doi:10.1002/smj.351 
Tax Policy Center. (2016). Briefing Book: A citizen's guide to the fascinating (though often 
complex) elements of the federal Tax System. In (pp. 1-518). 
Thompson, F., & Green, M. T. (2004). Vox populi? Oregon tax and expenditure limitation 
initiatives. Public Budgeting & Finance, 24(4), 73-87. doi:10.1111/j.0275-
1100.2004.00348.x 
Wallin, B., & Zabel, J. (2011). Property Tax Limitations and Local Fiscal Conditions: The 
Impact of Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 
41(4), 382-393. doi:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.03.008 
Wang, W. (2015). The great recession and the use of fund balances in North Carolina counties. 
In Local Government Budget Stabilization (pp. 17-32): Springer. 
 
147 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Unrestricted Cash (FYE Between 1996 and 2016) 
Panel A: County Governments       
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
   General Fund Cash (% of OE) 1026 12.582 9.810 0 54.696 Open Book NY 
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) 1026 61.460 19.031 1.884 100 “ 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      1026 0.2778 0.448 0 1 “ 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) 1026 0.058 0.233 0 1 “ 
   Internal Transfers Out (% of TL) 1026 12.715 14.666 0 66.514 “ 
   Short-Term Borrowing Per Capita (ln) 1026 3.916 1.624 0 8.020 Bloomberg, Open Book NY 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 1026 5.746 1.339 0 8.024 Open Book NY 
   Coefficient of Variation of Revenue  1026 0.489 0.199 0.114 1.289 “ 
   Limited Revenue (HHI) 1026 0.956 0.053 0.596 0.999 “ 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  1026 20.482 5.695 7.874 42.138 “ 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 1026 21.322 7.327 6.609 44.278 “ 
   Other Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 1026 0.271 0.286 0 2.349 “ 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  1026 16.244 7.776 2.278 50.885 “ 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  1026 13.364 3.247 5.184 31.438 “ 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   1026 10.855 3.233 2.857 26.676 “ 
   Administration (% of OE) 1026 41.159 6.221 21.963 62.440 NY LG & SA data 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 1026 6.195 3.813 0.432 42.076 “ 
   Population (ln) 1026 11.512 1.065 8.484 14.217 “ 
   Population Density  1026 0.319 0.684 0.0003 4.705 “ 
   Per Capita Personal Income (ln) 1026 10.419 0.268 9.843 11.453 U.S. BEA 
Panel B: City Governments 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
   General Fund Cash (% of OE) 1096 14.688 13.274 0 96.321 Open Book NY 
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) 1096 52.972 21.344 0.001 100 “ 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      1096 0.276 0.447 0 1 “ 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) 1096 0.063 0.243 0 1 “ 
   Internal Transfers Out (% of TL) 1096 24.494 21.664 0 100 “ 
   Short-Term Borrowing Per Capita (ln) 1096 4.518 1.765 0 7.872 Bloomberg, Open Book NY 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 1096 7.034 0.683 3.874 8.306 Open Book NY 
   Coefficient of Variation of Revenue  1096 0.482 0.264 0.107 1.616 “ 
   Limited Revenue (HHI) 1096 0.907 0.083 0.445 0.999 “ 
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Notes: (1) TE is total expenditures and other uses, TR is total revenues and other uses, OE is total operating expenditures and debt 
interest, HHI is Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, and all dollar values were adjusted with the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  1096 25.347 8.420 3.551 49.018 “ 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 1096 15.417 5.747 1.725 30.959 “ 
   Other Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 1096 0.661 1.035 0 11.251 “ 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  1096 22.733 10.828 0.748 65.021 “ 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  1096 13.167 6.389 3.245 51.730 “ 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   1096 5.182 4.658 0 30.987 “ 
   Administration (% of OE) 1096 68.089 9.317 32.445 85.023 NY LG & SA data 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 1096 12.670 7.790 1.419 51.211 “ 
   Population (ln) 1096 10.011 0.923 7.960 12.701 “ 
   Population Density  1096 3.826 2.904 0.047 16.887 “ 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 1096 10.508 0.329 9.893 11.453 U.S. BEA 
Panel C: Village Governments       
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
   General Fund Cash (% of OE) 7859 29.889 30.076 0 377.220 Open Book NY 
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) 7859 72.093 19.185 0 100 “ 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      7859 0.277 0.448 0 1 “ 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) 7859 0.075 0.263 0 1 “ 
   Internal Transfers Out (% of TL) 7859 32.749 37.097 0 100 “ 
   Short-Term Borrowing Per Capita (ln) 7859 2.484 2.272 0 12.534 Bloomberg, Open Book NY 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 7859 5.889 2.321 0 12.598 Open Book NY 
   Coefficient of Variation of Revenue  7859 0.900 0.884 0.077 11.455 “ 
   Limited Revenue (HHI) 7859 0.728 0.154 0.067 0.998 “ 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  7859 37.263 19.568 0.031 94.860 “ 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 7859 7.868 8.091 0 65.471 “ 
   Other Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 7859 0.895 0.989 0 16.196 “ 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  7859 29.741 18.255 0.091 84.899 “ 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  7859 6.225 6.855 0.187 90.839 “ 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   7859 2.920 7.323 0 79.890 “ 
   Administration (% of OE) 7859 48.818 16.537 1.770 97.199 NY LG & SA data 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 7859 14.589 14.523 0 94.513 “ 
   Population (ln) 7859 7.738 1.098 2.398 10.94295 “ 
   Population Density  7859 2.295 2.837 0.001 23.620 “ 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 7859 10.560 0.350 9.843 11.453 U.S. BEA 
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Deflator with at 2009 base. (2) Adjustments were made short-term borrowing and long-term borrowing, . One was added to short-
term borrowing and long-term debt to the natural log would be zero for no borrowing. Negative unrestricted cash for jurisdictions 
was replaced with zero values for 133 observations. Two locations Village of Haverstraw (2002) and Village of West Hampton 
Dunes (1999) reported going above their constitutional tax limit. These two locations were replaced with having zero ETC.  
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Table 4.2 Comparison of Local Government Cash Holdings Literature 
 Present Study  
 
Hand, Pierson, and 
Thompson (2016) 
Kioko (2015) Gore (2009) 
Types of local 
governments 
County, city, and village 
governments City governments County governments City governments 
Measure of cash 
holdings 
General Fund unrestricted 
cash holdings reported by the 
State of New York 
Cash holdings as 
reported by the Census 
Bureau 
Cash holdings and bond 
proceeds as reported by 
the Census Bureau 
Cash holdings as 
reported by the Census 
Bureau 
Months of cash 
Medians66 
(Means) 
Counties – 1.20 (1.51) 
Cities – 1.35 (1.76) 
Villages – 2.71 (3.59) 
10.93 
(not reported) 
3.69 
(4.77) 
8.34 
(10.44) 
Cash as a % of 
expenditures 
Medians 
(Means) 
Counties – 10.03% (12.58%) 
Cities – 11.27% (14.69%) 
Villages – 22.56% (29.89%) 
(not reported) 30.8% (39.7%) (not reported) 
Cash per capita, 
adjusted for inflation  
Medians  
(Means) 
County – $158.56 ($207.19) 
City – $154.42 ($214.35) 
Villages – $183.13 ($375.84) 
(not reported) $94.21 ($147.68) (not reported) 
Sample size County – 1,026 
City – 1,096 
Villages – 7,859 
9,576 75,916 9,413 
Fiscal years of data Between 1996 and 2016 Between 1967 and 2011 Between 1970 and 2004 Between 1997 and 2003 
Source New York State 
Comptroller’s Open Book 
New York  
Census Bureau’s Annual 
Survey of State and 
Local Government 
Finances 
Census Bureau’s Annual 
Survey of State and 
Local Government 
Finances 
Census Bureau’s Annual 
Survey of State and 
Local Government 
Finances 
                                                 
66 Cash is measured as the ratio of year-end cash to monthly operating and interest expenses in Gore (2009) and Hand et al. (2016) and is estimated as 
follows (cash/(operating and interest expenses)/12). In Kioko (2015), cash is reported as months of cash (cash and security holdings/(total expenditures/12 
months)), cash as a percent of expenditures, and cash per capita. See Kioko (2015) for the definition of cash and security holdings in Table 8.1. In the present 
study, cash is reported as the ratio of year-end General Fund unrestricted cash to monthly operating and interest expenses (cash/(current operating expenses and 
debt interest expenses)/12) and cash as a percent of current operation and debt interest expenses. 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for Short-Term Borrowing (FYE Between 1996 and 2016)  
Panel A: County Governments       
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
   Short-Term Borrowing Per Capita (ln) 1197 3.976 1.510 0 8.020 Bloomberg, Open Book NY 
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) 1197 61.749 18.719 1.884 100 Open Book NY 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      1197 0.238 0.426 0 1 “ 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) 1197 0.049 0.217 0 1 “ 
   Illiquidity (% of TA) 1197 64.800 15.655 19.645 100 “ 
   Prior Year Surplus (as a % of TE) 1197 1.173 5.290 -32.447 53.739 “ 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  1197 20.643 5.735 7.874 42.138 “ 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 1197 20.563 7.337 0.061 44.278 “ 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  1197 16.625 7.752 2.278 50.885 “ 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  1197 13.510 3.235 5.184 31.438 “ 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   1197 10.853 3.175 2.857 26.676 “ 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 1197 33.952 5.701 14.498 57.830 “ 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 1197 6.191 3.828 0.432 42.076 “ 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 1197 5.756 1.292 0 8.024 “ 
   Unemployment Rate (County level) (ln)  1197 1.734 0.290 0.993 2.416 U.S. BLS 
   Size (TR per capita) (ln) 1197 7.566 0.245 6.858 8.565 Open Book NY 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 1197 10.364 0.294 9.751 11.453 U.S. BEA 
   Short-Term Borrowing in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1197 0.986 0.118 0 1 Bloomberg, Open Book NY 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1197 0.582 0.493 0 1 Open Book NY 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) 1197 37.414 9.077 17.843 62.791 NY Board of Elections 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  1197 0.238 0.426 0 1 “ 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) 1197 0.286 0.452 0 1 “ 
   Located in a Chartered County (Yes=1) 1197 0.333 0.472 0 1 NY LG Handbook 
   County CAO Chair of Legislative Body (Yes=1) 1197 0.228 0.420 0 1 “ 
   County CAO Executive (Yes=1) 1197 0.281 0.450 0 1 “ 
   County CAO Manager (Yes=1) 1197 0.123 0.328 0 1 “ 
   County Legislative Body (Legislature=1) 1197 0.702 0.458 0 1 “ 
   Number of County Legislative Members 1197 17.421 6.187 7 39 “ 
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Panel B: City Governments 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
   Short-Term Borrowing Per Capita (ln) 1279 4.469 1.754 0 7.872 Bloomberg, Open Book NY 
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) 1279 53.524 20.978 0.001 100 Open Book NY 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      1279 0.237 0.425 0 1 “ 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) 1279 0.054 0.226 0 1 “ 
   Illiquidity (% of TA) 1279 62.287 19.732 6.794 100 “ 
   Prior Year Surplus (as a % of TE) 1279 1.151 11.043 -42.522 89.103 “ 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  1279 25.377 8.350 3.551 49.018 “ 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 1279 15.402 5.750 1.725 30.959 “ 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  1279 22.860 10.863 0.748 65.021 “ 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  1279 12.899 6.189 2.088 51.730 “ 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   1279 5.249 4.762 0 31.198 “ 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 1279 49.411 9.310 23.214 78.779 “ 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 1279 12.626 7.801 1.409 51.211 “ 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 1279 7.001 0.700 3.874 8.306 “ 
   Unemployment Rate (County level) (ln)  1279 1.704 0.294 1.030 2.398 U.S. BLS 
   Size (TR per capita) (ln) 1279 7.529 0.270 6.878 8.549 Open Book NY 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 1279 10.452 0.349 9.751 11.453 U.S. BEA 
   Short-Term Borrowing in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1279 0.984 0.127 0 1 Bloomberg, Open Book NY 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1279 0.701 0.458 0 1 Open Book NY 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) 1279 35.076 8.849 17.843 57.891 NY Board of Elections 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  1279 0.238 0.426 0 1 “ 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) 1279 0.285 0.451 0 1 “ 
   City FoG Mayor-Council (Yes=1) 1279 0.689 0.463 0 1 NY LG Handbook 
   City FoG Mayor-Council-Manager (Yes=1) 1279 0.180 0.384 0 1 “ 
   City FoG Council-Manager (Yes=1) 1279 0.033 0.178 0 1 “ 
   City FoG Mayor-Commission/-Manager (Yes=1) 1279 0.049 0.216 0 1 “ 
   Number of City Council Members 1279 6.921 2.280 2 16 “ 
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Panel C: Village Governments       
Variables N Mean SD Min Max Source 
   Short-Term Borrowing Per Capita (ln) 11526 2.059 2.235 0 12.534 Bloomberg, Open Book NY 
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) 11526 73.343 18.319 0 100 Open Book NY 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      11526 0.236 0.425 0 1 “ 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) 11526 0.059 0.236 0 1 “ 
   Illiquidity (% of TA) 11526 30.280 24.794 0 100 “ 
   Prior Year Surplus (as a % of TE) 11526 4.628 35.366 -100 1750.62 “ 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  11526 35.581 19.252 0 100 “ 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 11526 9.031 9.648 0 83.361 “ 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  11526 29.926 18.473 0 98.194 “ 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  11526 6.446 7.555 0 93.809 “ 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   11526 2.954 8.056 0 91.394 “ 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 11526 33.187 14.511 0 90.898 “ 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 11526 14.923 15.422 0 98.583 “ 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 11526 5.670 2.474 0 12.598 “ 
   Unemployment Rate (County level) (ln)  11526 1.699 0.292 0.993 2.416 U.S. BLS 
   Size (TR per capita) (ln) 11526 6.990 0.772 0.262 12.351 Open Book NY 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 11526 10.462 0.358 9.751 11.453 U.S. BEA 
   Short-Term Borrowing in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 11526 0.673 0.469 0 1 Bloomberg, Open Book NY 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 11526 0.622 0.485 0 1 Open Book NY 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) 11526 36.627 8.887 17.843 62.791 NY Board of Elections 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  11526 0.238 0.426 0 1 “ 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) 11526 0.285 0.452 0 1 “ 
Notes: (1) Median and mean short-term borrowing is $5.95 million and $47.2 million for the 1,161 counties that borrow, $2.63 million and 
$11.4 million for 1,245 cities that borrow, and $6,9147 and $595,160 for the 6,954 villages that borrow. Median and mean per capita short-
term borrowing ($) is 71.53 and 127.99 for counties, 115.34 and 253.66 for cities, and 31.80 and 256.03 for villages. (2) TE is total 
expenditures and other uses, TR is total revenues and other uses, TA is total governmental fund assets, TL is total liabilities, ln is natural 
log, and all dollar values were adjusted with the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator with at 2009 base. (3) One was added to 
short-term borrowing and long-term debt so the natural log would be zero for no borrowing. (4) Jurisdictions reporting negative assets or 
liabilities were dropped. (5) Jurisdictions that report a tax margin (the constitutional tax limit minus the levy subject to the tax limit) greater 
than the constitutional tax limit are given an excess taxing capacity of 100%.   
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Table 4.4 Comparison of Local Government Short-Term Borrowing Literature 
 Present Study  Lofton and Kioko (2018) Su and Hildreth (2018) 
Types of local 
governments 
County, city, and village 
governments 
County, city, town, and village 
governments City governments 
Measure of short-
term borrowing Short-term borrowing – short-term notes from Lofton and 
Kioko, liability amount due to 
other funds from all governmental 
funds, and  current year issues of 
capital notes, deficiency notes, 
installment purchase contracts, 
and state or authority loans 
Short-term notes – general obligation 
unlimited notes, general obligation 
limited notes, revenue notes, bond 
anticipation notes, tax anticipation 
notes, revenue anticipation notes, 
budget notes, certificates of 
participation, warrants, and 
overdrafts of cash accounts 
Cash management notes –
tax anticipation notes, 
revenue anticipation notes, 
and tax and revenue 
anticipation notes  
Borrowing amount 
(million $)67 
Medians 
(Means) 
Counties – 5.94 (47.20) 
Cities – 2.63 (11.50) 
Villages – 0.069 (0.595) 
Counties – 13.50 (72.60) 
Cities – 7.28 (18.50) 
Towns – 2.52 (9.74) 
Villages – 1.50 (2.75) 
6.36  
(58.50) 
Sample size County – 1,197 
City – 1,279 
Villages – 11,526 
Counties – 1,197 
Cities – 1,279 
Towns – 19,288 
Villages – 11,526 
3,761 
Years of data Between 1996 and 2016 Between 1996 and 2016 Between 2003 and 2011  
Source Bloomberg L.P. and New York 
State Comptroller’s Open Book 
New York 
Bloomberg L.P. and New York State 
Comptroller’s Open Book New York  
California Debt and 
Investment Advisory 
Commission’s Debt 
Issuance Database and 
California State 
Controller’s website 
                                                 
67 Mean and median values are for the local governments that borrow in the short-term. In Su and Hildreth (2018), 209 cash management notes were 
issued for 58 city governments for 182 city observations. In Lofton and Kioko (2018), short-term borrowing amounts were determined for 465 county 
observations, 541 city observations, 1,172 town observations, and 836 village observations that had issued short-term notes between 1996 and 2016. The present 
study has 1,161 county observations, 1,245 city observations, and 6,954 village observations engaging in short-term borrowing.  
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Figure 4.1 Average Excess Taxing Capacity for Sampled New York Local Governments 
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Table 4.5 General Fund Unrestricted Cash (% of OE) Regression Models with Fixed Effects (FYE Between 1996 to 2016) 
Variables County Governments  City Governments Village Governments 
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) -0.135* (0.063) 0.006 (0.057) -0.111* (0.056) 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      3.252 (7.735) -2.316 (7.542) -2.862 (8.727) 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) -1.884 (1.279) -7.268*** (1.797) -2.809* (1.199) 
   Internal Transfers Out (% of TL) 0.067 (0.052) 0.002 (0.036) 0.013 (0.013) 
   Short-Term Borrowing Per Capita (ln) -0.519 (0.326) -0.491 (0.332) -0.854*** (0.215) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 1.151 (0.678) -3.023 (2.130) -1.237* (0.529) 
   Coefficient of Variation of Revenue  25.588* (10.546) -13.265 (8.171) -3.024 (2.402) 
   Revenue Diversification (HHI) 37.287* (17.193) -7.670 (12.354) 3.534 (7.093) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  0.086 (0.225) 0.182 (0.196) -0.207* (0.090) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.162 (0.137) -0.145 (0.265) 0.536* (0.221) 
   Other Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 1.996 (1.855) -0.853 (0.613) 0.689 (0.875) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.206 (0.132) -0.310* (0.128) -0.064 (0.076) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.055 (0.178) 0.215 (0.181) -0.134* (0.068) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   -0.415* (0.187) -0.060 (0.116) -0.240** (0.081) 
   Administration (% of OE) 0.050 (0.138) 0.003 (0.090) 0.310*** (0.090) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.040 (0.079) 0.029 (0.059) 0.083* (0.033) 
   Population (ln) 7.670 (19.710) -38.883 (25.465) 9.922 (5.631) 
   Population Density  0.411 (0.708) -0.743* (0.301) -0.253 (0.357) 
   Per Capita Personal Income (ln) -3.270 (14.149) 7.726 (12.882) 21.458 (16.051) 
   Constant -80.037 (259.043) 369.527 (301.290) -260.968 (171.021) 
Observations 1026 1096 7859 
R-Squared 0.1703 0.1266 0.0574 
Jurisdiction Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
levels. (2) CTL is Constitutional Tax Limit, OE is operating expenditures and debt interest, TL is total governmental fund labilities, ln is 
natural log, TR is total revenues and other sources, and HHI is Hirschman-Herfindahl Index. (3) Similar statistically significant results 
for county and village governments dependent variable of cash and short-term investments as a proportion of operating and debt 
expenditures was also used which produce similar statistically significant impacts of ETC.  
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Table 4.6 Short-Term Borrowing (ln) Tobit Regression Models (FYE Between 1996 and 2016) 
Variables County 
Governments 
City 
Governments 
Village 
Governments 
IV Results for Village 
Governments* 
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) 0.010*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.002) 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      0.046 (0.115) 0.311* (0.128) 0.184* (0.077) 0.167* (0.077) 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) 0.282 (0.184) -0.417* (0.204) 0.113 (0.115) 0.111 (0.115) 
   Illiquidity (% of TA) 0.040*** (0.003) 0.015*** (0.002) 0.034*** (0.001) 0.033*** (0.001) 
   Prior Year Surplus (as a % of TE) -0.009 (0.007) -0.006 (0.004) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  0.024* (0.011) 0.0001 (0.008) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.007** (0.002) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.025** (0.009) -0.019 (0.011) -0.017*** (0.004) -0.015*** (0.004) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.034*** (0.009) 0.007 (0.006) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.002) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.054*** (0.015) -0.009 (0.009) -0.007 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   0.033* (0.014) 0.015 (0.010) -0.010** (0.004) -0.011** (0.004) 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 0.034*** (0.009) 0.029*** (0.008) 0.0004 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.050*** (0.011) 0.037*** (0.006) 0.021*** (0.002) 0.020*** (0.002) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 0.196*** (0.035) 0.933*** (0.078) 0.126*** (0.014) 0.124*** (0.014) 
   Unemployment Rate (County level) (ln)  -0.558*** (0.154) -0.432** (0.159) -0.131 (0.094) -0.153 (0.094) 
   Size (TR per capita) (ln) 0.984*** (0.235) -0.030 (0.264) 0.589*** (0.041) 0.579*** (0.042) 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 0.032 (0.257) -0.194 (0.203) 0.799*** (0.113) 0.799*** (0.113) 
   Short-Term Borrowing in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 2.536*** (0.347) 5.360*** (0.428) 3.935*** (0.069) 3.931*** (0.069) 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) -0.104 (0.075) 0.193* (0.093) 0.006 (0.052) 0.008 (0.052) 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) 0.002 (0.006) -0.010 (0.007) 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  -0.028 (0.90) -0.033 (0.103) 0.021 (0.062) 0.020 (0.062) 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) 0.017 (0.087) 0.004 (0.099) -0.162** (0.060) -0.162** (0.060) 
   Located in a Chartered County (Yes=1) 0.701*** (0.184)    
   County CAO (Chair of Legislative Body=1) 0.219* (0.105)    
   County CAO (Executive=1) -0.500* (0.194)    
   County CAO (Manager=1) 0.450** (0.139)    
   County Legislative Body (Legislature=1) -0.320** (0.099)    
   Number of County Legislative Members -0.005 (0.007)    
   City FoG Mayor-Council (Yes=1)  -0.187 (0.202)   
   City FoG Mayor-Council-Manager (Yes=1)  -0.292 (0.220)   
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   City FoG Council-Manager (Yes=1)  -0.217 (0.305)   
   City FoG Mayor-Commission/-Manager (Yes=1)  -0.340 (0.285)   
   Number of City Council Members  0.012 (0.021)   
   Constant -10.092*** (2.557) -6.723* (2.715) -16.074*** (1.251) -16.752*** (1.265) 
Observations 1197 1279 11526 11521 
Left Censored observations (≤ 0) 36 34 4572 4567 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.1259 0.1084 0.1832  
Wald χ2    Wald χ2(21) = 6998.50 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
levels. (2) *An instrumental variable regression was used for villages since ETC was tested to likely be endogenous. A one year 
lagged ranked variable was used as an instrument. (3) TE is total expenditures and other uses, TR is total revenues and other sources, 
TA is total governmental fund assets, TL is total liabilities, ln is natural log, and all dollar values were adjusted with the Gross 
Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator with at 2009 base.  
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Appendix 4.1 Linear Hurdle Models with Robust Standard Errors (FYE Between 1996 and 2016) 
 County 
Governments 
City  
Governments 
Village 
Governments 
Outcome Model     
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) 0.011*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.002) -0.003 (0.001) 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      0.098 (0.107) 0.266* (0.106) 0.507*** (0.068) 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) 0.186 (0.193) -0.274 (0.207) 0.242* (0.112) 
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 0.032*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.002) 0.027*** (0.001) 
   Prior Year Surplus/(Deficit) (as a % of TE) -0.011 (0.007) -0.005 (0.003) 0.0001 (0.001) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  0.004 (0.009) 0.003 (0.006) 0.009*** (0.003) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.041*** (0.006) -0.009 (0.009) -0.040*** (0.004) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % TR)  -0.034*** (0.008) 0.009 (0.005) 0.008*** (0.002) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.066*** (0.012) -0.014 (0.008) -0.013** (0.004) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   -0.013 (0.012) 0.025* (0.010) -0.015*** (0.004) 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 0.038*** (0.007) 0.029*** (0.007) -0.009*** (0.003) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.053*** (0.010) 0.037*** (0.006) 0.017*** (0.002) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) 0.204*** (0.032) 1.016*** (0.074) 0.305*** (0.021) 
   Constant  0.8672 (0.604) -5.425*** (0.804) 0.182 (0.294) 
Selection Model     
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) 0.012 (0.007) 0.013** (0.004) -0.004*** (0.001) 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      -0.324 (0.356) -0.242 (0.348) -0.053 (0.046) 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) 0.667 (0.765) -0.430 (0.402) -0.018 (0.072) 
   Illiquidity (as a % of TA) 0.067*** (0.011) 0.002 (0.005) 0.013*** (0.001) 
   Prior Year Surplus/(Deficit) (as a % of TE) 0.039 (0.023) -0.0004 (0.009) -0.0004 (0.0004) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  0.010 (0.033) -0.024 (0.014) 0.0009 (0.001) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.048 (0.027) -0.069* (0.022) -0.008*** (0.002) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % TR)  -0.056* (0.024) -0.029* (0.014) 0.001 (0.001) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR) 0.015 (0.036) -0.005 (0.024) -0.004 (0.002) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   0.041 (0.055) -0.049* (0.024) -0.001 (0.002) 
   Salaries & Wages Expenditures (as a % of TE) 0.071** (0.026) 0.019 (0.021) 0.009*** (0.001) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.177*** (0.044) 0.003 (0.012) 0.008*** (0.001) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita Issued in Year (ln) -0.053 (0.065) -0.049 (0.142) 0.048*** (0.008) 
   Unemployment Rate (County level) (ln) -0.722 (0.475) 0.295 (0.337) -0.284*** (0.056) 
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   Size (TR Per Capita) (ln) 0.133 (0.576) -0.049 (0.541) 0.029 (0.029) 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) 1.319 (0.826) 0.216 (0.422) 0.524*** (0.072) 
   Short-Term Borrowing in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) 1.089** (0.375) 2.969*** (0.348) 1.820*** (0.033) 
   Deficit in Past 2 Years (Yes=1) -0.349 (0.218) -0.023 (0.219) 0.013 (0.031) 
   Percent Voted for a Rep. Senator (County level) -0.027 (0.014) -0.017 (0.016) 0.001 (0.002) 
   Governor Election Year (County level) (Yes=1)  0.406 (0.310) -0.113 (0.205) 0.017 (0.037) 
   Presidential Election Year (County level) (Yes=1) -0.088 (0.249) 0.410 (0.262) -0.088* (0.036) 
   Located in a Chartered County (Yes=1) 5.716*** (0.453)   
   County CAO (Chair of Legislative Body=1) 0.409 (0.250)   
   County CAO (Executive=1) -5.859*** (0.530)   
   County CAO (Manager=1) 1.078* (0.507)   
   County Legislative Body (Legislature=1) 0.046 (0.298)   
   Number of County Legislative Members 0.054 (0.036)   
   City FoG (Mayor-Council=1)  -4.285** (1.426)  
   City FoG (Mayor-Council-Manager=1)  -4.662*** (1.370)  
   City FoG (Council-Manager=1)  -0.002 (1.507)  
   City FoG (Mayor-Commission/-Manager=1)  0.001 (1.521)  
   Number of City Council Members  -0.084 (0.044)  
   Constant -18.332* (7.902) 3.838 (6.180) -6.804*** (0.781) 
   Ln Sigma Constant 0.160*** (0.025) 0.315*** (0.023) 0.638*** (0.012) 
   Sigma  1.174 (0.029) 1.370 (0.032) 1.892 (0.023) 
Wald χ2 =  Wald χ2(12) = 417.14 Wald χ2(13) = 479.89 Wald χ2(13) = 1733.32 
(P > χ2 =) (P > χ2 = 0.0000) (P > χ2 = 0.0000) (P > χ2 = 0.0000) 
Pseudo R2 0.1184 0.1133 0.1899 
Observations 1197 1279 11526 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates that the corresponding coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. (2) TE is total expenditures and other uses, TR is total revenues and other uses, TA is total governmental assets 
(excluding capital, debt service and special district funds), ln is natural log, CAO is Chief Administrative Officer, FoG is Form of 
Government, and all dollar values were adjusted with the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator with at 2009 base. 
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Appendix 4.2 Months of General Fund Unrestricted Cash Regression Models with Fixed Effects (FYE Between 1996 and 2016) 
Variables County Governments  City Governments Village Governments 
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) -0.016* (0.008) 0.001 (0.007) -0.013* (0.007) 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      0.390 (0.928) -0.278 (0.905) -0.343 (1.047) 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) -0.226 (0.154) -0.872*** (0.216) -0.337* (0.144) 
   Internal Transfers Out (% of TL) 0.008 (0.006) 0.0002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 
   Short-Term Borrowing Per Capita (ln) -0.062 (0.039) -0.059 (0.040) -0.102*** (0.026) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 0.138 (0.081) -0.363 (0.256) -0.148* (0.063) 
   Coefficient of Variation of Revenue  3.071* (1.266) -1.592 (0.981) -0.363 (0.288) 
   Revenue Diversification (HHI) 4.474* (2.063) -0.920 (1.483) 0.424 (0.851) 
   Property Tax Revenue (as a % of TR)  0.010 (0.027) 0.022 (0.024) -0.025* (0.011) 
   Sales Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) -0.019 (0.016) -0.017 (0.032) 0.064* (0.027) 
   Other Tax Revenue (as a % of TR) 0.239 (0.223) -0.102 (0.074) 0.083 (0.105) 
   Fees & Charges Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.025 (0.016) -0.037* (0.015) -0.008 (0.009) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.007 (0.021) 0.026 (0.022) -0.016* (0.008) 
   Federal Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)   -0.050* (0.022) -0.007 (0.014) -0.029** (0.010) 
   Administration (% of OE) 0.006 (0.017) 0.0004 (0.011) 0.037*** (0.011) 
   Capital and Equipment Outlay (as a % of TE) 0.005 (0.010) 0.004 (0.007) 0.010* (0.004) 
   Population (ln) 0.920 (2.365) -4.666 (3.056) 1.191 (0.676) 
   Population Density  0.049 (0.085) -0.089* (0.036) -0.030 (0.043) 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) -0.392 (1.698) 0.927 (1.546) 2.575 (1.926) 
   Constant -9.604 (31.085) 44.343 (36.155) -31.316 (20.523) 
Observations 1026 1096 7859 
R-Squared 0.1703 0.1266 0.0575 
Jurisdiction Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
levels. (2) CTL is Constitutional Tax Limit, OE is operating expenditures and debt interest, TL is total governmental fund labilities, ln is 
natural log, TR is total revenues and other sources, and HHI is Hirschman-Herfindahl Index.  
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Appendix 4.3 Months of General Fund Unrestricted Cash Regression Models with Fixed Effects and Robust Standard Errors (Fiscal 
Year End Between 1996 to 2016) 
Variables County Governments City Governments Village Governments 
   Excess Taxing Capacity (CTL Slack) -0.021** (0.007) -0.002 (0.006) -0.010 (0.006) 
   Post Tax Cap Implementation (Yes=1)      0.304 (0.886) -0.400 (0.875) -0.420 (1.057) 
   Voted to Override the Tax Cap (Yes=1) -0.141 (0.146) -0.847*** (0.220) -0.359* (0.146) 
   Internal Transfers Out (% of TL) 0.008 (0.007) 0.0001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.002) 
   Short-Term Borrowing Per Capita (ln) -0.062 (0.041) -0.064 (0.040) -0.101*** (0.027) 
   Coefficient of Variation of Revenue  3.147* (1.253) -1.880 (1.078) -0.277 (0.318) 
   Revenue Diversification (HHI) 2.553 (2.000) -1.805 (1.167) -0.101 (0.509) 
   Long-Term Debt Per Capita (ln) 0.141 (0.080) -0.355 (0.253) -0.120 (0.065) 
   Population (ln) 0.374 (2.346) -5.043 (3.079) 1.208 (0.717) 
   Population Growth Rate (Past 5 Years) -0.001 (0.001) 0.075** (0.027) -0.008 (0.009) 
   State Aid Revenue (as a % of TR)  -0.001 (0.021) 0.033 (0.019) -0.002 (0.008) 
   Per Capita Personal Income (County level) (ln) -0.231 (1.624) 1.107 (1.493) 2.955 (1.932) 
   Constant -3.641 (30.351) 46.312 (36.439) -34.423 (20.956) 
Observations 1025 1096 7860 
R-Squared 0.1480 0.1093 0.0337 
Jurisdiction Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) 
levels. (2) CTL is Constitutional Tax Limit, OE is operating expenditures and debt interest, TL is total governmental fund labilities, ln is 
natural log, TR is total revenues and other sources, and HHI is Hirschman-Herfindahl Index.  
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